'Forever Temporary': Migrants in Calais, Then and Now (original) (raw)

‘Forever Temporary’: Migrants in Calais, Then and Now

JESSICA REINISCH

Abstract

This article examines two recent refugee crises in Calais: the debate around the Sangatte refugee camp, which was resolved in 2002, and the ongoing problems in Calais, which have been escalating since autumn 2014. It asks: why are these events repeating? What, if anything, has changed between 2002 and now? It points to a number of new developments since 2002, such as growing numbers of migrants worldwide, and a changing European political and legal landscape. But it also argues that a number of the same factors that led to the Sangatte crisis are still shaping events and responses in Calais today. They concern the persistent shortcomings of European states’ immigration controls, the failures to reach Europe-wide and international agreements on migration, and the inadequacies of international bodies such as the UNHCR and the 1951 Refugee Convention which it upholds.

Keywords: refugees, migrants, 1951 Convention, UNHCR, immigration, Cold War

There are estimated to be 3,000 migrants staying in a makeshift camp in the town of Calais. (They are variously referred to as refugees, asylum seekers, uprooted people or people on the move; let’s stick here with the term migrant as the most accurate shorthand.) In the context of the 59.5 million displaced persons worldwide, or the 340,000 migrants detected at the EU’s borders between January and July 2015, or the 90,000 who entered Italy and the 49,550 who arrived in Greece so far this year, these 3,000 bodies are a mere drop in the ocean. 1{ }^{1} Nonetheless, the Calais ‘Jungle’ hit a nerve. In Britain, the frenzied press coverage of the early summer (no doubt partly fuelled by a shortage of other news during the summer slump) brought out a number of more or less predictable responses: political scaremongering, complaints about transport disruption, more general accusations and blame, soul-searching and humanitarian concerns.

Many reports talk of an unprecedented crisis, record numbers of migrants and escalating threats. Yet it was only 13 years ago that a similarly sized camp-then in Sangatte, just west of Calais-was caught in a news storm. How much has changed between then and now?

Take 1: 1999-2002

In 1999, the French Red Cross opened a centre for migrants in Sangatte, close to the Euro Tunnel entrance in Coquelles, to deal with a growing problem of migrants attempting to use the Tunnel to enter Britain. (‘Refugee’ is a legal status, awarded to only some migrants.) The numbers given of individuals staying at the Sangatte camp fluctuated wildly. In October 2002, UNHCR and Red Cross figures estimated a ‘roving population’ of over 3,000, but an average of 1,700 people in camp at any one time, and around 100 new arrivals daily. 2{ }^{2}

Riots broke out in 2001, as groups of migrants stormed fences and attempted to enter the Tunnel. Eurotunnel, the private operator, twice initiated legal proceedings to close the centre; both were turned down. French and British local authorities also repeatedly called for the closure of Sangatte. Others pointed out that a closure would not end the migrant crisis. In the words of the British Refugee Council, the centre was ‘the symptom, not the cause of the problem’; 3{ }^{3} it was set up as a humanitarian response to people already sleeping rough in the Calais area, and they would not disappear.

During 2002, a series of new security measures were put in place: a double fence was built, CCTV cameras were installed and more police instructed to patrol the area. After several years of mutual accusations and bickering, the British and French governments eventually reached a ‘burdensharing agreement’ to close the camp and move its inhabitants. As a result, the UK was to take around 1,000 Iraqi Kurds and 200 Afghans, while France took responsibility for the remaining 300 residents and other foreign nationals in the vicinity. In November 2002, the camp was closed to new arrivals, and it was formally closed by the end of the year.

Why did this take place from 1999 onwards? And why in Calais?

The timing is not coincidental. Just a decade after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and eight years after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, the year 1999 marked the end of a decade of radical global change. In the course of this decade, the world mapfrozen in the geopolitical decisions made over fifty years earlier-was fundamentally reshaped. Velvet revolutions across the Eastern bloc brought new, non-Communist governments to power. The civil wars in the former Yugoslavia brought genocide to European lands. The United States led and won a military campaign in Kuwait, its first major offensive since the Vietnam War. An important round of NATO enlargement brought a number of former Soviet bloc countries into its fold.

