"Introduction: Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years after Dayton" (original) (raw)

Dayton Legacy – 25 Years of Building Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Review of International Affairs, 2020

A quarter of a century since peace was achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement represents an occasion to consider the scope of the agreement and make an assessment of the Dayton peace legacy 25 years after. This paper discusses the circumstances that postponed the final peace agreement in Bosnia and prolonged the war for three years, as well as the political environment that finally instigated successful negotiations finalized in reaching the Dayton Agreement. From the moment the agreement entered into force until today, it has been an object of various criticisms, which have often neglected the complex circumstances in which it was reached, as well as the importance of its crucial achievement-peace. The Dayton Agreement, which put an end to the civil war, can only be assessed to a limited extent, having in mind that a significant time distance is still required. In this paper, the scope of the agreement's legacy will be considered in relation to two basic functions: peacebuilding and state-building in Bosnia, whereas we assume that these two functions are highly conditioned, and therefore any assessment should be understood in the wider context including both dimensions.

Twenty Years After Dayton: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Still) Stable and Explosive

This paper examines how fragile Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is and whether it is indeed in danger of collapsing, as significant amount of academic literature often claims. The research finds that BiH is not in an immediate danger of collapse. BiH remains peaceful, despite the numerous challenges it faces. However, it comprises an alarming amount of causes of conflict that have been mitigated because both international actors and local elites benefit from the current status quo. Thus, BiH finds itself in a peaceful stalemate, which is likely to continue until a structural change occurs that triggers the outbreak of violent conflict.

Is Dayton Failing: Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement

In anticipation of the fourth anniversary on 21 November 1999 of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, this report presents a detailed analysis of the agreement and the future of the Bosnian peace process. The report assesses efforts to implement the agreement annex by annex, identifying obstacles to continued progress and setting out key choices facing international policymakers. A traditional peace treaty consists of a cease-fire and arms reduction and boundary demarcation agreements. Dayton went far beyond these goals to create a new state, comprised of two multi-ethnic entities. Dayton's aim was to not only stop the fighting, but to reverse ethnic cleansing and provide a blueprint for a unified country. Today Bosnia and Herzegovina has three de facto mono-ethnic entities, three separate armies, three separate police forces, and a national government that exists mostly on paper and operates at the mercy of the entities. Indicted war criminals remain at large and political power is concentrated largely in the hands of hard line nationalists determined to obstruct international efforts to advance the peace process. In many areas, local political leaders have joined forces with police and local extremists to prevent refugees from returning to their pre-war homes. The effect has been to cement wartime ethnic cleansing and maintain ethnic cleansers in power within mono-ethnic political frameworks. The few successes of Dayton – the Central Bank, a common currency, common license plates, state symbols and customs reforms – are superficial and were imposed by the international community. Indeed, the only unqualified success has been the four-year absence of armed conflict. A thorough examination of the Dayton Peace Accords, annex by annex, indicates that the ethnic cleansers are winning the battle to shape post-war Bosnia. All in all, significant portions of Dayton remain unimplemented. In spite of the High Representative's recent energetic and long-awaited actions on refugee returns, it is too early to state whether or not they will translate into actual implementation. Local authorities continue to demand donor aid in return for partial co-operation. Dayton’s fragile and limited achievements to date could now be threatened as donor aid starts to fall. The inability of donors to hold out the promise of aid could cause local leaders to be even more non-compliant than now. The severe economic downturn and negative GDP growth that a reduction in aid will cause can only aggravate social unrest. Pensions are in arrears, and estimates of unemployment range from 39 percent in the Federation to 50 percent in Republika Srpska. Social discontent has already burst into the open, with demonstrators regularly blocking highways and buildings. Ominously, in the past, many local politicians have channelled this unrest into nationalism. The current policies for implementing Dayton are flawed, due to the refusal of the NATO-led international force (SFOR) to fulfil its mandate and act as an implementing agent, despite clear authorisation to do so under the terms of the agreement. In addition, two out of the three ethnic groups actively oppose Dayton, and are prepared to wait until such a time as the international community withdraws and the agreement can be laid to rest. Unless a way can be found to break the current deadlock, the agreement’s only major success – peace – will be increasingly at risk. While peace was a worthy and admirable goal, it was the promise of implementation of certain key principles and the creation of a unified state that persuaded the Bosniaks in particular to sign the agreement in 1995. Unlike the Serbs and Croats, they demand a higher level of implementation of all the Dayton annexes throughout all three ethnic areas. The failure of current policies to ensure complete implementation could yet trigger renewed fighting, particularly as the international community starts to withdraw. As the 1998 Madrid Implementation Council noted, “Bosnia and Herzegovina’s structure remains fragile. Without the scaffolding of international support, it would collapse”. The international community must now examine seriously its options for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future. These policy options include: 1. Pulling out immediately; 2. Maintaining the present approach; 3. Rewriting the Dayton Peace Accords; 4. Enforcing Dayton more robustly; 5. Creating an international protectorate for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community must decide if Dayton is worth salvaging, or whether a complete pullout is warranted, as isolationist forces in some countries urge. If the international community decides to pull out, it must be prepared for the very real possibility that the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks will attempt to achieve their unrealised war aims through violence. All the hard-won progress of the last four years will be lost. If the international community chooses this option, it must decide if it is willing to pay the social, political, economic, and human costs associated with a renewed war in the Balkans, as well as the implications for broader pan-Balkan and European stability. If, on the other hand, the international community wishes to remain engaged in Bosnia, it must choose one of the remaining options, realising that some could also lead to renewed fighting. The International Crisis Group does not believe that Option Two – maintaining the present approach – provides a viable basis for long-term peace in Bosnia. Option Three, while risking renewed fighting, could also lead to a positive reinterpretation of the political realities in place and lead to a lasting peace. Options Four and Five, while requiring a more focused long-term international presence, would lock in the gains made to date and create an environment conducive to the development of an international exit strategy, and the emergence of Bosnia as a self-sustaining economic and political unit. Option Four would require a more robust approach within the Dayton framework, both by SFOR and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), as well as more targeted approaches to aid. Option Five, while unpopular abroad, is very popular in Bosnia, and would enable the international community to correct some of Dayton's mistakes. Sarajevo, 28 October, 1999

