Delusions and belief flexibility in psychosis (original) (raw)
Related papers
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 2012
Two reasoning biases, jumping to conclusions (JTC) and belief inflexibility, have been found to be associated with delusions. We examined these biases and their relationship with delusional conviction in a longitudinal cohort of people with schizophrenia-spectrum psychosis. We hypothesized that JTC, lack of belief flexibility, and delusional conviction would form distinct factors, and that JTC and lack of belief flexibility would predict less change in delusional conviction over time. Two hundred seventy-three patients with delusions were assessed over twelve months of a treatment trial . Forty-one percent of the sample had 100% conviction in their delusions, 50% showed a JTC bias, and 50%-75% showed a lack of belief flexibility. Delusional conviction, JTC, and belief flexibility formed distinct factors although conviction was negatively correlated with belief flexibility. Conviction declined slightly over the year in this established psychosis group, whereas the reasoning biases were stable. There was little evidence that reasoning predicted the slight decline in conviction. The degree to which people believe their delusions, their ability to think that they may be mistaken and to consider alternative explanations, and their hastiness in decision making are three distinct processes although belief flexibility and conviction are related. In this established psychosis sample, reasoning biases changed little in response to medication or psychological therapy. Required now is examination of these processes in psychosis groups where there is greater change in delusion conviction, as well as tests of the effects on delusions when these reasoning biases are specifically targeted.
Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs
Neuroethics
Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of many delusions is no different in kind from the irrationality that marks many non-pathological states typically treated as beliefs. She takes this to secure the doxastic status of those delusions. Bortolotti’s approach has many benefits. For example, it accounts for the fact that we can often make some sense of what deluded subjects are up to, and helps explain why some deluded subjects are helped by cognitive behavioral therapy. But there is an alternative approach that secures the same benefits as Bortolotti’s account while bringing additional benefits. The alternative approach treats both many delusions and many of the non-pathological states to which Bortolotti compares them as in-between states. Subjects in in-between states don’t fully believe the beliefs which it is sometimes convenient to ascribe to them. This alternative approach to belief and belief-ascription fits well with an independently attractive account of the varied purposes of our ordinary attitude ascriptions. It also makes it easier to make fine-grained distinctions between intentional attitudes of different kinds.
Cognitive factors associated with subclinical delusional ideation in the general population
Psychiatry Research, 2012
Cognitive biases have been found to be associated with delusions in schizophrenia and schizotypy. In the current study, we examined the relationship between subclinical delusional ideation, measured using the Peters Delusions Inventory, and cognitive biases including the bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), 'jumping to conclusions', and need for closure, evaluated using the computerized BADE program, in a sample of 117 healthy, non-psychiatric controls. Our results suggest that subclinical delusional ideation is associated with BADE, greater need for closure, a 'jumping to conclusions' response style, and a tendency to rate absurd and unlikely interpretations of an event as more plausible, which might be indicative of insufficient evidence integration or 'liberal acceptance'. These cognitive biases, which occur in a much milder fashion than seen in typical deluded patient samples, may nonetheless additively play a role in the development of delusional ideation, and suggest common pathways seen in healthy and psychiatric samples.
Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction
Psychiatry research, 2011
Emotional distress and reasoning biases are two factors known to contribute to delusions. As a step towards elucidating mechanisms underlying delusions, the main aim of this study was to evaluate a possible "jumping to new conclusions" reasoning bias in healthy people with delusional ideation and its association with emotions. We surveyed 80 healthy participants, measuring levels of depression, anxiety, cognitive error and delusional ideation. Participants completed two versions of the beads task to evaluate their reasoning style. Results showed that people with delusional ideation reached a conclusion after less information, as expected. Interestingly, they also tended to change their conclusions more often than people without delusional ideation and did so with greater conviction. Depression and cognitive errors were strong predictors of delusional ideation but not of reasoning style. We conclude that delusional ideation in non-psychotic individuals is independently predicted by depressive symptoms and by a high conviction in new conclusions.
The jumping to conclusions bias in delusions: Specificity and changeability
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 2010
There are indications that a jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) plays a role in the formation and maintenance of delusions and should be targeted in therapy. However, it is unclear whether (a) JTC is uniquely associated with delusions or simply an epiphenomenon of schizophrenia or impaired intellectual functioning and (b) it can be changed by varying task demands, motivational factors, or feedback. Seventy-one patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and either acute or remitted delusions and 68 healthy controls were included. Patients were assessed with self-and observer-rated symptom measures. All participants were assessed for intellectual ability and performed the classic beads task with a ratio of 80:20. They were then presented with task variations that involved increasing the difficulty of the ratio to 60:40, introducing a rule for which correct decisions were rewarded by monetary gains and false decisions led to financial losses, and providing feedback on the accuracy of the previous decisions. Participants with current delusional symptoms took fewer draws to decision (DTD) than did those in remission and healthy controls. DTD were associated with observer-rated delusions, but controlling for negative symptoms or intelligence rendered this association insignificant. DTD increased after the difficulty of the task increased and after feedback. The study demonstrated that JTC is linked to delusions but that this association is not unique. Patients with delusions are principally able to adapt their decisions to altered conditions but still decide relatively quickly even when decisions have negative consequences. These difficulties might stem in part from impaired intellectual functioning.
