Diversification in the Internet Economy:The Role of For-Profit Mediators (original) (raw)

Diversification in the internet economy

ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2008

We investigate market forces that would lead to the emergence of new classes of players in the sponsored search market. We report a 3-fold diversification triggered by two inherent features of the sponsored search market, namely, capacity constraints and collusion-vulnerability of current mechanisms. In the first scenario, we present a comparative study of two models motivated by capacity constraints -one where the additional capacity is provided by for-profit agents (or, mediators), who compete for slots in the original auction, draw traffic, and run their own sub-auctions, and the other, where the additional capacity is provided by the auctioneer herself, by essentially acting as a mediator and running a single combined auction. This study was initiated by us in , where the mediator-based model was studied. In the present work, we study the auctioneer-based model and show that this single combinedauction model seems inferior to the mediator-based model in terms of revenue or efficiency guarantee due to added capacity. In the second scenario, we initiate a game theoretic study of current sponsored search auctions, involving incentive driven mediators who exploit the fact that these mechanisms are not collusion-resistant. In particular, we show that advertisers can improve their payoffs by using the services of the mediator compared to directly participating in the auction, and that the mediator can also obtain monetary benefit by managing the advertising burden of its advertisers, without violating incentive constraints from the advertisers who do not use its services. We also point out that the auctioneer can not do very much via mechanism design to avoid such for-profit mediation without losing badly in terms of revenue, and therefore, the mediators are likely to prevail. Thus, our analysis indicates that there are significant opportunities for diversification in the internet economy and we should expect it to continue to develop richer structure, with room for different types of agents and mechanisms to coexist.

Evolution of diversity and dominance of companies in online activity

PLOS ONE, 2021

Ever since the web began, the number of websites has been growing exponentially. These websites cover an ever-increasing range of online services that fill a variety of social and economic functions across a growing range of industries. Yet the networked nature of the web, combined with the economics of preferential attachment, increasing returns and global trade, suggest that over the long run a small number of competitive giants are likely to dominate each functional market segment, such as search, retail and social media. Here we perform a large scale longitudinal study to quantify the distribution of attention given in the online environment to competing organisations. In two large online social media datasets, containing more than 10 billion posts and spanning more than a decade, we tally the volume of external links posted towards the organisations’ main domain name as a proxy for the online attention they receive. We also use the Common Crawl dataset—which contains the linkag...

The dynamics of competition in the internet search engine market

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001

Search engines hold the key to helping consumers access the wealth of information on the web. In this paper I examine the evolution of and competition in the internet search engine market. The goal of my analysis is to examine whether early entrants benefit in the long-run from their first-mover position in internet markets. I find that while early entrants (Yahoo, Lycos, Excite, Infoseek, and Altavista) still have an advantage, the pure "brand effect" advantage has been declining over time. Yahoo has maintained its leadership position by providing a superior product. The success of a wave of recent new entrants suggests that entry barriers are still quite low in the internet search engine market. __________________________ I am grateful to Paul Geroski, Shane Greenstein, Jose Mata for many helpful suggestions and comments.

Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions

Computing Research Repository, 2007

One natural constraint in the sponsored search advertising framework arises from the fact that there is a limit on the number of available slots, especially for the popular keywords, and as a result, a significant pool of advertisers are left out. We study the emergence of diversification in the adword market triggered by such capacity constraints in the sense that new market mechanisms, as well as, new for-profit agents are likely to emerge to combat or to make profit from the opportunities created by shortages in ad-space inventory. We propose a model where the additional capacity is provided by for-profit agents (or, mediators), who compete for slots in the original auction, draw traffic, and run their own sub-auctions. The quality of the additional capacity provided by a mediator is measured by its fitness factor. We compute revenues and payoffs for all the different parties at a symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) when the mediator-based model is operated by a mechanism currently being used by Google and Yahoo!, and then compare these numbers with those obtained at a corresponding SNE for the same mechanism, but without any mediators involved in the auctions. Such calculations allow us to determine the value of the additional capacity. Our results show that the revenue of the auctioneer, as well as the social value (i.e. efficiency ), always increase when mediators are involved; moreover even the payoffs of all the bidders will increase if the mediator has a high enough fitness. Thus, our analysis indicates that there are significant opportunities for diversification in the internet economy and we should expect it to continue to develop richer structure, with room for different types of agents and mechanisms to coexist.

Systemic Concentration in Sponsored Search Markets

ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 2016

Keyword-based search engine advertising markets on the Internet, referred to as Sponsored Search Markets (SSMs), have reduced entry barriers to advertising for niche players. Known empirical research, though scant and emerging, suggests that while these markets provided niche firms with greater access, they do exhibit high levels of concentration—a phenomenon that warrants further study. This research, using agent-based simulation of SSM, investigates the role of “market rules” and “advertiser practices” in generating emergent click share heterogeneity among advertisers in an industry. SSMs often rank ads based on the click-through rate (CTR) that gives rise to reinforcing dynamics at an individual keyword level. In the presence of spillovers arising from advertisers’ practice of managing keyword bids with a cost cap operating on the keyword portfolio, these reinforcing dynamics can endogenously generate industry-level concentration. Analysis of counterfactual markets with different...

For-profit mediators in sponsored search advertising

Computing Research Repository, 2007

A mediator is a well-known construct in game theory, and is an entity that plays on behalf of some of the agents who choose to use its services, while the rest of the agents participate in the game directly. We initiate a game theoretic study of sponsored search auctions, such as those used by Google and Yahoo!, involving {\em incentive driven} mediators. We refer to such mediators as {\em for-profit} mediators, so as to distinguish them from mediators introduced in prior work, who have no monetary incentives, and are driven by the altruistic goal of implementing certain desired outcomes. We show that in our model, (i) players/advertisers can improve their payoffs by choosing to use the services of the mediator, compared to directly participating in the auction; (ii) the mediator can obtain monetary benefit by managing the advertising burden of its group of advertisers; and (iii) the payoffs of the mediator and the advertisers it plays for are compatible with the incentive constraints from the advertisers who do dot use its services. A simple intuition behind the above result comes from the observation that the mediator has more information about and more control over the bid profile than any individual advertiser, allowing her to reduce the payments made to the auctioneer, while still maintaining incentive constraints. Further, our results indicate that there are significant opportunities for diversification in the internet economy and we should expect it to continue to develop richer structure, with room for different types of agents to coexist.

Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation

Journal of Economic Theory

In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call "joint concavity." Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences.

Search, Design, and Market Structure

American Economic Review, 2012

The Internet has made consumer search easier, with consequences for competition, industry structure and product o¤erings. We explore these consequences in a rich but tractable model that allows for strategic design choices.

Market Dominance and Quality of Search Results in the Search Engine Market

We analyze a search engine market from a law and economics perspective and incorporate the choice of quality improving innovations by a search engine platform in a two-sided model of internet search engine. In the proposed framework we, first, discuss the legal issues the search engine market raises for antitrust policy through analysis of several types of abusive behavior by the dominant search engine. We also explore the possible consequences of monopolization of the search engine market for advertisers and users in the form of excessive pricing and deterioration of the quality of the search results. Second, in the technical analysis part we incorporate these considerations in the two-sided market model and analyze the rate of innovation, pricing, and quality choices by the dominant search engine. Our fi ndings show that a dominant monopoly platform results in higher prices and underinvestment in quality improving innovations by a search engine relative to the social optimum. More generally, we show that monopoly is sub-optimal both in terms of harm to advertisers in the form of excessive prices, harm to users in the form of reduction in quality of search results, as well as harm to the society in the form of lower innovation rates in the industry.