Bringing the Good, the Bad and the Ugly into the Peace Fold : The Republic of Sierra Leone's Armed Forces after the Lomé Peace Agreement (original) (raw)
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ARMED FORCES RESTRUCTURING AND AND INFLUENCE ON REDUCTION OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
The state of the armed forces in the third-world countries today is a threat to the gains of democratization. Most of these armed forces can at their best be described as mostly ragtag, drug-crazed, unwieldy, poorly paid, poorly trained, undependable and unproductive. The most important risk is the fact that most are composed of starkly illiterate or semi-literate men and women waiting for the next Foday Sankoh, Laurent Kabila or Jonas Savimbi to come along. People with political ambitions, “revolutionaries” and the so-called “Men-of the People” who are not ready to test their popularity at the polls (Foday Sankoh) or having done so and failed (Jonas Savimbi) have always found easy recruits for their “Popular revolutions” from the rank and file of illiterate and semi-literate members of the armed forces in the third-world. The solution to the prevention of crises in the third world lies not in giving more aid since it will only worsen the debt problem. Grants always end up being used on mostly irrelevant projects while the rest find their way into personal foreign accounts of politicians and administrators. The basis for the prevention of the crises therefore lies in applying the same tactics that has ushered in democracy in most of the third world to compel the third world nations to re-structure their armed forces in line with internationally accepted standards.
Between April and June 2000, Sierra Leone witnessed two months of renewed tension and hostility between government forces and the rebel movement, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), despite signing what many thought was a viable peace agreement at Lome Togo on July 7, 19991. According to Ero (2000), the failure lies in the accord's inadequate role of external moral guarantors. It demonstrates the limits and dangers of outside attempts to mount but not assist in sustaining peace processes. Therefore, my overarching question in this paper is to understand why the peace agreement failed. Were RUF rebels not faithful keepers of the peace, or was it a result of outside influence that there was too much at stake to assume a peace settlement, or was the is the government seen not as a credible negotiator?
OALib
This paper examines the integration of armed groups into security sector of a country, especially the military, as an approach to peace building. It takes an overview of such approaches in South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). The paper argues that while such an approach is good for peace's sake, it usually fails to attain peace in the long term due to its rushed conceptualization and implementation, lack of sufficient resource support, lack of political will, vested interests by the armed groups and external actor, among other reasons. Furthermore, the paper notes that integration leads to disaffection among the rank and file of the national military; since some of the rebel elements become their seniors without proper qualifications. The battle animosities and suspicion tend to persist even after the integration. All these are factors that are likely to lead to breakdown of a peace agreement; and eventual resumption of conflict with formation of splinter factions of the integrated rebels, as is the case with National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) elements in DRC who mutinied and formed M23 movement. In advancing the argument of failures in military integration as a conflict resolution strategy, the paper glances back at the Montevideo convention on the roles and obligations of states. It points out an interesting line of thought that states engage with states and not non-states. Thus, engaging with armed groups runs the risks of recognition and legitimization of armed groups and may lead to more demands. Such engagements also risk sending the wrong message that "violence pays" and this can lead to formation of more armed groups to agitate for their interests. However, the paper recognizes that if post conflict integration of armed groups into security structures of a country is done properly and with sufficient support, it is likely to lead to long term peace as is the case in post-genocide Rwanda. This is especially in times of conflict where alleviation How to cite this paper: Kamais, C.E.
Using Power-Sharing to Win a War: The Implementation of the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone
2009
To end the civil war in Sierra Leone the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed a peace agreement guaranteeing power-sharing in July 1999. Such power-sharing is a widely used, often recommended political arrangement to overcome deep divisions between groups. However, scholars disagree on whether power-sharing causes peace, or, on the contrary, causes continuing violence. One reason for this is the literature's tendency to neglect how power-sharing is actually put into place. But post-agreement implementation is essential if we are to judge the performance of power-sharing. Therefore, we investigate the role played by power-sharing in terminating the civil war in Sierra Leone. We argue that the government was able to use the peace agreement to pursue its goal of ending the war through marginalising the RUF.
Open Access Library Journal, 2019
This paper examines the integration of armed groups into security sector of a country, especially the military, as an approach to peace building. It takes an overview of such approaches in South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). The paper argues that while such an approach is good for peace’s sake, it usually fails to attain peace in the long term due to its rushed conceptualization and implementation, lack of sufficient resource support, lack of political will, vested interests by the armed groups and external actor, among other reasons. Furthermore, the paper notes that integration leads to disaffection among the rank and file of the national military; since some of the rebel elements become their seniors without proper qualifications. The battle animosities and suspicion tend to persist even after the integration. All these are factors that are likely to lead to breakdown of a peace agreement; and eventual resumption of conflict wit...
