SARS in Healthcare Facilities, Toronto and Taiwan (original) (raw)

Identification and containment of an outbreak of SARS in a community hospital

CMAJ : Canadian Medical Association journal = journal de l'Association medicale canadienne, 2003

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is continuing to spread around the world. All hospitals must be prepared to care for patients with SARS. Thus, it is important to understand the transmission of this disease in hospitals and to evaluate methods for its containment in health care institutions. We describe how we cared for the first 2 patients with SARS admitted to our 419-bed community hospital in Richmond Hill, Ont., and the response to a SARS outbreak within our institution. We collected clinical and epidemiological data about patients and health care workers at our institution who during a 13-day period had a potential unprotected exposure to 2 patients whose signs and symptoms were subsequently identified as meeting the case definition for probable SARS. The index case at our hospital was a patient who was transferred to our intensive care unit (ICU) from a referral hospital on Mar. 16, 2003, where he had been in close proximity to the son of the individual with the first ...

Hospital Preparedness and SARS

On May 23, 2003, Toronto experienced the second phase of a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Ninety cases were confirmed, and >620 potential cases were managed. More than 9,000 persons had contact with confirmed or potential case-patients; many required quarantine. The main hospital involved during the second outbreak was North York General Hospital. We review this hospital's response to, and management of, this outbreak, including such factors as building preparation and engineering, personnel, departmental workload, policies and documentation, infection control, personal protective equipment, training and education, public health, management and administration, follow-up of SARS patients, and psychological and psychosocial management and research. We also make recommendations for other institutions to prepare for future outbreaks, regardless of their origin.

SARS in Hospital Emergency Room

Thirty-one cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred after exposure in the emergency room at the National Taiwan University Hospital. The index patient was linked to an outbreak at a nearby municipal hospital. Three clusters were identified over a 3-week period. The first cluster (5 patients) and the second cluster (14 patients) occurred among patients, family members, and nursing aids. The third cluster (12 patients) occurred exclusively among healthcare workers. Six healthcare workers had close contact with SARS patients. Six others, with different working patterns, indicated that they did not have contact with a SARS patient. Environmental surveys found 9 of 119 samples of inanimate objects to be positive for SARS coronavirus RNA. These observations indicate that although transmission by direct contact with known SARS patients was responsible for most cases, environmental contamination with the SARS coronavirus may have lead to infection among healthcare workers without documented contact with known hospitalized SARS patients.

Infection control for SARS in a tertiary paediatric centre in Hong Kong

Journal of Hospital Infection, 2004

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an emerging infectious disease. After the appearance of an index patient in Hong Kong in February 2003, SARS outbreaks occurred rapidly in hospitals and spread to the community. The aim of this retrospective study is to evaluate the effectiveness of a triage policy and risk-stratified infection control measures in preventing nosocomial SARS infection among paediatric healthcare workers (HCWs) at the Prince of Wales Hospital, a general hospital to which children with SARS are referred in Hong Kong. The acute paediatric wards were stratified into three areas: (1) ultra high-risk area, (2) high-risk area and (3) moderate-risk area according to different risk levels of nosocomial SARS transmission. The implementation of different levels of infection control precautions was guided by this risk stratification strategy. Between 13 March and 23 June, 38 patients with probable and suspected SARS, 90 patients with non-SARS pneumonia, and 510 patients without pneumonia were admitted into our unit. All probable SARS cases were isolated in negative-pressure rooms. Twenty-six HCWs worked in the ultra high-risk area caring for SARS patients and 88 HCWs managed non-SARS patients in other ward areas. None of the HCWs developed clinical features suggestive of SARS. In addition, there was no nosocomial spread of SARS-associated coronavirus to other patients or visitors during this period. In conclusion, stringent infection control precautions, appropriate triage and prompt isolation of potential SARS patients may have contributed to a lack of nosocomial spread and HCW acquisition of SARS in our unit.

SARS Surveillance During Emergency Public Health Response

medscape.com

In response to the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the United States established national surveillance using a sensitive case definition incorporating clinical, epidemiologic, and laboratory criteria. Of 1,460 unexplained respiratory illnesses reported by state and local health departments to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from March 17 to July 30, 2003, a total of 398 (27%) met clinical and epidemiologic SARS case criteria. Of these, 72 (18%) were probable cases with radiographic evidence of pneumonia. Eight (2%) were laboratory-confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infections, 206 (52%) were SARS-CoV negative, and 184 (46%) had undetermined SARS-CoV status because of missing convalescent-phase serum specimens. Thirty-one percent (124/398) of case-patients were hospitalized; none died. Travel was the most common epidemiologic link (329/398, 83%), and mainland China was the affected area most commonly visited. One case of possible household transmission was reported, and no laboratory-confirmed infections occurred among healthcare workers. Successes and limitations of this emergency surveillance can guide preparations for future outbreaks of SARS or respiratory diseases of unknown etiology.