US Trade Remedies and the Adjustment Process (original) (raw)
2004
Michael Mussa (1974, 1978, 1982) was among the first theorists to analyze the economics of adjustment to changing conditions of international trade, and throughout his career he has also been an outspoken commentator on the political economy of trade policy. This paper focuses on the "adjustment environment" in the United States as set out by the active US trade remedy laws (antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguards) as well as the Trade Adjustment Assistance program. We document US industries' use of these various laws and relate trade-remedy use by industry to revealed comparative advantage. We also examine potential effects of trade remedies in promoting or retarding industry adjustment and give examples of industry outcomes.
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