Are delusions beliefs? A qualitative examination of the doxastic features of delusions
There is extensive debate about whether delusions are best considered beliefs. This debate is seldom addressed by clinicians though it bears on how delusions are conceived, managed and treated. Little empirical work exists to address this issue. This study explored whether individuals with first hand experiences of delusions spoke about those ideas in ways that were consistent with their being beliefs. Seventeen individuals identified as experiencing, or having experienced, delusions were recruited for a semi-structured interview. Responses to the interview were read and coded by two raters in terms of criteria relevant to whether a mental state is a belief. The majority of delusions examined here were spoken about as though they were beliefs. Most participants believed other things that were consistent with the delusions, attempted to defend their delusions with evidence, had frequently acted on their delusions and provided reasons for holding them. However, there was some varia- tion in the extent to which this was the case. This study provides tentative support for the claim that some delusions are beliefs.
Jumping to conclusions and the continuum of delusional beliefs
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 2007
The present study examined the jumping to conclusions reasoning bias across the continuum of delusional ideation by investigating individuals with active delusions, delusion prone individuals, and non-delusion prone individuals. Neutral and highly self-referent probabilistic reasoning tasks were employed. Results indicated that individuals with delusions gathered significantly less information than delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on both the neutral and self-referent tasks, (po.001). Individuals with delusions made less accurate decisions than the delusion prone and nondelusion prone participants on both tasks (po.001), yet were more confident about their decisions than were delusion prone and non-delusion prone participants on the self-referent task (p ¼ .002). Those with delusions and those who were delusion prone reported higher confidence in their performance on the self-referent task than they did the neutral task (p ¼ .02), indicating that high self-reference impacted information processing for individuals in both of these groups. The results are discussed in relation to previous research in the area of probabilistic reasoning and delusions. r
Frontiers in Psychology, 2015
Metacognitive training (MCT) was developed to promote awareness of reasoning biases among patients with schizophrenia. While MCT has been translated into 31 languages, most MCT studies were conducted in Europe, including newer evidence recommending an individualized approach of delivery. As reasoning biases covered in MCT are separable processes and are associated with different symptoms, testing the effect of selected MCT modules would help to develop a targeted and costeffective intervention for specific symptoms and associated mechanisms. This study tested the efficacy of a four-session metacognitive training for delusions, MCTd (in Traditional Chinese with cultural adaptations, provided individually), as an adjunct to antipsychotics in reducing severity and conviction of delusions, jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias and belief inflexibility. Forty-four patients with delusions were randomized into the MCTd or the wait-list control condition. Patients on wait-list received the same MCTd after 4 weeks of treatment as usual (TAU). Assessment interviews took place before and after the treatment, and at 4-week follow-up. There was an additional baseline assessment for the controls. JTC and belief flexibility were measured by the beads tasks and the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale. Attendance rate of the MCTd was satisfactory (84.5%). Compared to TAU, there was a greater reduction in psychotic symptoms, delusional severity and conviction following MCTd. There was a large treatment effect size in improvement in belief flexibility. Improvement in reaction to hypothetical contradiction predicted treatment effect in positive symptoms and delusions. JTC bias was reduced following MCTd, although the treatment effect was not significantly larger than TAU. Our results support the use of process-based interventions that target psychological mechanisms underlying specific psychotic symptoms as adjuncts to more conventional approaches.
Delusions and Other Not Quite Beliefs
Neuroethics, 2012
Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of many delusions is no different in kind from the irrationality that marks many non-pathological states typically treated as beliefs. She takes this to secure the doxastic status of those delusions. Bortolotti’s approach has many benefits. For example, it accounts for the fact that we can often make some sense of what deluded subjects are up to, and helps explain why some deluded subjects are helped by cognitive behavioral therapy. But there is an alternative approach that secures the same benefits as Bortolotti’s account while bringing additional benefits. The alternative approach treats both many delusions and many of the non-pathological states to which Bortolotti compares them as in-between states. Subjects in in-between states don’t fully believe the beliefs which it is sometimes convenient to ascribe to them. This alternative approach to belief and belief-ascription fits well with an independently attractive account of the varied purposes of our ordinary attitude ascriptions. It also makes it easier to make fine-grained distinctions between intentional attitudes of different kinds.