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years after Dayton: Complexity Born of Paradoxes

International Peacekeeping, 2015

This paper will start with an analysis of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and assess to what extent it focused on peace-building, state-reconstruction and democratization. It will provide an overview of major peace-building, state-reconstruction and democratization initiatives by international and local actors in postwar Bosnia. Following the often-presented argument that "Dayton is a good peace agreement but a bad blueprint for a democratic state," the paper will ask if the Dayton Peace Agreement has failed in the consolidation of Bosnian statehood and the democratization of the country. In order to do this, an in-depth analysis of the current situation in terms of state consolidation and democratization will be given. The main argument of the paper demonstrates that while the Dayton Agreement had some inherent weaknesses, actions by local elites and international state-builders also explain some of the current issues of the Bosnian state.

Dayton at twenty: towards new politics in Bosnia- Herzegovina

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2015

The Dayton Agreement continues to be mentioned as a potential model by Western politicians and pundits for various conflicts and sectarian violence around the globe, most recently for Syria, Ukraine and Iraq. Indeed, the Dayton Agreement is rightly associated by Bosnians and foreigners alike with the end of war and the absence of renewed armed conflict. However, for most people in BiH it is also associated with ushering in a political-economic order of inequality and dispossession, not only of the means of dignified livelihood, but of a future and the agentive capacities to shape that future. For this reason, most long-time observers caution against seeing BiH as a 'success story,' or at least recognizing it as one with a morbid after-life. The articles in this collection make clear that negotiations for peace between warring parties may not be the best conditions under which to design a system to secure freedom and prosperity. Indeed, they caution us to draw sharp distinctions between peace accords and social contracts.