At the same time, integration in Europe accelerated with treaties signed at Maastricht in 1992, and Amsterdam in 1997. From March 1995, the Schengen Agreement let people of any nationality travel freely between seven countries, without any passport controls at the borders. A single market was created and the euro was introduced. Negotiations for EU membership began with ten central and eastern European countries.

The themes of the decade were integration and union, but also the disappearance of old certainties, and instead greater heterogeneity, military conflict and civil war. One product of both trends was a growing number of migrants and refugees, particularly from eastern and south-eastern European countries, and from parts of the Middle East and Africa now affected by new conflicts and
civil wars. Over 80 per cent of the Sangatte residents came from Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan. 4{ }^{4} Numbers of migrants sleeping in the streets of Calais and surrounding areas increased gradually during the late 1990s, until in 1999 the French government instructed the French Red Cross to open a warehouse to provide some shelter for them.

One answer to the second question (why in Calais?) follows on from the first (why in 1999?): Calais was now at the border between a country that had signed up to Schengen, and one that had not. The Channel Tunnel was opened in 1994 and made it faster and easier to travel from France to Britain, but only for those with the right passports and visas.

It was also at the border of two different interpretations of the term ‘refugee’. Both France and the UK are signatories of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which is (along with its 1967 amendment) the key legal document defining who a refugee is and the kind of legal, political and social protection refugees are entitled to: refugees are persons outside their country of origin because of a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ at home, and to whom the host state is obliged to offer asylum. Refugees cannot be sent back to a place where their lives or freedom would be at risk from persecution. However, the Convention did not define ‘persecution’ itself, and the different signatories have interpreted this differently. In France, only individuals at risk from persecution executed by governments are considered to fall within the remits of the Convention, whereas in the UK persecution can also be the result of non-governmental agents and forces. This is an important distinction. Reporting in 2001, the UK Refugee Council argued that the situation in Calais would continue for as long as ‘real or perceived differences between the French and British asylum systems’ remained. As a result, ‘the UK and its EU partners [had] to renew their efforts to create a common system in which refugees are treated in the same way, wherever they happen to apply for asylum’. 5{ }^{5}

Take 2: 2014/15

Migrants never stopped heading for Calais, even after Sangatte was closed and moved

out of the spotlight. Between 2002 and 2014, there were regular warnings that the situation was deteriorating. The debate yoyoed between the two positions of giving migrants shelter and basic care, and making conditions inhospitable so as to deter new arrivals.

In January 2009, France’s immigration minister Eric Besson said that a new Sangatte was ‘out of the question’. A camp 'would create a powerful invitation to new networks of illegal immigration. It would not be a solution to the humanitarian problem. It would be an extra humanitarian problem. 6{ }^{6} In September 2009, after talks with Besson, UK Home Secretary Alan Johnson welcomed the impending closure of a yet another makeshift camp that had appeared: 'The measures that we have put in place are not only there to prevent illegal immigration but also to stop people-trafficking", he said. 'We are working with the French, not only to strengthen our shared border but that of Europe as a whole. 7{ }^{7} More recently, a March 2015 report by the Home Affairs Committee, chaired by Keith Vaz, reiterated that accommodation 'cannot provide a long term answer to the problem. Such camps have the potential, like Sangatte, to make a bad situation worse. 8{ }^{8}

Others pointed out that an absence of shelter has not acted as a deterrent, and was unlikely to do so. Squats and makeshift shelters were periodically erected and torn down again. The Mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart, regularly, and again in spring 2015, called for the creation of a ‘night welcome centre’ for migrants near the port: suggestions that this would act as a magnet for more arrivals were nonsensical, since ‘they are already here’. 9{ }^{9} In practice, local volunteer groups continued to provide hot meals and dry clothes for the migrants throughout this period. UNHCR established a permanent presence in Calais from July 2009 to July 2012. During these years the organisation provided legal aid and counselling to potential asylum seekers, and provided publicity about migrants’ conditions. A UNHCR film from 2010 portrayed this underworld of migrants sleeping rough on the streets of Calais and their regular encounters with French police. 10{ }^{10} In July 2012, it handed over responsibilities to the French non-governmental organisation

France terre d’asile. Two years later, UNHCR staff were back in Calais.

