Governmental Repression and Likelihood of Civil War Onset: World Analysis, 1981-1997 (original) (raw)
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Research on the relationship between civil conflict and repression has led to one conclusion—the law-like finding that states respond to internal challengers with repression—and one puzzle with competing hypotheses—whether state repression escalates civil conflict or not. Studies of repression's effect on conflict have been limited to case studies and subnational designs, which limits the external validity of the arguments. Studies of conflict's effect on repression have treated conflict as a control variable without taking into account the inherent endogeneity between internal conflict and state repression. This article contributes by providing a general, cross-national study of repression's effect on conflict, and vice versa, for external validity. Results of simultaneous equation models demonstrate that both directions of the relationship between state repression and conflict are positive and significant—suggesting a cyclical relationship—while single equation models with a lag structure establish that the effect of repression on conflict is greater than the reverse.
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Dictators and Rebellious Civilians
Perspectives on Politics, 2013
Thanks to research conducted in the past few years, our understanding has been significantly expanded concerning democracy and authoritarian regimes, as well as the means of both destroying and rebuilding democratic institutions. While there is a clear link between a developed economy and democracy, the relationship is not self-evident in all cases. Also, economic growth is not conducive to the development of democracy under all circumstances, especially when the distribution of wealth is not considered fair by all citizens. In and of itself an election, even a competitive one—long considered a democratic minimum—does not guarantee the survival of a democracy, as strongmen have learned how to run an authoritarian system behind an electoral veil. The majority of autocratic leaders use the concept of democracy as a screen for building a political regime antithetical to the spirit and practice of a real democracy. Autocrats adopt a number of democratic institutions only to subvert thei...