Wage bargaining and induced technical change in a linear economy: Model and application to the US (1963–2003) (original) (raw)

Dynamic wage bargaining and labour market fluctuations: the role of productivity shocks

SN Business & Economics, 2021

In this paper, we explore the way in which different bargaining settings affect labour market fluctuations by means of an analytical apparatus that has never been used for this purpose. Specifically, modelling wage negotiations as a problem of stochastic optimal control, we analyze how productivity disturbances shape the dynamics of output, employment, and wages by focusing on the way in which firms’ technology and workers’ preferences interact with the adjustment rules of employment underlying the bargaining process. With a quadratic production function and risk averse workers, we show that wage negotiation outcomes whose employment adjustments go in the direction of the labour demand of the firms match the cyclical behaviour of the involved variables but fail to replicate the observed wage rigidity. By contrast, we show that wage bargaining outcomes whose employment adjustments target the contract curve of two negotiating parties are also able to deliver a strong degree of wage st...

Matching, Bargaining, and Wage Setting in an Evolutionary Model of Labor Market and Output Dynamics

Advances in Complex Systems, 2004

In this paper, we present an agent-based, evolutionary, model of output-and labormarket dynamics. Firms produce a homogeneous, perishable good under constant returns to scale using labor only. Labor productivities are firm-specific and change stochastically due to technical progress. The key feature of the model resides in an explicit microfoundation of the processes of: (i) matching between firms and workers, (ii) job search, (iii) wage setting, (iv) endogenous formation of aggregate demand, and (v) endogenous price formation. Moreover, we allow for a competitive process entailing selection of firms on the basis of their revealed competitiveness. Simulations show that the model is able to robustly reproduce Beveridge, Wage and Okun curves under quite broad behavioral and institutional settings. The system generates endogenously an Okun coefficient greater than one even if individual firms employ production functions exhibiting constant returns to labor. Monte Carlo simulations also indicate that statistically detectable shifts in Okun and Beveridge curves emerge as the result of changes in institutional, behavioral, and technological parameters. Finally, the model generates sharp predictions about how system parameters affect aggregate performance (i.e. average GDP growth) and its volatility.

Technical Change and a Falling Wage Share if Profits are Maintained

Metroeconomica, 1999

In the framework of a multi-sectoral and ®xed-coef®cients Leontief model with capital stock matrix B, the paper addresses the issue of the impact of technical change on income distribution. Comparing two steady-state positions, it is shown that with cost-reducing, capital-using and (uniformly) labour-saving technical change the equilibrium rate of pro®t will fall, if it is the aggregate wage share which remains ®xed, not the absolute level of the real wage. Conversely, the wage share falls if the pro®t rate does not change. The reactions are ambiguous if, instead of the coef®cients of the matrix B, the coef®cients of the input±output matrix A increase.

Wage Divergence and Asymmetries in Unemployment in a Model with Biased Technical Change

1999

In this article we present a model with two levels of skills and two classes of goods, one produced with a technology requiring high skills, the other produced with a technology that can be operated by both low and high skilled workers. In this model skill biased technical change causes a drop in the demand for low skilled workers. The model, however, generates two distinct labour market regimes. In one regime we show skill biased technical change causes wage divergence between skilled and unskilled workers. In the alternative regime a reallocation of labour prevents such wage responses. Introducing labour market institutions through a bargaining process endogenises labour supply. This leads to three possible labour market regimes and shows that skill biased technical change always causes wage divergence but wage responses are moderated by higher unemployment of low skilled workers.

Wage Bargaining and Capital Accumulation: A Dynamic Version of the Monopoly Union Model

In this paper, I explore the relationship between wage bargaining and capital accumulation by developing a differential game in which a monopolistic union sets the wage of its members by taking as given the optimal employment strategy of a representative firm and the way in which capital is evaluated over time. Under the assumption that investment amounts to a constant share of produced output, I show that a meaningful open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium requires the union to be more patient than the firm. Moreover, relying on some numerical simulations, I show that although adjustments towards the steady-state equilibrium occur through damped oscillations, after an initial period of decline the model predicts a stable union wage premium.

Labour markets, bargaining and innovation

European Economic Review, 1998

Much of the recent empirical work on the impact of unions on R&D is based on a theoretical model which predicts that (i) unions have a negative impact on R&D; (ii) under some circumstances an increase in union strength can make both firms and unions worse off. We survey a more recent theoretical literature which takes account of the fact that R&D is often undertaken for strategic reasons by firms that are in competition with one another. We show that in this framework the prevailing theoretical paradigm may be overturned. Thus when firms and unions can enter into long-term bargains then an increase in union strength will increase (decrease) R&D spending if successful innovation causes employment to rise (respectively fall). However, when R&D falls then this increase in union strength can cause both firms and unions to be better off. When firms and unions engage in short-term bargaining then an increase in union bargaining strength will cause R&D to fall when bargaining is over wages alone. However, when bargaining takes place over wages and employment, then, if unions care a lot about employment, the relationship between union strength and R&D is inverse U-shaped. 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Labor Supply, Biased Technological Change and Economic Growth

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

We consider a model of factor saving innovations and study the effects of exogenous changes in labor supply. In a biased innovations setting, as economies accumulate capital, labor becomes relatively scarce and expensive. As a consequence, incentives for labor saving and capital using innovations appear. By the same token, exogenous changes in labor supply affect factor prices. In general, a reduction in labor supply decreases current output and generates incentives for labor saving innovations. Therefore, the effect that a change in the supply of labor has on factor prices is mitigated and, depending on the initial conditions, it may be contrasted by the effect of the technological bias. Finally, the movements of the factor prices affect the saving decisions and consequently the dynamics of economic growth. We explore the consequences of an exogenous decrease in labor supply in two different settings: a homogenous agents model with infinite horizon and an overlapping generations model. JEL Classification: O11, 031, J20, J31.