Private Security: Implications for Social Control (original) (raw)

Seeing private security like a state

Criminology & Criminal Justice, 2008

Based on a systematic and detailed statutory analysis of 58 jurisdictions in Canada and the United States, this article constructs a modal typology of state regulation of contract private security. State regulation of private security has been neglected despite the fact it has grown across North American jurisdictions in the past two decades. Moving beyond rudimentary regulatory models and focusing on the contract security sector exclusively, five key dimensions of state regulation of private security are identified: governing-at-a-distance, character, identity, training, and information. Whether and how these dimensions relate to management protocols at the security agency level are then examined by combining these results with an analysis of an international survey of contract security managers within these jurisdictions. In turn, each dimension is found to relate to security agency management protocols. Implications for understanding state regulation and future research on privat...

Private security regimes: Conceptualizing the forces that shape the private delivery of security

There is as much diversity within the private security industry as there are differences between public and private security providers. Whereas comparisons of the two modes of delivery have kept criminologists and economists fairly busy over the years, internal variations have not attracted the same level of interest. In the current environment, binary classifications such as the public/private security dichotomy might be too generic to capture the broad spectrum of unique security arrangements being adopted by various organizations. The aim of this article is therefore to offer an alternative conceptual framework that can account for the broad range of mechanisms responsible for the diversity of private security arrangements observed in late modern societies. The term ‘security regime’ defines the convergence of internal forces and environmental constraints that determine the conditions under which security is produced and exchanged by an organization. The four key dimensions (focus, risks, utility and constraints) that characterize a specific security regime were identified from interviews conducted with more than 50 security managers. The security regime approach should expand our knowledge of the various causes that facilitate, empower or hinder public–private relationships.

We Need To ''Cut Off The King's Head'' - An Essay on Analyzing the Rise in Private Security

The problem concerning sovereignty of the state, which Foucault (1975) described almost four decades ago, is still omnipresent today, especially with the current rise in private security. Within this essay it will be discussed whether it is more accurate to analyse the rise of private security as ‘privatization of security’, as ‘commodification of security or as ‘responsibilization’.

Private security and the public safety

Journal of Urban Economics, 1978

The demand for private protection and the effect of such protective measures on the level of crime are examined. Private protection may reduce a household's expected victimization rate either by deterring some crime or by diverting crime to other households. The greater the relative importance of the latter effect, the more likely a community is to "tip" in the direction of deserting the streets at night and taking other precautions. Data on crime and protection are analyzed, but they are inadequate for a full estimation of the model. The paper concludes with a normative analysis of protection and implications for social policy.

Private security: Deterrent or diversion?

International Review of Law and Economics, 1994

Window bars, chain-link fences, and guard dogs are ubiquitous in wealthy Asian homes from New Delhi to Taipei. By contrast, all of these are rare in similar British, Canadian, and U.S. residential districts without the rate of property crime being substantially higher.' Generally, private security expenditures have two effects (Clotfelter, 1978; Clarke, 1983; Cook , 1986; and Shavell, 1991). First, they may deter some potential criminals, i.e., persuade them not to attempt crime at all. Second, they may also divert criminals towards other potential victims. 2 To the extent that security expenditures divert crime, their marginal effect on crime will be lower, which would be consistent with the contrast between Asia and the West noted above. Empirical evidence (from Britain) on the diversionary effect, however, is mixed. The installation of additional surveillance cameras in selected London Underground stations appeared not to divert crime to other stations (Mayhew, Clarke, et al., 1979). By contrast, after steering column locks were required on new cars, theft of new cars fell, while theft of older cars rose (Mayhew, Clarke, et al., 1976). Can these two apparently conflicting observations be reconciled? We thank Steve Shave11 for generous advice and encouragement on this paper 'With regard to institutional expenditures, Cunningham and Taylor (1984) estimated that in 1980 U.S. institutions spent a total of 2I.7billiononprivateprotectivegoodsandservices,comparedwithatotallossof2 I .7 billion on private protective goods and services, compared with a total loss of 2I.7billiononprivateprotectivegoodsandservices,comparedwithatotallossoft?7 billion from economic crime in the same year. Using different methods, Laband and Sophocleus (1992) give a substantially higher estimate of $157.83 b.ll' I mn for security expenditures in 1985. Tullock (1967) was one of the first scholars to emphasize private security expenditures as an important consequence of crime. 'Strictly, only security expenditures that potential criminals can observe have both effects. By contrast, precautions that cannot be identified with a particular victim have only the deterrent effect (Friedman, 1984; Shavell, 1991). For instance, in British public housing, a major burglary target is coin-fed electricity and gas meters. When these were replaced by conventional billing in some houses, the burglary rate for all units in the estate fell. Potential burglars could not tell from outside whether a particular house had a coin meter or conventional billing (Pease, 1992).