The Embodied Reminder of Death: Physical Pain / Idealistic Studies 45:2 (original) (raw)
Related papers
Painfulness, Suffering, and Consciousness (penultimate draft)
The Philosophy of Suffering, eds. D. Bain, M. Brady and J. Corns, 2019
The popular view on which unpleasant pain consists of two dissociable components, and on which there may be pains that wholly lack affect, is the product of a theoretical deference to consciousness. The same is true of the thesis that suffering is exclusively a conscious phenomenon. Pain researchers defer to consciousness, but in my view they do not properly heed its message regarding pain, painfulness, and suffering. I will argue that consciousness actually gives us a double-edged message about these phenomena. Introspection reveals pain and painfulness to be essentially kinds of qualia, or qualitative character, (§1)—a thesis I defend from the ‘heterogeneity problem’ (§2). But introspection also prompts a conception of pain and painfulness on which these are capable in principle of unconscious existence (§3, §5). This implies, in turn, that suffering may well occur unconsciously (§§4-5), something I argue for in part by criticising rival models of suffering (§4). Taking consciousness seriously as an epistemic source for the natures of pain, painfulness, and suffering, thus has the surprising result that consciousness is removed from the metaphysics of pain, painfulness, and suffering.
On Pain, Its Stratification, and Its Alleged Indefinability
Gestalt Theory, 2017
This paper develops a phenomenological approach of pain, which highlights the main presuppositions that underlie pain research undertaken both in the natural and in the socio-historical sciences. My argument is composed of four steps: 1) only if pain is a stratified experience can it become a legitimate theme in both natural and socio-historical sciences; 2) the phenomenological method is supremely well suited to disclose the different strata of pain experience; 3) the phenomenological account here offered identifies three fundamental levels that make up the texture of pain experience: pain can be conceived as a pre-reflective experience, or as an object of affective reflection, or as an object of cognitive reflection; 4) such a stratified account clarifies how pain can be a subject matter in the natural and socio-historical sciences. Arguably, the natural and socio-historical sciences address pain at different levels of its manifestation. While the natural sciences address pain as an object of cognitive reflection, socio-historical sciences first and foremost deal with pain as a pre-reflective experience and as an object of affective reflection.
The subject’s relationship with pain and its impact on identity and existence
2012
What is pain, what does it mean that the subject has a relationship with it, and how does this affect his identity and existence? My definition of pain is derived from that proposed by scientists such as Melzack and Wall, and Freud. Pain is a dynamic, multilayered, diverse collection of experiences which impact and influence the subject throughout life. Pain is a kind of conglomerate of past, traumatic, neurobiological, psychological and emotional imprints-pain as in suffering or being in pain. The aim of this thesis is to argue that it is not pain, as such, but the relationship of the subject to (his/her) pain which is most significant to his/her processes of life. In examining the combination of two theories of pain, namely, Freud's psychosexual theory of development and Melzack's theory of the Neuromatrix, my thesis endeavours to evidence my theory by using case study methodology. The similarities in the theories which are a hundred years apart have sparked my interest to propose that there is the distinct possibility for the existence of what I have named a Psychomatrix-patterns of pain (loss-abandonment, grief, rejection, desire) imprinted from infancy within an innate matrix that are specifically translated by their own 'psychological and emotional neural loops' and therefore, similar to the neuromatrix concept. As pain is triggered these 'loops' become more ingrained as information is analysed and coded to create a continuous (subjective) experience of suffering or being in pain. This is also true for positive emotions, such as love and joy, however I suggest that pain is the primary, and most significant emotion that needs to be understood in order to understand the others which are triggered by the same neuralpsychological and physicalpathways as incidental emotions of the quality of existence. A vast spectrum of (on-going) research has identified the impact of cultural, religious, social and political factors on pain and pain management. I suggest that all of these figure in the conglomerate. Using a psychoanalytical frame of reference this is a theoretical and conceptual thesis. My final conclusion is that pain becomes an object that compels the subject to respond accordingly and consequently, from birth to death, defining his/her identity and existence.
Series in Continental Thought (Ohio University Press), 2020
The Phenomenology of Pain is the first book-length investigation of its topic to appear in English. Groundbreaking, systematic, and illuminating, it opens a dialogue between phenomenology and such disciplines as cognitive science and cultural anthropology to argue that science alone cannot clarify the nature of pain experience without incorporating a phenomenological approach. Building on this premise, it develops a novel conception of pain grounded in phenomenological principles: pain is an aversive bodily feeling with a distinct experiential quality, which can only be given in original first-hand experience, either as a feeling-sensation or as an emotion. The book crystallizes the fundamental methodological principles that underlie phenomenological research. On the basis of those principles, it offers a phenomenological clarification of the fundamental structures of pain experience and contests the common conflation of phenomenology with introspectionism. It analyzes numerous pain dissociation syndromes, brings into focus the de-personalizing and re-personalizing nature of chronic pain experience, and demonstrates what role somatization and psychologization play in pain experience. In the process, it advances Husserlian phenomenology in a direction that is not explicitly worked out in Husserl’s own writings.
A tapestry of pain: review of 'A Philosophy of Pain'
The Berlin Review of Books, 2012
Review of A.J. Vetlesen, 'A Philosophy of Pain'. London: Reaktion Books, 2009. Veltesen offers an eclectic study of pain, mixing philosophical and cultural analysis. I divide his chapters roughly into three overlapping parts. These make sense of pain as an isolating experience, a shared aspect of the human condition, and a cultural phenomenon. Part I probes the pain which results from torture, chronic illness, and psychological trauma. Through these, Vetlesen provides a conceptual analysis of how pain changes our normal connections to the world, including to other humans. Part II is a phenomenological description of how pain is experienced. From it, he draws existentialist conclusions about our responsibility and vulnerability in the world. Part III develops a model of how pain circulates within society and how culture transforms this pain. He uses it to interpret two aspects of western culture: its violence and valorisation of choice. The published version of this article is available at: http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/phiccf
The Philosophy of Pain - Introduction
Forthcoming in The Philosophy of Pain, edited by D. Bain, M. Brady, and J. Corns. London: Routledge
Over recent decades, pain has received increasing attention as – with ever greater sophistication and rigour – theorists have tried to answer the deep and difficult questions it poses. What is pain’s nature? What is its point? In what sense is it bad? The papers collected in this volume are a contribution to that effort ...
Gestalt Theory, 2017
Summary This paper develops a phenomenological approach to the concept of pain, which highlights the main presuppositions that underlie pain research undertaken both in the natural and in the sociohistorical sciences. My argument is composed of four steps: (1) only if pain is a stratified experience can it become a legitimate theme in both natural and sociohistorical sciences; (2) the phenomenological method is supremely well suited to disclose the different strata of pain experience; (3) the phenomenological account offered here identifies three fundamental levels that make up the texture of pain experience: pain can be conceived as a prereflective experience, as an object of affective reflection, or as an object of cognitive reflection; and (4) such a stratified account clarifies how pain can be a subject matter in the natural and sociohistorical sciences. Arguably, the natural and sociohistorical sciences address pain at different levels of its manifestation. While the natural sc...