Military involvement in post-conflict transformation in African Peace-Building
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 2017
Post-conflict transformation is a difficult task, since renewed violence frequently flares up after peace treaties have been signed. Failure to end conflict often results from misinterpretations of the roots or an inability of the conflict to create suitable exit strategies for military forces. Reintegration of soldiers and nonstate armed actors entails delicate and complex procedures, which are central in maintaining security in a newly created democracy. These all point to the important role of the military in post-conflict transformation. The focus of the study on which this article is based, was on evaluating the role and place of military forces in postconflict peace-building activities. These activities relate to diverse peacekeeping experiences in Africa, and focused on flaws and challenges in post-conflict peacebuilding missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and the Central African Republic; post-conflict transformation and development; security sector reform; and South Africa's participation as member of the Southern African Development Community.
The disturbing level of impoverishment; together with the threatening issue of inefficiency in the security sector and an astonishing mentality of “democratic greed”, have rendered the West African sub-region economically and politically unstable to say the least. The history of the sub-region has been written in blood spilled over internal resources, with little or no concern for human security and institutional stabilization. Veering into this history, one would notice that the knack for violence is commonplace; even as the composite states are orientated in a variety of “civilizations".This paper does not aim to disprove of the efforts made by some West African states and concerned external agents such as the UN or ECOWAS. It only tends to point out the striking challenges that should be improved upon in the course of carrying out military reforms in West Africa. Furthermore, it will be a better idea overall to encourage the reform of the military in West Africa to be an internal affair- within the state itself – rather than an interventional one. After all, the sub-region embarked on increased military budgets especially in during the oil boom which is tied to the success of most of its fast growing economies.
SSR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Armed Wing of State-Building?
This paper directly challenges some of the popular Security Sector Reform (SSR) mythology that has grown around the UK’s involvement in Sierra Leone and the subsequent policy developments associated with SSR. It raises questions about the underlying political assumptions of the SSR process and contemporary SSR material, much of which lacks analysis of underlying theories of SSR relating to broader state-building and construction of a liberal peace. Using a case taken from the reconstruction of Sierra Leone, this paper outlines some of the key issues emerging after ten years of reconstruction efforts. Sierra Leone is usually over-cited, but given its importance to any orthodoxy that may be said to exist, it is relevant here. Fundamentally, Sierra Leone remains a relatively small state in West Africa and the fact a viable state remains elusive, challenges assumptions about time taken in reconstructing socio-political norms and structures, and also questions state-building as a post-conflict approach. This paper will argue that SSR in Sierra Leone was never a developed strategy but came to represent a series of policies that evolved on the ground largely as the result of the interaction of individuals and groups engaged in those early decisions, sometimes against the wishes of Whitehall, but always sharing a “direction of travel.” This is an important point in terms of how SSR policy was actually developed and also how approaches come to be seen as being far smoother and well planned with hindsight, but also in terms of how policy-makers and academics can learn about social, governance and security processes. Finally the paper moves on to analyse what lessons can and cannot be drawn from this experience and what the implications are for SSR going forward. It argues that the example of Sierra Leone as a “classic” post-conflict situation is enlightening but also damaging in the sense that any future SSR intervention will face radically different circumstances and needs to take into account broader issues of state-building and in particular recognising the deeply political aspects of what is being done when an international agency engages in SSR.
Conflict Studies Quarterly Issue 34, 2021
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes are necessary in states that experience armed conflict. Several post-conflict societies are usually characterised by the activities of individuals who undermine state building efforts and prefer to work against joint problem solving aimed at sustaining peace. The study explores the change and continuity in the DDR programme and prospects for sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. With primary and secondary sources, including key informant interview with a former Minister, the paper responds to these questions: To what extent did remobilisation undermine peace agreements? How were the weapons and ex-combatants controlled by the government? What were the lessons and challenges of the DDR programme? How are the stakeholders sustaining post-DDR peace at the community level? The success of the state building was occasioned by the joint problem solving approach adopted by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), ECOMOG troops, the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leon, and other stakeholders at the community level. This paper stresses that the remobilisation of ex-combatants increased the intensity of the war which necessitated more external intervention to create enabling environment for state building and security sector reforms. Sustaining peace in Sierra Leone demands continuous empowerment of youths and their active involvement in informal peace education. Post-DDR peacebuilding should be more youth-focused and development oriented to prevent the resurgence of armed conflicts.