The Ontological Commitments of Natural Language are Indeterminate (original) (raw)
Since the linguistic turn, many have taken semantics to guide metaphysics. I argue that the semantics of a true theory in a natural language can, at best, serve as only a partial guide to ontology and so as only a partial guide to metaphysics. If semantics is to be our guide, we should look to our best semantic theories to determine whether a theory carries ontological commitments to Fs. I argue that the logical forms of natural language are those delivered by semantically adequate treatments. I develop criteria to determine when a semantic treatment is semantically adequate and should be counted amongst our best theories. Given these criteria, there can be more than one semantically adequate treatment of a natural language theory. To determine ontological commitments I appeal to Quine’s Criterion. I argue that to determine what a theory says and entails, we must appeal to semantic treatments. Since different treatments might yield different contents and entailments, Quine’s Criterion delivers ontological commitments only relative to a semantic treatment. To discover unrelativized commitments, I argue for a supervaluationist principle that delivers unrelativized, but possibly indeterminate, commitments of a theory. For theories with a privileged semantic treatment ontology will be determinate and based solely on an application of Quine’s Criterion. In cases in which there are multiple adequate semantic treatments the theory’s commitments may be determinate or indeterminate. I argue that theories with plural expressions offer one case in which natural language theories carry indeterminate ontological commitments. Finally, I argue that whether the ontological indeterminacy delivered by the principle is epistemic or metaphysical, semantics can serve as, at best, only a partial guide to answering ontological questions.
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