In the intermittent media reports, the migrant shantytown became known as ‘the Jungle’. In September 2014, it once again attracted international attention when a ferry bound for the UK was stormed by 235 migrants. In October, reports that around 2,500 migrants were sleeping rough in Calais and disturbing local peace created a new panic. The Jules Ferry day centre was opened in January 2015 to provide migrants with water, electricity and basic meals. Pas-de-Calais Council also operated a ‘night shelter’ for vulnerable people sleeping out in the freezing winter cold-in practice, little more than a community hall with cardboard boxes as bedding.

Numbers of registered migrants seem to have remained steady around the 2,500 to 3,000 mark since the start of the year, in spite of panicked predictions of great surges. Once again, British and French officials have been squabbling over who is responsible for sorting out the mess. Once again, official responses to date have focused on new rounds of additional security measures: new detection technology, more dog searches, more security guards, an extended ‘secure zone’, a joint UK-French fund for security, and plans for the creation of a new UKFrance ‘control and command centre’. So far, there has been no talk of ‘burden sharing’. In late August 2015, with the end of the school holidays in sight and British protests about transport disruptions becoming less vocal, the Calais migrants seem to have dropped off the media radar once again, and focus has shifted to the crises in Greece, Austria and Hungary-but they are still there.

What has changed?

A number of things have changed since the official resolution of the first Calais crisis. Perhaps most importantly, overall numbers of migrants have increased, escaping more military conflicts, civil wars, unrest, financial crises and recession across the globe. Europe only takes in a small proportion of themover 86 per cent of them are accommodated by developing countries, according to UNHCR-but those numbers have grown.

At a UNHCR meeting in October 2014, Ban Ki-Moon pointed to unprecedented

numbers of people on the move. ‘Never before in United Nations history’, he said, 'have we had so many refugees, displaced people and asylum seekers. Never before has the United Nations been asked to reach so many with emergency food assistance and other life-saving support. 11{ }^{11} We should be wary of careless references to unprecedented crises, but in this case the statistics are on his side. The migrants in Calais continue to come primarily from countries affected by war or civil war; people from Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran make up the vast majority. Since there are now more people leaving these parts of the world, it is likely that the numbers trying to reach Europe will continue to increase.

The EU is now significantly larger than it was in 2002: eleven central and eastern European countries joined between 2004 and 2013. The EU is also much more fraught with internal divisions. The financial crash of 2008, followed by the years of recession, have exposed and exaggerated deep economic and political inequalities between member countries. These disparities, too, have resulted in greater numbers of migrants, many of them following the welltrodden route from poverty and uncertainty in the south and east to prosperity and relative stability in the north and west.

The EU’s legislative and administrative landscape has grown a lot more complex since 2002. Under the umbrella of the Common European Asylum System, some work has been done to ‘harmonise’ the EU member states’ legal frameworks and minimum standards for giving asylum, but with mixed results. There is now a common definition to measures of migration, which allows for the collection of better, Europe-wide statistics. And the so-called Dublin Regulation, a mechanism for handling asylum claims within the EU, which came into force in 1997, has been revised. The original agreement specified that the responsibility for processing asylum applications usually lay with those EU countries where migrants first arrived. This method was propped up by the Eurodac system, the European fingerprint database for identifying asylum seekers, which was supposed to track migrants’ paths across the continent. This could only ever work if a migrant’s country of entry
into the EU could be proven. However, as the numbers of migrants at Europe’s southern borders increased, those countries became reluctant to take fingerprints, because it would make them responsible for more and more asylum applications.

In the aftermath of Sangatte and under pressure from southern European countries who saw themselves unfairly burdened, Dublin II presented criteria for making it possible for a member state to assume responsibility for a migrant even if it wasn’t the first point of entry. For example, the criteria of family reunion could now mean that an asylum seeker with family connections in another EU country could be sent there, even if that wasn’t the original entry point into the EU. A so-called ‘Sangatte clause’ also absolved states from responsibility for asylum seekers who subsequently managed to move on into another state and stay undetected for a certain period of time.

