The Status of Emotions in Gaston Bachelard’s Philosophy of Science (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Scientific Discovery of Emotions - A Turning Point in Philosophy
2016
ln Moral Tribes, Greene (2013) promotes the proposition that emotions are crucial for everyday decision making. The author thereby introduces subjectivity into the contemporaryphilosophical landscape, which is dominated by an analytic orientation and a need for objectivity. This perspective has philosophical and practical implications.
This essay introduces our call for an intertwined history-of-emotions/history-of-science perspective. We argue that the history of science can greatly extend the history of emotions by proffering science qua science as a new resource for the study of emotions. We present and read science, in its multiple diversities and locations, and in its variegated activities, products, theories, and emotions, as constitutive of the norms, experiences, expressions, and regimes of emotions. Reciprocally, we call for a new reading of science in terms of emotions as an analytical category. Assuming emotions are intelligible and culturally learned, we extend the notion of emotion to include a nonintentional and noncausal “emotional style,” which is inscribed into (and can reciprocally be generated by) technologies, disease entities, laboratory models, and scientific texts. Ultimately, we argue that emotional styles interrelate with broader emotional cultures and thus can contribute to and/or challenge grand historical narratives.
Philosophy and the Emotions ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SUPPLEMENT: 52 EDITED BY
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SUPPLEMENT: 52, 2003
Looking inside oneself for the springs of such passion might make a nice case of soul-searching, but is not necessarily the best means for advancing philosophical inquiry. The papers in this volume arise from an international symposium on emotions, and provide material for a continuing dialogue among researchers with different philosophical itineraries. Each essay addresses, in varying detail, the nature of emotions, their rationality, and their relation to value. Chapters I to VIII map the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the intricate relation between consciousness and the body. Chapters IX to XI analyse the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by powerful or persistent emotions. Chapters XII to XIV explore questions of normativity and value in making sense of emotions at a personal, ethical, and political level.
2014
The Editor's invitation to contribute to this volume appeared to license telling more than I know. Accordingly this essay will move quickly from an all too brief survey of what I know to raise some of the increasingly speculative questions that currently preoccupy me. I. What I know On second thought, there's nothing I'm that sure of. II. What I'd like to think I know. 1. Reconstructing Cognitivism. There has been much made in recent decades of the idea that emotions are "cognitive". The term is used in a confusing diversity of senses. Sometimes by 'cognition ' one means merely to insist that emotions are not "merely subjective " phenomena. But that is hardly helpful, since there are by my count at least a dozen different things one can mean by 'subjective ' (de Sousa 2002a). A more contentful thesis is that emotions are genuine representations not just of the inside world of the body but through that of the external world ...
Philosophical Aspects of Emotion
In this paper, I give readers an idea of what some scholars are interested in, what I found interesting, and what may be of future interest in the philosophy of emotion. I begin with a brief overview of the general topics of interests in the philosophy of emotion. I then discuss what I believe to be some of the most interesting topics in the contemporary discourse, including questions about how philosophy can inform the science of emotion, conceptions of the mind and the mind-body problem, concerns about perception, cognition, and emotion, along with questions about the place of 4E approaches and meta-semantic pluralist approaches in the embodied cognitive tradition. Finally, I discuss the emerging field of cultural evolution, the import of a dual-inheritance theory in this emerging field, and I propose a possible way to integrate the frameworks of dual-inheritance theory and meta-semantic pluralism to demonstrate at least one way in which the philosophy of emotion can contribute to...
Gaston Bachelard's Psychoanalysis of Reason and Its Practical Dimension
Er(r)go. Teoria–Literatura–Kultura // Er(r)go. Theory–Literature–Culture, 2024
The aim of the article is to analyze Gaston Bachelard's psychoanalysis of the scientific mind in its practical dimension. Inspired by Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis, Bachelard deployed his own method to analyze the scientific unconscious, populated by epistemological obstacles inhibiting scientific cognition. As this article seeks to demonstrate, Bachelard's psychoanalysis aims to purify, and thereby streamline the cognitive mind on two levels: individual and historical. Bachelard's methodological experiment, transferring psychoanalysis into the spheres of the theory of knowledge and philosophy of science, turns out to be, at the same time, an instance of the architecture of a scientific mind, a polemic with cognitive realism and empiricism, and a postulate of analytical therapy in the field of cognition.
[Review] S. Lepine, "La nature des émotions"
Dialectica, 2023
We are now in the age of affectivism (Dukes et al., 2021): while emotions have long been contrasted with cognition, they are now seen as a central element of our rational life. Samuel Lepine joins this paradigm, arguing that emotions are cognitive states, source of axiological knowledge, and even an essential component of values. Lepine’s original contribution consists of an extremely cautious and impressive interweaving of psychological and philosophical discussions of emotions as well as of values. We may take from La nature des émotions a set of entangled statements: (i) emotions are cognitive states distinguished by their evaluative nature; (ii) they are sui generis psychological modes that focus our attention and prepare our body for action; (iii) they are evaluative since we can ascribe a correspondence between the emotion and the value instantiated by the emotion’s intentional object (i.e., correctness conditions); (iv) the correctness and justification conditions of emotions partially depend on the background motivations on which every emotion is based, because (v) values depend on some non-evaluative properties of external objects as well as on the agents’ motivations. These different points fit together to form the most comprehensive introduction to emotions I’ve read since Deonna & Teroni’s The Emotions (2012). Let us examine how.