The politics of de-delegation: Regulatory (in)dependence in Turkey (original) (raw)
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Banking Law no 4389 (1999, effective in 2000) Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) Regulate the banking sector, prevent bad loans, protect rights of savings owners, enable the functioning of the credit system, delegating the right to allocate banking permits to the IRA Public Procurement Law no 4734 (2002) Public Procurement Agency (PPA) Eliminate politicised tenders, create a transparent framework for competitive bidding Energy Law no 4628 and 4646 (2001) Energy Market Regulation Agency (EMRA) Achieve full privatisation and liberalisation, establish a competitive framework in the energy sector, eliminate Treasury guarantees Telecommuni cation Law no 4502 (2000) Telecommunication Agency (TA) Achieve full liberalisation in and regulate the telecommunication sector