Frontex, a new EU agency charged with keeping European borders secure and controlling illegal immigration, human trafficking and terrorist infiltration, began its work in 2005. It produces annual risk analysis reports on the various threats to European border security, but its operational record is patchy. It took over the Italian Navy’s ‘Mare Nostrum’ search and rescue operation for migrants at sea, but its replacement, known as Operation Triton, was focused primarily on deterring migrants from crossing, rather than on saving lives. Triton has rightly been criticised. Following the deaths of at least 300 migrants in the Mediterranean in February 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, called Triton ‘a woefully inadequate replacement for Italy’s Mare Nostrum’. 12{ }^{12}

All in all, these revisions since 2002 tinkered with the system, but ultimately failed to find a way of sharing the responsibilities for migrants across the EU states. This has proved to be particularly detrimental at times of recession and growing economic differences between member states. It is no coincidence that situations in both Sangatte and the 2014/15 Jungle escalated during periods when British and French unemployment and levels of economic activity diverged, which fuelled perceived and actual differences in the prospects of newcomers.

Differences in the treatment of asylum seekers from the same country of origin by different EU countries have also persisted, and no agreement has yet been found to iron them out.

The political climate in Europe has also changed since 2002. In recent years, electorates across the continent have brought right-wing governments to power and replaced social-democratic or centre-left governments or coalitions. Far-right protest parties standing on anti-immigration platforms have significantly increased their share of the votes across the continent. However, national European immigration policies have not changed significantly as a result. Much more significant for immigration into Europe has been the collapse of governance in North Africa, which created new routes for both people-traffickers and migrants taking their own chances to reach Europe.

The more things change

In fact, in many ways the 1999-2002 Calais crisis was not all that different from what is going on now. Calais still lies at the Schengen border and between different asylum and migration systems. The debate between proponents of a humanitarian idea to help vulnerable people in need, and those who argue that perceived and actual harshness in their treatment can deter new arrivals, is as paralysing as it has always been. In practice, initiatives of the former have continued to coexist with the political face-saving rhetoric of the latter. But humanitarian work is dependent on financial resources, and if such work is not a political priority any resources will be in dire short supply. The waxing and waning of media interest has also not been conducive for the development of a consistent, long-term approach.

Another unchanging feature in this story is the failure of European states to control immigration. In the most basic interpretation, states control who is and isn’t a citizen, make them pay taxes, safeguard public peace and control borders and incomers. However, throughout twentieth and twentyfirst century Europe, states have consistently failed to live up to their stated policies about immigration. As historian David Feldman points out for the UK, the persistent feature
here is not so much the fact of immigration, but rather the gap between proclaimed policy and actual immigration numbers. 13{ }^{13} Indeed, David Cameron came to power with a promise to reduce net migration into Britain to below 100,000 people a year. Yet in May 2015, official statistics revealed that net migration had in fact risen to 318,000 people, and by late August to 330,000-the highest yet under his watch. No new announcements of new immigration bills can disguise the fact that his and his predecessors’ immigration policy has failed, and perhaps was never intended to succeed. Exit checks were only re-introduced in Britain in April 2015, after they had been abolished by the Conservatives in 1994 on 40 per cent of people leaving the country, and the remaining 60 per cent by Labour in 1998. With the refusal to introduce ID cards, the options for tracking migrants within the UK remain strictly limited. If one of the most prosperous countries in the EU, which welcomed far fewer asylum seekers per week than many other European countries, cannot secure its borders, then it remains highly unlikely that Greece, Italy or Hungary, with far fewer political and economic resources and far higher rates of new entries, will manage any better.

The fundamental failure to find Europeanwide agreements on immigration also seem a permanent feature. ‘This is a Europeanwide problem which needs a solution at European level’, Donna Covey, chief executive of the Refugee Council, said in September 2009. 14{ }^{14} The rhetoric of a need for collective responsibility has not changed, but neither has the evident failure to bring this about. ‘Forever temporary’ is what the French Red Cross officer Pierre Kremer called migrant arrangements in Sangatte. ‘The harmonization of their immigration policies does not seem to be high on the list of political priorities of the 15 countries of the European Union’, he wrote in 2002. 15{ }^{15} The lack of European agreements and financial support on immigration was as true then as it is for the twenty-eight-member EU today. Recent failures to support and control struggling member economies have made the EU weaker than ever, and the prospect of a real European-wide shared approach to immigration seem ever more unattainable. As a result, it is possible for a system to

exist, where Border Force-the British law enforcement command charged with securing the British border-reportedly intercepted 30,180 attempts to enter the UK through Calais and Coquelles from March 2014 to the end of January 2015, many of them attempted by the same people, who were caught by Border Force, handed over to France, released by the French authorities, only to try their luck again, and again, and again. 16{ }^{16}

