The Person, a Meaningful Notion in Bioethics. A Philosophical and a Theological Approach (original) (raw)
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The Debate on the Concept of the Person in Bioethics
2020
This article endeavours to sketch the debate about the concept of a person in the realm of bioethics. Initially, it sets out three understandings of the issue, namely the concept of a person in naturalistic philosophy, in the current of communitarianism and in one of the humanistic positions. The analysis of these approaches lead to the conclusion that a human person is perceived either as an empirical and psychological entity or as a free subjectivity creating him/herself. This thesis provides stimulation for further research. In order to avoid a kind of dualism in the perception of a person stemming from the stances outlined above, the personalistic approach is developed. This points out that a human being should be depicted as one indivisible entity unifying in itself more strictly its self, a subjective aspect of the person, with nature-body aspect which is an objective facet of being human. Given this personalistic perspective, a person comes out as an embodied subjectivity for...
Bioethics and the identity of the human person
Revista Romana De Bioetica, 2013
, what is a person?, then we should start out from the experience we have about ourselves, the experiences of our body, from the continuity in which the experience of knowledge and thinking is the experience of our entire person and not of a part (I'm the one thinking, not my brain thinking about me). On the other hand there are sufficient biological, anthropological and ontological arguments, which show that the concept of human being and the one of person may be used as synonymous terms, since they indicate the same reality. The question is why we still prefer to use the concept of person and not the one of human being. The answer seems as simple as possible. Although we essentially express the same reality, yet the concept of person attributed to man serves to express uniqueness, for the way a person is different from any other beings. Christian faith is presented as a place to be welded "the claim of dignity and human life socialization". Human ego finds actually in God not only his Creator, but also his absolute interlocutor, not just a master of life, but a Father of life, a Brother in human history, allowing us to understand the deep meaning of being created after the image and likeness of God. In this article we want to offer our reflections a scientific but also religious nature, regarding the secrecy and the permanent miracle of the human person's life.
FORUM PHILOSOPHICUM, 2007
The concept of personhood has been recently strongly criticized by some bioethicists. The present article aims at refuting these criticisms. In order to show how the notion of personhood operates in bioethics, two understandings of it proposed by an Italian bioethicist Maurizio Mori are sketched: a person as a part of the cosmological order and a person as an autonomous-like entity. It is argued that none of the proposed understandings is adequate. The cosmological concept perceives the person as a derivative of the empirical processes. The autonomous-like, in turn, conceives the person as a freely acting subject. This paper endeavours to prove that both conceptions are one-sided. In order to do that, the thought of German philosopher Robert Spaemann is deployed. He convincingly points out that the person must be considered from a so-called modus existendi stance. It means that to be a person is to possess a unique way of being. That being encompasses the material content (body) not as a casual factor but as an indispensable mean of expressing itself. The final thesis is that the persons being is mans life. Drawing upon such a conclusion, it is taken up a critical discussion with the views rejecting the usefulness of the concept.
HELLENIC-SERBIAN PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE SERIES, 2020
In this short essay I will discuss the concept of the person. More specifically, I intend to focus on identifying the perspectives that the scientific discussion has created for the relationship of person and bioethics. I will argue that humans as persons, therefore as moral agents, are not identified by their biological existence, and that the respect of human dignity is a fundamental individual right, due to which we share an obligation to protect human persons against all forms of coercion. I will conclude with the view that all issues that fall within the field of bioethics would vanish into thin air, in case real, selfless love was the dominant feature as far as our inter-personal relations are concerned. If love pervades bioethics throughout as its starting point, its 'body' and its final end, it would be certain that the value of humanity and personhood would be safeguarded, moral agents' rights would not be infringed, and humans wouldn't ever be used merely as means. Hence, my concluding thesis is that, in order to overcome the deadlocks bioethics deals with, we should be oriented towards the Bioethics of Love.
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2020
This article presents the hegemonic interpretation on the concept of “human” in Bioethics and represents this paradigm from Martin Heidegger’s concept of Dasein (“there being”). In the first part, we discuss how the “oblivion of being” (Seinsvergessenheit) allows the emergence of the “subject,” who finds in modern reason and metaphysics fertile ground for dominance of the dual model, subject-object, on all contemporary phenomena, specifically bioethics. In the final part of the article, we reflect on the originality of Heidegger’s interpretation of human experience as Dasein. We intend to broaden the debate and the bioethical perspective on the concept of “human” and, with it, a whole range of “successors” concepts completely submerged in layers of tradition.
The Nature of Human Persons: Metaphysics and Bioethics
The New Bioethics
This monograph rigorously argues for a Thomistic (after the thirteenth century theologian and philosopher St Thomas Aquinas) account of the human person. Each chapter addresses different stages of human existence, considering the metaphysical and philosophical issues arising from these. Dualist and materialist accounts are considered, and Eberl's Thomistic position is carefully elucidated. Eberl argues that the Thomistic account is as a via media between dualism and materialism, combining the strengths, whilst avoiding the weaknesses, of both camps. Chapter One: 'What Am I?' sets the scene. The desiderata for an account of the human person are delineated and justified, and the reader is introduced to the distinct, but closely related, concepts of 'human being' and 'person'. Eberl outlines the many different ways these two terms are used and shows that whilst some thinkers will use them as synonyms, others will use them to refer to very different concepts. Ultimately, Eberl settles on the term human person to allow for the possibility of non-human persons. During this chapter, the outline of the rest of the book is laid out. Chapter Two: 'This is Us' sets out Eberl's Thomistic account of the human person in broad strokes. Along the way, cerebral transplant thought experiments, in which one person's cerebrum is transplanted into a different person's body (I shall return to this topic later), and dicephalic twins are considered. Chapter Three: 'I Think, Therefore … ' introduces the reader to two contemporary alternative dualist accounts, substance dualism and emergent dualism, with Swinburne's substance dualism and Hasker's emergent dualism being used as quintessential representatives of each. Both views are considered and critiqued. Chapter Four: 'Thou Art Dust' introduces the reader to one reductive and three non-reductive materialist alternatives: animalism, constitutionalism, four-dimensionalism and the embodied mind theory. Olson's animalist approach is considered as a representative reductive physicalist account. Baker's constitutionalism, Hudson's four-dimensionalism and McMahan's embodied mind account are the three non-reductive materialist accounts considered. In the process of doing this, teletransporter thought experiments and their correct interpretation are also considered. Chapter Five: Starting Out then applies these accounts to the beginning of human life and the various questions and issues raised therein. Eberl argues that his Thomistic account is superior based on the arguments of previous chapters. He shows how, according to his Thomistic account, a human person comes into existence at conception. In doing this, he also spends quite some time carefully engaging with the new bioethics, 2020, 1-4
The Troublesome Concept of the Person
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 1999
In today'sbioethical debates, the concept of the person plays a major role. However, it does not hold this role justly. The purpose of this paper is to argue that the concept of the person is unsuited to be a central concept in bioethical debates, because its use is connected with serious problems. First, the concept is superfluous. Secondly, it is a confusing concept and it lacks pragmatic use. Thirdly, its use leads to simplifications. Finally, the concept can easily be used as a cover-up concept. Therefore, it is argued that relinquishing the concept of the person could enhance the clarity and quality of bioethical debate. Moreover, the historic origin of much of the present confusion surrounding the concept of the person is clarified. It is demonstrated that three influences resulting from Locke'sideas on the person and personal identity can be determined as contributing factors to the confusion and controversy within the present bioethical debates centering around the person.