Reading Hans Blumenberg’s Work on Myth (original) (raw)

Blumenberg on bringing myth to an end

Blumenberg on bringing myth to an end, 2023

This paper offers an account of Hans Blumenberg's unique approach to myth. §1 shows that Blumenberg's thought on myth, like his thought on metaphor, has been widely misconstrued. §2 argues that Blumenberg's account of myth should be seen as part of the discussion of non-conceptuality. It explains that Blumenberg, invoking conceptuality's epistemic limitations, challenges modern philosophy's denigration of non-conceptuality. Blumenberg argues that conceptuality should not be understood in terms of mathematicalscientific rationality, but more broadly, and claims that myth and metaphor are themselves conceptual. When conceptuality is understood broadly, what is taken to be quintessentially nonconceptual can be seen to be conceptual. §3 examines Blumenberg's nuanced characterization of myth, focusing on the key notions of 'work on myth' and 'work of myth', and showing that the corresponding distinction between structure and function is insufficient to define myth. §4 explores 'significance' (Bedeutsamkeit), the additional concept needed to fully characterize myth. 'Significance' comes to light in the encounter between myth and myth's deployment in subjective life experiences. Whether there can be an end to myth is discussed in §5. Cartesian rationalism and German Idealism were touted as bringing myth to an end, but Blumenberg contends that myth's functional role in human life precludes its elimination.

"Hans Blumenberg on the Rigorism of Truth and the Strangeness of the Past"

Thesis Eleven, 2021

In this paper I discuss Hans Blumenberg's The Rigorism of Truth, a short polemic that criticizes Freud and Hannah Arendt for placing (what he considers) a misplaced faith in the liberatory potential of rational truth in moments of historical disaster. The secondary literature suggests that this piece exhibits either all the signs of a late, Romantic capitulation to the 'need' for myth, or Blumenberg's failure to recognize his own faith and debts to the 'mythology' of reason's emancipatory hopes. My argument hinges on the claim that these readings put undue emphasis on the philosophical anthropology component of Blumenberg's work. Instead, I offer a new reading of the essay, in keeping with an alternative reading of his theory of myth. The essay transforms, then, from a polemic regarding the need for myth, into a nuanced description of the ways in which we can overestimate our capacity to overcome it.

Scientific Explanation and Metaphorical Practice Blumenberg's Theory of Unconceptuarity

Preface The history of philosophy often has been described from the perspective of 'rationality'. As the most popular slogan 'From Mythos to Logos' represents, which is the typical view of enlightenment philosopher 1 , the realm of Mythos has been evaluated as an irrational dimension in the history of philosophy. With such a historical perspective, not only myth, but also technology, rhetoric, and metaphor, in opposition to teoria, does not have entered it. However, we can question as following; is it legitimate to conceive philosophy as just only a rational activity? Is there any irrational dimension in the philosophical activities? And, in the first place, whether is the distinction between rational and irrational appropriate to evaluate philosophy itself? Hans Blumenberg(1920-1996), who is an attractive, however esoteric philosopher in PostWar German thought, would give answers to these questions. It is suggestive to examine his research program "metapholology" because he touched on the problem of 'From Mythos to Logos' historical view and criticized the assumption that logos overcame mythos. Despite using the distinction between rational and irrational, he used the words "concept (Begriff)" and "unconcept (Unbegriff)", so then presented his historical view as following; Die Eigenart und Geschichte der philosophischen Aussage bedingen, daß >Terminologie< hier einen umfassenderen Sinn hat als in anderen Disziplinen......Die Philosophie, die es immer wieder mit dem Unbegriffenen und Vorbegriffenen aufzunehmen hat, stößt dabei auch auf die Artikulationsmittel des Unbegreifens und Vorbegreifens......Die Vorstellung, der philosophische Logos habe den vorphilosophischen Mythos >überwunden<, hat uns die Sicht auf den Umfang der philosophischen Terminologie verengt; neben dem Begriff im strengen Sinne, der durch Definition und erfüllte Anschauung aufgewogen wird, gibt es ein weites Feld mythischer Transformationen, den Umkreis metaphysischer Konjekturen, die sich in einer vielgestaltigen Metaphorik 1 Concerning the enlightenment story about myth, and its relationship to human sciences, see, Angus Nicholls, Myth and Human beings Sciences, Hans Blumenberg's Theory of Myth, Routledge, 2015, pp. 41-44.

Mythological Hermeneutics of Hans Blumenberg

According to Hans Blumenberg, myth is a complex and multi-faceted subject that cannot be easily defined within the constraints of any one discipline. Rather, it exists in the "intermediate realm" between disciplines and can only be understood through an interdisciplinary approach. Even so, Blumenberg argues that myth has not yet been fully explored or utilized in this way, and that only by doing so can we truly understand the concept and its many nuances. In other words, the definition of myth and its inherent ambiguity cannot be determined at the outset of an interdisciplinary investigation, but must be arrived at through the course of such an investigation. 1 Our lack of a clear and distinct concept of myth makes Blumenberg suspicious of those mythologies that claim to have such a concept and try to explain it solely based on the methodology of their discipline. These disciplines have provided their practitioners with the tools and language necessary to define and understand relevant phenomena, but Blumenberg questions their ability to adequately explain myth without a more comprehensive understanding of the concept. Blumenberg believes that if one were to remove myth from the domain of these disciplines, one would risk engaging in a discourse that is casual, unmethodical, and therefore incompetent. However, this language of incompetence, which is not 1 "Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Wirkungspotential des Mythos" in Hans Blumenberg and Anselm Haverkamp. .

Introduction: Hans Blumenberg at 101

New German Critique, 2022

The philosopher Hans Blumenberg (1920-96) must count among the most prolific thinkers of postwar Germany. He also remains one of its most enigmatic figures and one of the last to enjoy the "transatlantic theory transfer" in which New German Critique has engaged over the last half century. 1 Compared with the reception of other members of what one could call "German theory" in America-Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, the Frankfurt School, or even Niklas Luhmann and Friedrich Kittler-Blumenberg's has gathered momentum only slowly. This special issue aims to contribute to its acceleration and place Blumenberg's insights into dialogue with contemporary discourses. While the erudition displayed in Blumenberg's weighty tomes and dense essays may stagger the reader, the breadth of their topics is equally astounding, as is apparent from a survey of his most famous works. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (1966/1975-76, trans. 1983) not only defends modernity against its detractors from both right and left but also offers a functionalist theory of historical reception. The Genesis of the Copernican World (1975, trans. 1987) recounts the momentous loss of earth's-and humanity's-central position in the cosmos and reflects on its philosophical consequences. Work on Myth (1979, trans. 1985), beyond developing a theory of the persistence that mythical 1. See Huyssen and Rabinbach, "Transatlantic Theory Transfer."