Finally, there is the striking continuity of the failure of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Convention has many problems, not least its vague terms and criteria, and the failure to define exactly what persecution entails. Persecution as the main pillar of the refugee status was adopted in 1951 to privilege those migrants who were fleeing Communist regimes. One of the most important legacies of this today is that it enshrines a separation of so-called political refugees from economic migrants. This separation of political from economic factors, of ‘push’ from ‘pull’ factors-one set legitimate, the other ‘illegal’ - has been particularly problematic for migration since the end of the Cold War. Every political refugee is seeking a better life; and every economic migrant is fleeing a number of explicit or implicit threats or disasters. As a result, whether any particular country grants them asylum is often more a result of its political priorities than the ‘genuineness’ of the asylum seekers.

Even the European Commission’s 2008 Policy Plan on Asylum pointed to the inadequacy of the Convention: ‘an ever-growing percentage of applicants are granted subsidiary protection or other kinds of protection status based on national law, rather than refugee status according to the Geneva Convention. This is probably due to the fact that an increasing share of today’s conflicts and persecutions are not covered by the Convention.’ The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, agreed in 2010 that it has become increasingly difficult to sustain ‘the traditional distinction between refugees and migrants, and between voluntary and forced movements’. 17{ }^{17} In Calais this is true as well. The March 2015 Home Affairs Committee report observed that 'Many migrants in Calais appeared to want to come to the UK to work in what they believed to be an
unregulated job market. Yet the migrants we met in Calais were overwhelmingly from regions suffering from war, internal conflict and failure of the state, who would appear eligible to apply for asylum in Europe. 18{ }^{18}

The distinction between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ causes of migration has certainly not served those migrants who don’t straightforwardly fall within the ‘genuine’ category to be rewarded with asylum. But it has clearly often also not helped those who are fleeing persecution. For the thousands of daily arrivals from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq on the Greek island of Kos, or those waiting in Calais, their ability to prove their eligibility for asylum has not resulted in better treatment, at least in the short and medium term. The reality of blurred lines has made it possible for governments and national media to focus on the ‘illegal’, ‘bogus’ migrants as a way of dodging responsibilities altogether.

At the same time, the UNHCR, the UN agency charged with protecting and supporting refugees, has never seemed more impotent. It always had a limited mandate, with little institutional or financial autonomy, and the current events remind us that today it still usually is no more than a weak advocate of refugees’ rights. At Sangatte in 1999 and in the Calais Jungle today, UNHCR officers can only make appeals for urgent action, hope that governments can find solutions and counsel individual refugees in how to navigate asylum applications. This appealing and hoping is a long way from the global UNHCR campaign, launched in 2014, to end the causes of statelessness by the year 2024. 19{ }^{19} In practice it is unable to broker agreements between states, or to force them to make and adhere to supra-national agreements. The painful lesson, already learned years before the Second World War by bodies such the League of Nations and the Nansen Bureau, one of the UNHCR’s predecessors, is that without member nations’ political and financial commitments, they will remain impotent and powerless.

The problem is that the 1951 Convention and UNHCR were both created as compromises between competing interests, and at a rare point in time when the signatories shared a desire to create and uphold an international apparatus for dealing with migration and

migrants-albeit in such a closely circumscribed, limited and ideologically suitable form. Abandoning it today because of its flaws, at a time when there is little political will for any real global or European migration policy, would be unlikely to lead to a replacement with anything better. So we are stuck with a framework that is deeply flawed, because we can’t afford to be without one.

In the meantime, the day-to-day lot of the migrants themselves hasn’t changed either. Whether or not they succeed in their attempts to come to Europe is still determined by their luck, financial resources, family connections and ability to manoeuvre through the paper world of asylum and immigration policies. Many hundreds of thousands will continue to embark on dangerous and humiliating journeys in search of a better life, one without the daily threat of war, hunger, disease, or poverty, and many of them will continue to die in the process. A few of them might end up in Calais.

