Russian banking: a comeback of the state (original) (raw)

Government Banking in Russia: Magnitude and New Features

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

State-controlled banks are currently at the core of financial intermediation in Russia. This paper aims to assess the magnitude of government banking, reveal some of its special features and arrangements. We distinguish between directly-and indirectly state-controlled banks and construct a set of bank-level statistical data covering between 2000 and 2011. By January 2011 the market share of state-controlled banks reached almost 54 percent of all bank assets, putting Russia in the same league with China and India and widening the gap from typical European emerging markets. We show that direct state ownership is gradually substituted by indirect ownership and control. It tends to be organized in corporate pyramids that dilute public property, take control away from government bodies, and underpin managerial opportunism. Statecontrolled banks blur the borderline between commercial banking and development banking.

The role of state in the banking industry: Evidence from Russia

Desenvolvimento em Debate, 2015

The article examines the role of the state in the Russian banking industry. Statistical data illustrates the market share of public banks and its dynamics over the past 25 years. We show the impact of public banks on the lending to non-financial companies, and particularly longer-term lending. Empirical findings suggest that it terms of profitability and technical efficiency the core public banks are not necessarily worse than privately held institutions. Finally, the author compares the macro-level structure and the core institutions of the banking systems in China and Russia and suggests that these are typologically more similar than different.

Direct and indirect state ownership on banks in Russia

2010

This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks' total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (topmanagers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.

How big is the visible hand of the state in the Russian banking industry?

2009

This paper tackles state participation in the Russian financial sector. We take the case of the banking industry to suggest criteria for a more accurate definition of public sector boundaries and an assessment of the actual scale of state presence in the national banking market. The approach for the assessment of the extent of state participation is based on the analysis of the peculiarity of the Russian banking industry due to the high extent and institutional specificity of government intervention in the financial system. The results presented in this paper provide evidence that the existing channels of state influence over banks are not limited to equity ownership with governance and other methods of control being employed as well and prove the hypothesis about the presence of downward bias in official estimates of the existing scale of state penetration.

Twenty Five Years of Russian Banking System

International Studies, 2014

The purpose of this article is to assess the Russian banking system for the period 1991–2015. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia introduced economic reforms to move from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and banking reforms were part of it. During early years of transition, Russia suffered from negative growth rate: 1998 and 2008 crises. The entire Russian economy, including the banking system, got affected. Therefore, it is essential to know how the Russian banking system performed in these 25 years. The study found that the Russian banking system performance was not satisfactory until 1998–1999; from 2000 onwards, the system showed some signs of resilience. The Russian banking system is largely concentrated and dominated by state-owned banks with 58.4 per cent of share of the total banking assets and 57 per cent share of the total banking capital in comparison to foreign-owned and privately owned banks. Banks are largely concentrated in the regions...

Banking reform in Russia: problems and prospects

OECD Economics Working Paper No. 410, 2004

Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine Complete document available on OLIS in its original format ECO/WKP(2004)33 Unclassified English -Or. English ECO/WKP(2004)33 2

Evolution of the Banking System in the Russian Context: An Institutional View

Journal of Economic Issues, 2013

We undertook an institutional analysis of commercial banks in Russia. After the failed experiment with private financial intermediation in the 1990s, Russia migrated towards a banking system consisting of three -rather than twotiers and featuring core institutions controlled by the state directly or indirectly. This evolution is consistent with this country's historical pattern of financial intermediation. It is also in line with recent trends in the real sector of the economy, where public ownership has rebounded over the past decade. The core state-controlled banks have evolved into hybrid institutions, performing two various sets of functions: those of regular commercial banks and of policy banks. We found a similar evolution in China, but not in the transitional economies of central Europe. Institutional matrix theory suggests that, in non-market economies, centralized finance and credit allocation is the dominant institutional form, while private banking activity is complementary.

Evolution of the Banking System in the Russian

2013

We undertook an institutional analysis of commercial banks in Russia. After the failed experiment with private financial intermediation in the 1990s, Russia migrated towards a banking system consisting of three-rather than twotiers and featuring core institutions controlled by the state directly or indirectly. This evolution is consistent with this country's historical pattern of financial intermediation. It is also in line with recent trends in the real sector of the economy, where public ownership has rebounded over the past decade. The core state-controlled banks have evolved into hybrid institutions, performing two various sets of functions: those of regular commercial banks and of policy banks. We found a similar evolution in China, but not in the transitional economies of central Europe. Institutional matrix theory suggests that, in non-market economies, centralized finance and credit allocation is the dominant institutional form, while private banking activity is complementary.