Von Neumann Minds: Intentional Automata (original) (raw)
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Von Neumann Minds: A Toy Model of Meaning in a Natural World
Von Neumann Minds: A Toy Model of Meaning in a Natural World. In: Aguirre A., Foster B., Merali Z. (eds) Wandering Towards a Goal. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Cham, 2018
The question of meaning, or intentionality, is plagued by the homunculus fallacy: postulating an 'internal observer' appraising mental representations leads to an infinite regress of such observers. We exhibit the structure behind this problem, and propose a way to break it down, by drawing on work due to von Neumann. This allows to eliminate the dichotomy between a representation and its user, eliminating the infinite regress. We briefly comment on how the resulting model handles other problems for a naturalistic account of meaning, such as the problem of error and the frame problem.
The von Neumann self-reproducing architecture, genetic relativism and evolvability
2000
Abstract Within any suitable framework of primitive automaton components (CA or otherwise) the von Neumann architecture for self-reproduction can generally give rise to (an infinity of) infinite sets of self-reproducing automata. The automata within any single such set are characterised as sharing a particular “constructing” or “decoding” subsystem (a “general constructive automaton”).
Self-Reference, Self-Representation, and the Logic of Intentionality
Erkenntnis, 2021
Representationalist accounts of mental content face the threat of the homunculus fallacy. In collapsing the distinction between the conscious state and the conscious subject, self-representational accounts of consciousness possess the means to deal with this objection. We analyze a particular sort of self-representational theory, built on the work of John von Neumann on self-reproduction, using tools from mathematical logic. We provide an explicit theory of the emergence of referential beliefs by means of modal fixed points, grounded in intrinsic properties yielding the subjective aspects of experience. Furthermore, we study complications introduced by allowing for the modification of such symbolic content by environmental influences.
Von Neumann’s Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata: A Useful Framework for Biosemiotics
Biosemiotics, 2011
[Author's note: This paper has been substantially revised and superseded by Chapter Six in my book Behavior and Culture in One Dimension. https://1dimensional.com\] As interpreted by Pattee, von Neumann’s Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata has proved to be a useful tool for understanding some of the difficulties and paradoxes of molecular biosemiotics. But is its utility limited to molecular systems or is it more generally applicable within biosemiotics? One way of answering that question is to look at the Theory as a model for one particular high-level biosemiotic activity, human language. If the model is not useful for language, then it certainly cannot be generally useful to biosemiotics. Beginning with the Universal Turing Machine and continuing with von Neumann’s Theory and Pattee’s interpretation, the properties of universality, programmability, underspecification, complementarity of description/construction, and open-ended evolutionary potential are shown to be usefully applicable to language, thus opening a new line of inquiry in biosemiotics.
Going Amiss In Experimental Research, 2009
Proofreading or "editing" has been suggested in DNA replication . . . but a detailed description of its chemical kinetic basis is lacking. The problem is thus to find a simple quantitative model containing the essential features of proofreading scheme. . . . These circumstances allow the construction of a simple mechanism of "kinetic proofreading." 1 John J. Half a century ago, in January 1952, in a lecture delivered at the California Institute of Technology, John von Neumann envisaged the synthesis of reliable organisms from unreliable components. This was not a science-fiction talk, calling for imaginative creations in the spirit of Ridley Scott's Blade Runners. It was a carefully argued scientific paper in which von Neumann sought to prove the existence of a self-reproducing universal computer. The paper constitutes an important contribution to the consolidation of the theory of automata. Von Neumann did not conceive of cellular automata as mathematical objects for pure investigation; rather, he considered the new algorithm a means for treating in detail the problem of how to make machine reproducible. 2 The realization that cellular automata can demonstrate that "arbitrarily complicated mathematics could be performed within a system whose basic organization is thoroughly rudimentary," 3 is a testimony to the success of von Neumann's idea. Indeed, his construction shows that "a small set of local rules acting on a large repetitive array can result in a structure with very complex behavior. The von Neumann construction thus immediately suggests how an organ with behavior as complex as the brain's can be specified from limited genetic information." 4 To get the basic terms clear, cellular automata are "abstract dynamical systems that play a role in discrete mathematics comparable to that played by partial differential equations in the mathematics of the continuum." 5 These dynamical systems