Notes

1 See UNHCR figures from 18 June 2015 http:// www.unhcr.org/558193896.html and Frontex data from 18 August 2015, http://frontex.eu-ropa.eu/news/number-of-migrants-in-one-mon th-above-100-000-for-first-time-89Mllo and 7 August 2015, http://frontex.europa.eu/news/ record-number-of-migrants-enter-greece-in-julydMt39y, widely reported in the media, e.g. L. Peter, ‘Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?’, BBC News, 19 August 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe24583286; A. Konstantinidis, ‘Ferry packed with Syrian refugees heads for Greek mainland’, Reuters, 19 August 2015, and http://www.reuters. com/article/2015/08/19/us-europe-migrants-greece-idUSKCN0QO1PL20150819 (all accessed 19 August 2015).
2 UNHCR, ‘Sangatte: UNHCR establishes permanent presence’, 18 October 2002, http:// www.unhcr.org/3dafe36e5.html (accessed 4 August 2015).
3 UK Refugee Council, ‘The situation at the Sangatte camp in France’, 7 September 2001, http:// www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/754\_ the_situation_at_the_sangatte_camp_in_france (accessed 4 August 2015).
4 Figures from UNHCR, ‘Sangatte: UNHCR establishes permanent presence’, 18 October

2002, http://www.unhcr.org/3dafe36e5.html (accessed 4 August 2015).
5 UK Refugee Council, ‘The situation at the Sangatte camp in France’, 7 September 2001, http:// www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/754\_ the_situation_at_the_sangatte_camp_in_france (accessed 4 August 2015).
6 For example, reported by BBC News, ‘French migrant camp re-examined’, 27 January 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7852621.stm (accessed 4 August 2015).
7 For example, reported by the Guardian, 22 September 2009, ‘French police clear the “jungle” migrant camp in Calais’, http://www. theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/22/french-police-jungle-calais (accessed 4 August 2015).
8 Home Affairs: First Special Report, The work of the Immigration Directorates Calais, 21 July 2015, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm 201516/cmselect/cmhaff/380/38002.htm (accessed 4 August 2015).
9 For example, reported in The Telegraph, 22 June 2015, ‘France must provoke “diplomatic incident” with UK over migrants, says Calais mayor’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ europe/france/11691628/France-must-provoke-diplomatic-incident-with-UK-over-migrants-says-Calais-mayor.html (accessed 4 August 2015).
10 UNHCR, ‘Out in the Cold in Calais’, 2010, http://unhcr.org/v-4b6844ec6 (accessed 4 August 2015).
11 UNHCR, ‘UN chief urges more action to tackle displacement’, http://www.unhcr.org.uk/ news-and-views/news-list/news-detail/article/ un-chief-urges-more-action-to-tackle-displacement-recalls-youth-on-the-run-in-wartime-korea.html, 2 October 2014 (accessed 4 August 2015).
12 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR calls for more robust search-and-rescue operation on Mediterranean’, 12 February 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/54dc 8dc59.html (accessed 4 August 2015).
13 D. Feldman, ‘Talking the Talk: Immigration Policy Since 1962’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 85, no. 3, 2014, pp. 348-50, and an extract published on LSE Blog, ‘Why immigration policy since 1962 has such a poor record of achievement’, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsand policy/talking-the-talk-immigration-policy-since1962/ (accessed 4 August 2015).
14 For example, reported by BBC News, 22 September 2009, ‘UK “won’t take Calais migrants”’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/ 8268113.stm (accessed 4 August 2015).
15 P. Kremer, ‘In action: Sangatte - a place of hope and despair’, The Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 2002, http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2002\_2/sangatte.html (accessed 4 August 2015).

16 Home Affairs: First Special Report, The work of the Immigration Directorates Calais, 21 July 2015, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm 201516/cmselect/cmhaff/380/38002.htm (accessed 4 August 2015).
17 UNHCR, ‘UN refugee chief uses Oxford University speech to call for international action on global refugee crisis’, 13 October 2010, http://www.unhcr.org.uk/news-and-vie
ws/uk-press-releases/unhcr-london-press-relea ses/un-refugee-chief-uses-oxford-university-spe ech-to-call-for-international-action-on-global-refu gee-crisis.html (accessed 4 August 2015).
18 Home Affairs: First Special Report, The work of the Immigration Directorates Calais.
19 UNHCR, ‘The campaign to end statelessness’, 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/53174c306\. html (accessed 4 August 2015).