Where Are (Mind-Independent) Facts? (original) (raw)
2003
What are there in the world? Against the traditional Aristotelian conception of ontology, according to which the world is the totality of objects, Wittgenstein characterizes the world as the totality of facts. But what is the ontological status of facts? Especially, are facts mind-independent entities? Metaphysical factual realists (hereafter, MF-realists) think so. It is the burden of my paper to argue that facts are not mind-independent entities and therefore MF-realism is false.
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