Peirce's "method of tenacity" and the "method of science": the consistency of pragmatism and naturalism (original) (raw)
In1877 Peirce distinguished four different methods of “fixating our beliefs”, among which I here concentrate on what could be called the “method of tenacity” and the “method of science”. I then use these distinctions to argue that despite their apparent conflict, pragmatism, relying on the method of tenacity, and naturalism, relying on the method of science, can and should coexist, bothin science and in metaphysics. In1877 Peirce distinguished four different methods ,of “fixating our beliefs” (Peirce 1877), among which I will concentrate on what could be called the “method of tenacity”, to becontrasted,with the “method of science”. The method ,of tenacity ,is described ,as an epistemic attitude that consists in reinforcing one’s beliefs at all costs, however they are arrived at, while the method of science consists instead in letting one’s beliefs be constantly shaped and revised by empirical, mind-independent regularities (laws) that are exemplified by natural phenomena. In this pa...
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A real surprising fact is the absence of the phrase “Scientific Metaphysics” in Charles S. Peirce writings in spite of the presence of that expression on the spine of volume 6 of Peirce’s Collected Papers. In order to explain the circumstances of that fact and to get a clearer view of this expression, the paper is arranged into five sections: 1) a brief presentation of Peirce, focusing on his work as a professional scientist; 2) an exposition of Peirce’s conception of science; 3) a sketch of the notion of metaphysics in the mature Peirce; 4) an attempt to answer the question of what a scientific metaphysics is; and finally, 5) a brief conclusion.
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