A Defence of Panpsychism (PhD Thesis) (original) (raw)
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Towards a new Philosophy of 'Panpsychism' - 'The Awareness Principle'
Introduction to a new, consistently monistic and immaterialist philosophy of consciousness, presented at the same time as a critique of traditional and essentially dualistic understandings of 'panpsychism' - which claim that consciousness is merely an innate 'property' or 'feature' of all things - rather than being constitutive of them and of all that is.
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2015
Physicalism has a problem: experience must derive from wholly physical things, but how can physical matter produce experience? An answer to this question may require a drastic change in the physicalist paradigm. Some propose Panpsychism as the best available response. Panpsychism contends that all physical matter has mental properties. To many such a notion is a sheer absurdity. Two mainstream responses may be more tolerable: Reductionism and Emergentism. Panpsychism is defensible only if these alternate approaches fail. This project lays out the logic of the panpsychist arguments against reductionism and emergentism, as well as stating an overall case for physicalist panpsychism. The apparent absurdity of panpsychism will be found trivial in comparison with the remaining difficulties for more traditional physicalist approaches. Panpsychism should therefore be considered a viable option on the mind-body problem. Despite outstanding difficulties with the view, it has considerable the...
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Panpsychism has reestablished itself as a legitimate stance on the mind-body problem. Yet, it remains unclear precisely what metaphysical commitments this view involves and where, exactly, it fits relative to the coordinates of the traditional space of positions regarding the metaphysics of mind. This paper is meant to contribute to an improved clarification of these issues. In particular, it is argued that while many panpsychists stress the continuity of their view with physicalism, or materalism, this association is misguided. When properly conceived, panpsychism (or at any rate Russellian panpsychism) is either a form of dualism or of idealism. Of these two, idealism is motivated as providing the most natural and compelling interpretation.
Scholars' Press, 2021
Panpsychism has emerged as a key component in attempts to solve the hard problem of consciousness which consists in explaining the existence of non-materialist subjective experiences in a world which mainstream science insists is made up of purely materialist elements. Although contemporary interpretations of panpsychism are, in the main, utilised in trying to solve problems of consciousness, the concept has a long history with diverse and widespread uses and applications. After examining aspects of this history, different versions of panpsychism – physicalist and idealist – are analysed and contrasted. In conclusion, a compatibilist unification is suggested in the form of conscious realism which posits the construction of reality through a network of interacting conscious agents. In conclusion, the principal implications for knowledge and understanding of this position are examined within the framework of Buddhist philosophy and practice.
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Beshara Magazine, 2020
A survey of the 'problem'. I outline why the problem is so recent and examine the range of solutions. Particular attention is given to Philip Goff's book 'Galileo's error'.
Grounding the Qualitative: A New Challenge for Panpsychism
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2021
This paper presents a novel challenge for the panpsychist solution to the problem of consciousness. It advances three main claims. First, that the problem of consciousness is really an instance of a more general problem: that of grounding the qualitative. Second, that we should want a general solution to this problem. Third, that panpsychism cannot provide it. I also suggest two further things: (1) that alternative kinds of Russellian monism may avoid the problem in ways panpsychists cannot, and (2) that a kind of neo-Aristotelian or ground-theoretical physicalism fares just as well here if not better.
Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism 2016
[1] Stoff ist Kraft (≈ being is energy). [2] Wesen ist Werden (≈ being is becoming). [3] Sein ist Sosein (≈ being is qualit(ativit)y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein (≈ being is mind). [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles, and there are also good reasons for favouring [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals about the fundamental nature of concrete reality. More strongly: unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favour panpsychism over all other substantive theories. This is not simply because panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view—given that the existence of conscious experience is certain, and that panpsychism doesn’t posit the existence of any kind of stuff other than conscious experience. A question arises as to why metaphysicians have posited the existence of something for which there is no evidence: non-experiential concrete reality—especially since physics is completely silent on the question of the intrinsic non-structural nature of reality.
Panpsychism: A Meta-View in the Philosophy of Mind [Organon F 31 (3) 2024]
Organon F 31(3), 2024
In this article, my aim is to present panpsychism as a meta-view in the philosophy of mind rather than as a position that can be juxtaposed with leading positions such as materialism and dualism. I argue here that proponents of some versions of dualism, dual-aspect theory, some non-standard forms of physicalism, or idealism may be guided by the assumptions of panpsychism as a meta-view. For ex-ample, the literature includes positions such as Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism, Strawson’s physicalist panpsychism, and Sprigge’s idealist panpsychism, along with Nagel’s remarks on dual-aspect theory. I argue that panpsychism, as a meta-view, provides a framework within which to analyze how these positions address the mind-body problem. Consequently, I conclude that the solution to the mind-body problem itself remains neutral toward these positions. Instead of focusing on the elaboration of these metaphysical positions, atten-tion should be directed toward the crucial issue for panpsychism: the combination problem.
Three Kinds of Arguments for Panpsychism
Acta Analytica, 2023
Panpsychism may be roughly defined as a view that at least some of the properties constituting the fundamental level of reality are mental or proto-mental. Despite its long history, it has been revived in recent discussions as a solution to the problems raised by the mind, especially to the so-called hard problem of consciousness. Contemporary panpsychism differs significantly from incarnations known from the history of philosophy mainly due to the fact that the former is often combined with so-called Russellian monism. According to Russellian monism, the intrinsic properties of physical things remain unknown. This encourages panpsychists to argue that those properties are in fact mental. In my paper, I examine the three most common arguments for panpsychism: the Continuity Argument, the Hegelian Argument, and the Agnostic Argument. I take a closer look at each of them to assess their advantages and weaknesses. As I point out, the way in which one argues implies the version of panpsychism one adopts. This turns out to be especially important with regard to the Hegelian Argument and the Agnostic Argument. Both can be combined with Russellian monism, resulting in Russellian panpsychism. However, I claim that the philosophical consequences of these arguments are different, so it is legitimate to distinguish two kinds of Russellian panpsychism. In conclusion, I hold that there are reasons to prefer panpsychism based on the Agnostic Argument, which is more promising, as it responds to some general problems of panpsychism.