2003
In this paper we argue that no forms of Turing test are either necessary or sufficient to establish if a machine is conscious or not. Furthermore, from a modeling point of view, the problem is that the Turing test does not really provide testable predictions. We believe that the model structure should explain the function (of consciousness). We argue that the cornerstone of any model on consciousness is to (partly) overcome the obstacle of the homunculus fallacy about the use of representations. In this contribution a possible solution is suggested, which makes use of reflexive architectures. The emerging computational constraints on the proposed architecture have lead to testable predictions on the dynamical behavior of the biological substrate. Interestingly, these predictions are in good agreement with recent experimental observations. * submitted to the Journal of Consciousness Studies
Intentionality and Foundations of Logic: a New Approach to Neurocomputation
Fuzzy Logic Systems Institute (FLSI) soft computing series, 2001
In this work we start from the idea that intentionality is the chief characteristic of intelligent behavior, both cognitive and deliberative. Investigating the ''originality of intelligent life'' from this standpoint means investigating ''intentional behavior'' in living organisms. In this work, we ask epistemological questions involved in making the intentional behavior the object of physical and mathematical inquiry. We show that the subjective component of intentionality can never become object of scientific inquiry, as related to self-consciousness. On the other hand, the inquiry on objective physical and logical components of intentional acts is central to scientific inquiry. Such inquiry concerns logical and semantic questions, like reference and truth of logical symbols constituted as such, as well as their relationship to the ''complexity'' of brain networking. These suggestions concern cognitive neuroscience and computability theory, so to constitute one of the most intriguing intellectual challenges of our age. Such metalogical inquiry suggests indeed some hypotheses about the amazing ''parallelism'', ''plasticity'' and ''storing capacity'' that mammalian and ever human brains might exhibit. Such properties, despite neurons are over five orders of magnitude slower than microchips, make biological neural nets much more efficient than artificial ones even in execution of simple cognitive and behavioral tasks.
Chapter 1 Intentionality and Foundations of Logic: a New Approach to Neurocomputation
2014
In this work we start from the idea that intentionality is the chief characteristic of intelligent beha-vior, both cognitive and deliberative. Investigating the ''originality of intelligent life' ' from this standpoint means investigating ''intentional behavior' ' in living organisms. In this work, we ask epistemological questions involved in making the intentional behavior the object of physical and mathematical inquiry. We show that the subjective component of intentionality can never become object of scientific inquiry, as related to self–consciousness. On the other hand, the inquiry on ob-jective physical and logical components of intentional acts is central to scientific inquiry. Such in-quiry concerns logical and semantic questions, like reference and truth of logical symbols consti-tuted as such, as well as their relationship to the ''complexity' ' of brain networking. These sugges-tions concern cognitive neuroscienc...
Conscious Representations: An Intractable Problem for the Computational Theory of Mind
Minds and Machines, 2011
Advocates of the computational theory of mind claim that the mind is a computer whose operations can be implemented by various computational systems. According to these philosophers, the mind is multiply realisable because-as they claim-thinking involves the manipulation of syntactically structured mental representations. Since syntactically structured representations can be made of different kinds of material while performing the same calculation, mental processes can also be implemented by different kinds of material. From this perspective, consciousness plays a minor role in mental activity. However, contemporary neuroscience provides experimental evidence suggesting that mental representations necessarily involve consciousness. Consciousness does not only enable individuals to become aware of their own thoughts, it also constantly changes the causal properties of these thoughts. In light of these empirical studies, mental representations appear to be intrinsically dependent on consciousness. This discovery represents an obstacle to any attempt to construct an artificial mind.