Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of our Believing (original) (raw)
Related papers
Wittgenstein on the Chain of Reasons (in: Witt. Stud.)
Wittgenstein-Studien, 2016
In this paper, I examine Wittgenstein’s conception of reason and rationality through the lens of his conception of reasons. Central in this context, I argue, is the image of the chain, which informs not only his methodology in the form of the chain-method, but also his conception of reasons as linking up immediately, like the links of a chain. I first provide a general sketch of what reasons are on Wittgenstein’s view, arguing that giving reasons consists in making thought and action intelligible by delineating reasoning routes; that something is a reason not in virtue of some intrinsic property, but in virtue of its role; and that citing something as a reason characterises it in terms of the rational relations it stands in according to context-dependent norms. I then argue that on Wittgenstein’s view, we misconceive chains of reasons if we think of them on the model of chains of causes. Chains of reasons are necessarily finite, because they are anchored in and held in place by our reason-giving practices, and it is in virtue of their finitude that chains of reasons can guide, justify and explain. I argue that this liberates us from the expectation that one should be able to give reasons for everything, but that it limits the reach of reasons by tying them to particular reasoning-practices that they cannot themselves justify. I end by comparing and reconciling Wittgenstein’s dichotomy between chains of reasons and chains of causes with seemingly competing construals of the dichotomy, and I clarify its relation to the dichotomy between explanation and justification.
On Wittgenstein’s Response to Scepticism: The Opening of On Certainty
2005
Does Wittgenstein’s On Certainty point to a sustained treatment of philosophical problems about knowledge and justification of the kind that Philosophical Investigations supplies for matters of mind, language and their relation to the world? Some of the reasons for pessimism are systematic. Casting about for why Moore’s pronouncements about the external world and his knowledge thereof, as well as sceptical doubts concerning them, are prone to strike him at one time as nonsense, at another as perfectly intelligible, Wittgenstein acknowledges that ‘it is…difficult to find the beginning. Or better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning’ (OC 471). A little earlier, struggling with the idea that ‘propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts’ (OC 401), he dismisses this way of talking as ‘thoroughly bad’ (OC 402) and complains, ‘I cannot yet say the thing I really want to say’ (OC 400).
Wittgenstein and the Duty to Believe
Topoi 41 (5), 2022
It is generally assumed that hinge-commitments are deprived of an epistemically normative structure, and yet, that although groundless, the acceptance of Wittgensteinian certainties is still rational. The problem comes from the intellectualist view of hinge-approvals which many recent proposals advance-one that falls short of the necessities and impossibilities pertaining to what would be the right description of how it is like to approve of hinges. I will raise the Newman-inspired worry as how to cash the abstract acceptance of principles of enquiry into real assent, as well as the question about how to extend normativity all the way back to foundations. It is my aim here to argue that ethical normativity is the only kind of normativity capable to ground the rationality of hinges. In defence of this, I will draw some consequences from Ernest Sosa's claim that hinges about the external world are logically related to the cogito.
Wittgenstein on the Chain of Reasons
Wittgenstein-Studien, 2016
In this paper,¹ I examine Wittgenstein’s conception of reason and rationality through the lens of his conception of reasons. Central in this context, I argue, is the image of the chain, which informs not only his methodology in the form of the chain-method, but also his conception of reasons as linking up immediately, like the links of a chain. I first provide a general sketch of what reasons are on Wittgenstein’s view, arguing that giving reasons consists in making thought and action intelligible by delineating reasoning routes; that something is a reason not in virtue of some intrinsic property, but in virtue of its role; and that citing something as a reason characterises it in terms of the rational relations it stands in according to context-dependent norms. I then argue that on Wittgenstein’s view,we misconceive chains of reasons if we think of them on the model of chains of causes. Chains of reasons are necessarily finite, because they are anchored in and held in place by our ...
The Tension in Wittgenstein's Diagnosis of Scepticism
Dialectica, 2005
I argue that Wittgenstein's rejection of scepticism in On Certainty rests on the view that epistemic concepts such as 'doubt,' 'knowledge,' 'justification,' and so on, cannot be intelligibly applied to the common sense propositions that traditional sceptical arguments appear to undermine. I detect two strands in On Certainty in support of this view. I attempt to show tha t neither of these strands adequately establishes the thesis, and that they point to a tension in Wittgenstein's treatment of scepticism. I argue that the first strand is dogmatic, but accords with the constraints of Wittgenstein's method, while the second strand avoids the dogmatism of the first at the cost of violating these constraints.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Although Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally more known for his works on logic and on the nature of language, but throughout his philosophical journey he reflected extensively also on epistemic notions such as knowledge, belief, doubt, and certainty. This interest is more evident in his final notebook, published posthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth OC), where he offers a sustained and, at least apparently, fragmentary treatment of epistemological issues. Given the ambiguity and obscurity of this work, written under the direct influence of G. E. Moore’s A Defense of Commonsense (1925, henceforth DCS) and Proof of an External World (1939, henceforth PEW), in the recent literature on the subject, we can find a number of competing interpretations of OC; at first, this article presents the uncontentious aspects of Wittgenstein’s views on skepticism, that is, his criticisms against Moore’s use of the expression “to know” and his reflections on the artificial nature of the skeptical challenge. Then it introduces the elusive concept of “hinges,” central to Wittgenstein’s epistemology and his views on skepticism; and it offers an overview of the dominant “Wittgenstein-inspired” anti-skeptical strategies along with the main objections raised against these proposals. Finally, it briefly sketches the recent applications of Wittgenstein’s epistemology in the contemporary debate on skepticism.
Wittgenstein: Faith and Reason
Kai Nielsen introduced a philosophical account of religion that he called Wittgensteinian Fideism, which he argued could be derived from the writings of several Wittgensteinian philosophers. He defined Wittgensteinian Fideism as a philosophical description of religious forms of life where religious discourse amounts to a self-sufficient, internally coherent language game that is not open to criticism from other modes of discourses, such as the sciences, and he criticized it in particular for disallowing the criticism of the seeming irrationality and incoherence of religious discourse (1967). D.Z. Philips, among others, argued that Nielsen's Wittgensteinian Fideism was not Wittgensteinian at all, for according to Philips, Wittgenstein's account of religious discourse allowed for external criticism. He did not, however, conclude that therefore one can criticize religious discourse for its alleged irrationalities. He acknowledged that there was a "fideistic" element to be found in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion, but he denied the disparagement, the intellectual sin of not using reason, that came with the charges of fideism. I align mostly with Philips's side on the issue, on whether or not the rationality and coherence of religious discourse can be criticized, on whether or not Wittgenstein puts forward a fideistic understanding of religion, and on whether or not that would be a bad thing. My answers to the first and third questions are yes and no, respectively, and I plan to dissolve the second. I hold that the language game of religion is one that does not employ reason as it is used within scientific or empirical matters, but also that this characteristic of religious beliefs does not justify the claim that reason does not apply in religious discourses.