A Theory of Hostile Takeovers (original) (raw)
2000, SSRN Electronic Journal
In this paper, a consistent picture of the multifaceted mechanism of a hostile leveraged takeover is provided. The analysis points out two basic issues. The first is the financial problem caused by the leveraged acquisition, which calls for detailed strategic planning in order to ascertain the feasibility of the operation with respect to the capital structure of the target company.
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