On Feyerabend's version of ‘Mach's theory of research and its relation to Einstein’ (original) (raw)
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The paper aims to investigate some aspects of Ernst Mach’s epistemology in the light of the problem of human orientation in relation to the world (Weltorientierung), which is a main topic of Western philosophy since Kant. As will be argued, Mach has been concerned with that problem, insofar as he developed an original pragmatist epistemology. In order to support my argument, I firstly investigate whether Mach defended a nominalist or a realist account of knowledge and compare his view to those elaborated by other pragmatist thinkers, such as W. James, H. Vaihinger and H. Poincaré. Secondly, the question of what does it mean, for Mach, to orient ourselves in science is addressed. Finally, it will be argued that, although Mach tried to keep his epistemology restricted to a mere operational and economical account of science, that question involves the wider plane of practical philosophy.
Two Theories of Scientific Knowledge
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My aim in discussing two theories of scientific knowledge is to make a case for one being wrong and one being right. There would be little point in doing this if the wrong theory were not commonly accepted as the right one. I shall attempt to show, therefore, why the theory of scientific knowledge commonly taken to be correct is really mistaken, and why a theory often dismissed as mistaken is really correct. I adopt this approach as a means of focusing sharp attention on a dispute that, in my view, is of fundamental importance to the theory of knowledge. According to most philosophy textbooks, the two rival theories of scientific knowledge are associated with the names "rationalism" and "empiricism". These are not the alternatives I shall discuss, however. I shall assume that any acceptable or, today, even tempting theory of scientific knowledge must conform to the vague demands of empiricism. I say "vague demands of empiricism", because the essential spirit of empiricism-its critical, undogmatic charactermay be possessed by theories sharply opposed to the views actually held by traditional empiricists. For lack of better names, I shall provisionally dub the theories. I wish to discuss the "foundations" theory and the "no foundations" theory. The foundations theory views scientific knowledge as an organized structure resting on a foundation of basic certainty. The foundation is deemed necessary, because the substantive claims of a science are generally reached by a complicated
https://thesis-journal.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Hajdin-Abazi.pdf, 2019
Feyerabend generally is known most for his discovery on the helpfulness of breaking rules when they become a hindrance and for the legitimacy of the counter-inductive approach as a way to make fundamental changes in science. But his view about the decontamination of old theories and the implantation of new theories‘ conception deserves equal recognition. And, of course, his alternative of open instead of closed exchange is invaluable as epistemological contribution. All this together make Feyerabend‘s viewpoint very distinct, especially to understand the need of openness as a condition to make easy the scientific development. Those three aspects constitute the originality of Feyerabend‘s contribution in the philosophy of science, which will be the focus of this paper. These novelties, as it will be argued, fill respective aspects where previously there were shortcomings, which made possible to clarify epistemologically the understanding and explanation, according to the practice, how the development of science and the growth of knowledge were attained (and as a consequence how they usually go). The approach of the treatise pursues the historical context and the theoretical articulation of Feyerabend‘s view, including some critical reflections. Keywords: legitimacy of counter-rules, open exchange, (de)contamination of evidence, scientific development, growth of knowledge, Feyerabend
What is this thing called philosophy of science?
Metascience, 2000
A lan Chalmers' book has been the best introduction to philosophy of science since it appeared in 1976. It remains so in 1999 courtesy of this newly published third edition. Translated into fifteen languages, the book has been a major force worldwide for straight thinking about science, q21e book, reflecting its author's own intellectual biography, is especially valuable as a way of introducing graduates in science to its philosophy. Drawing liberally on examples from the history of science, it reveals the central philosophical and methodological issues, not as dry, 'merely academic' puzzles, but as exactly the things that a reflective practitioner ought to worry about. Chalmers writes in a clear, direct, entirely pretension-free style, taking-unusually for an introductory account-a clear stand on virtually every issue he raises, and never being afraid to say that he finds the motivation for some of the opposing positions incomprehensible. While some will object to this feature, the book, in my view, gains from its directness and vigour more than it loses from any lack of evenhandedness. The third edition contains a somewhat reworked version of the material from earlier editions on observation and experiment, induction, falsification, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. A substantially reworked version of the second edition material on "unrepresentative realism" now becomes an extended account of the ongoing realism/anti-realism debate (Chapter 15). The concession to Feyerabend-made slightly mutedly in edition two-that there is no single universal method for science is now highlighted and * The editor is very grateful to Peter Ansty for organising this excellent symposium.