“Justice and the Banning of the Poets: The Way of Hermeneutics in Plato’s Republic” (original) (raw)
Related papers
Plato against the Poets. Discrediting Arguments in the Dialogues
The present work is my doctoral thesis, which was completed in 2008 and to which some minor modifications have been made. Originally I intended to publish it in the traditional format, i.e. in paper and with an academic publisher. In the meantime, there have been some unsuccessful dealings with publishers, some material was published separately by Brill (see http://www.academia.edu/591371/Poets\_and\_mimesis\_in\_the\_Republic) in the collection Plato and the Poets, some years have passed and I have also come to believe that publicly funded research (as mine was, to a large extent) should in principle be free and universally accessible. So here it is – and good luck to it! Abstract The thesis approaches Plato’s treatment of poets as an integral part of his ethical and ‘political’ engagement: as I argue, the fact that poets (beside rhetoricians, sophists and politicians) dealt with religious, social, educational and, more generally, with ethical and political matters, was the principal reason for Plato’s committed and often adverse attitude to them (and these other figures). The thesis focuses on Plato’s treatment of poetry in the Ion, Gorgias and Republic X. Although these discussions provide three quite different accounts of poets and their activity and have thus commonly not been associated, a similar objective may be detected in them: they all aim to discredit poets as moral authorities, presenting them as incompetent in what they do and also (in Gorg. and Rep. X) as morally harmful. As I first argue, the three discussions fundamentally differ from Plato’s other major discussions of poetry in Republic II-III and Laws II and VII, in their aim: while the former discussions seek to provide (discrediting) answers to the descriptive questions ‘Do poets have relevant knowledge?’ and ‘How do they morally affect their public?’, the latter are concerned with the prescriptive question of what poets should do in their envisaged subordinate role as political instruments. In the close study of the three discrediting discussions, my aim is to identify exactly what each discussion seeks to prove about poets and their activity and what arguments it employs to this end, as well as showing where these arguments have appeared fallacious. Due to the complexity of the argument on poetry as mimēsis in Rep. X, most space is devoted to this discussion. Arguing that a single meaning (‘doing something that is intentionally like something else’) can be applied to the term mimēsis in Platonic texts, I reject the widely-accepted assumption of ‘narrower’ (‘impersonation’) and ‘wider’ (‘artistic representation’) meanings of the term mimēsis in Rep. III and Rep. X respectively and propose an account of poets’ deceptive mimēsis in Rep. X (vs. non-deceptive, in Rep. III). Finally, arguing that Plato’s arguments ‘against poets’ ultimately rely on the premise that there are ethical and political truths and such knowledge (Bambrough 1971), I critically examine some political implications as well as the grounds of this premise. See also http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/3306
The Quarrel Between Poetry and Philosophy: Plato - A Sceptical View on ‘Poetry’
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2013
theoretical views on poetry that show the manner in which the Western culture had outlined the idea of literature. Admittedly, one of the most important moments in theoretical views on poetry (as presented in Apology of Socrates, Ion and Republic) in connection with an analysis of the ry denies tradition and its role, while trad represents the birth of an analytical perspective on poetry, seen as a particular cultural phenomenon.
Praxis filosófica, 2016
Plato offers two criticisms of imitative poetry in the Republic. In the first one, developed in books II and III, Plato seems to criticize poetry softly, banning only one part of imitative poetry. The second criticism, developed in book x, seems to establish a more drastic critique to imitative poetry that precludes the possibility of any kind of imitative poetry in the polis. Many different interpretations have been proposed in order to account for this apparent clash. I will defend Tate's classical interpretation, according to which no clash exists because Plato distinguishes two kinds of imitations, and he remains consistent in preserving one and banishing the other.
Drawing on Plato as paradigmatic philosopher and, to a large extent, the intellectual architect of subsequent Western philosophy, the essay examines the definite limits of philosophical discourse and explores the conditions of its legitimacy. Taking Plato's treatment of the poets in the Republic as an example, the essay argues that poetry and philosophy are autonomous discourses, "separate magisteria"; that rational foundations are the conditions of meaningful philosophical discourse; and that poetic discourse is a form of dramatic wisdom which becomes meaningful precisely at the point at which philosophical discourse breaks down.
Plato, Aristotle the Dialectics of Poetry
International Journal on Integrated Education
The present paper attempts at estimating the legacy of two of the seminal philosophical minds, Plato and Aristotle. Their ideas have been so instrumental in shaping western critical literary tradition that any discussion on literary theory and criticism has to have them as a point of reference. Plato’s negative conception of mimesis is juxtaposed with Aristotle’s affirmative stand. The paper also examines the various philosophical and pragmatic charges labelled against poetry by Plato in his works such as Republic, Phaedrus and Ion. The paper concludes with a general overview of critical responses to Plato by succeeding men of letters.
A Homeric Challenge: The Purpose and Meaning of the Poetry Critique in Book 10 of Plato’s Republic
This article defends and develops a dialectical interpretation of the book 10 poetry critique of Plato’s Republic. Socrates’ attack on Homer is argued to be ironic and designed to test Glaucon in various ways, and generate interest in the concept of imitation and Homeric poetry in the context of the psychology of the Republic. This article also shows how Socrates subtly indicates how a successful defense of Homer might proceed.