Reason's disciples: Seventeenth-century English feminists (original) (raw)

Continuity of the Rational: Naturalism and Historical Understanding in Collingwood

Journal of The Philosophy of History, 2008

It is sometimes suggested that Collingwood's philosophy of history is decidedly anti-naturalist and argues for a complete separation between history and the natural sciences. Th e purpose of this paper is to examine this suggestion and to argue that Collingwood's conception of the relationship between history and natural sciences is much more subtle and nuanced than such a view would allow for. In fact, there is little in Collingwood to offend contemporary naturalistic sensibilities reasonably construed. Th e impression that Collingwood's views are incompatible with naturalism stems, in part, from an overly Kantian interpretation of the idea of rationality, as applied to historical agents, in terms of transcendentally fixed norms. Th is difficulty, however, does not arise if we opt for a more Hegelian interpretation of rationality in terms of continuity in thought, which Collingwood himself seemed to favor. Examining Collingwood's pronouncements on these topics leads one to the conclusion that, while objecting to the excesses of early naturalism, Collingwood saw no insurmountable obstacles to the reconciliation of science and history and their potential collaboration in some areas.

Collingwood, Scientism and Historicism

Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2017

The philosophy of history is undergoing something of a revival. Much has happened since its heyday in the 1960s when methodological discussions concerning the structure of explanation in history and the natural sciences were central to the philosophical agenda. This introduction revisits Collingwood’s contribution to the philosophy of history, his views on the relation between science and history, and the possibility of historical knowledge suggesting his work is of enduring relevance to contemporary debates. It locates his contribution in the context of the hermeneutic tradition and locates his defence of the methodological autonomy of history in the context of recent debates concerning the relation between science and the history of the philosophy of science.

Repetition and Reenactment: Collingwood on the Relation between Natural Science and History

R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943) is well known for his contributions to the fields of aesthetics and the philosophy of history. Perhaps the most distinctive and constant feature of his work, however, is his effort throughout to articulate and clarify the relations between domains of thought that are traditionally held to be distinct - such as religion, art, history, science and philosophy. In this essay, I consider the import of the conclusion to his treatise The Idea of Nature, and argue that a careful consideration of how and why he came to write this conclusion shows that he appreciates the relative autonomy of natural science and history as fields of inquiry, but argues that successful scientific research requires that scientists come to understand the import of the work of their predecessors. Far from accepting as a limitation of historical research with respect to natural science the idea that the past cannot be repeated but that natural occurrences can, Collingwood holds that, with different aims in mind, both scientist and historian must and do engage regularly and successfully in the effort to bring to life the character and significance of past events.

The Interpretation of Nature. A Review Article

Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1987

Man and the Natural World has received an astonishing amount of media attention and has been hailed as a masterpiece on all sides. Two features of the book have apparently impressed commentators: its originality and its wealth of empirical material. The work is indeed an amazingly rich compendium of ideas about all facets of the relationships human beings have with nature, and it has all the qualities of "a good read." It's not often that reviewers can chuckle with pleasure at piquant anecdotes about such things as goats, trees, and vegetarians. Furthermore, its scope is even more extensive than the title suggests, since Thomas draws many of his examples from the nineteenth century and goes well beyond the confines of England in search of illuminating comparisons and traditions to serve his main thesis. This is that the "early modern period" saw a significant, even revolutionary change in man's attitudes towards nature, in that, at the beginning of this epoch people felt entitled to use nature for human ends, whereas by the end of it there were widespread doubts about this. These manifested themselves in organisations to prevent cruelty to animals, attempts to preserve and conserve the countryside and so on. The main outlines of this interpretation are hard to fault, and they have, in fact, been explored by many other scholars, often in the form of studies of the transition "from the closed world to the infinite universe," as a result of which man no longer held, or felt entitled to hold, pride of place. With the broad contours of the landscape Thomas has depicted for us we cannot quarrel, but we may want to inspect it at closer quarters. My concern here is with the kind of historical knowledge this book has produced, for it draws upon a number of intellectual traditions which work on a broad canvas, painting large suggestive sweeps, while at the same time offering minute, intricate points of supportive detail. The general attraction of such a style of history writing and the equally general approbation with which it is now regarded make it a suitable case for analysis. Thomas locates his work within a particular tradition: "The book is thus

The Shape of History

History and Theory, 1998

Condorcet was right, there is progress in history. Through their capacity to reason, people have developed science and technology in ways which have enabled them to predict and control natural occurrences more effectively, and to meet many of their basic needs in an increasingly efficient manner, notably their needs for food, medicine, shelter, transport, communication, and weapons. Sometimes this understanding and technology has been used for war and oppression, but often it has been used to improve people's standard of living. Progress in science and technology has not been steady or evenly distributed across the world, but it has been consistent, with few if any periods of regression. Can the progress in science and technology provide the framework for a comprehensive philosophy of history? Clearly not, as Graham points out, for there are many other aspects of life which must be considered before one could argue that history as a whole has been progressing. Graham considers progress in political freedom, morality, art, and religion, and argues that there has been progress in all these fields. In this book he tries to defend the plausibility of a general theory of historical progress. Graham's arguments are not very convincing, but they would suit someone of the sort of liberal conservative views which Graham has defended before in other books I will discuss shortly. What is most disappointing is that, while defending his view of history, Graham does not engage rigorously with the central issue of how we should relate to the history of the world, as far as we know it. He is content to depict world history in an optimistic way as getting better and better, with God inspiring people at times to love those around them and improve the quality of their lives. This picture of universal historical progress is nothing but reassuring. Unfortunately it is also so inadequate as to be very misleading. Finally, Graham looks for a role for God in history, and finds it as I have said in the inspiration of individuals and in the exercise of their reason and will. This is to ignore the traditional Christian interpretation of the period between the resurrection of Christ and his second coming as one of spiritual warfare, between the forces of greed and destruction and the powers of truth and love. Graham misses the cosmic, world-historical dimension of this conflict, and the hope of Christians to extend the kingdom of heaven on earth against what seem at times to be overwhelming odds. Perhaps this scenario is not as comfortable as a liberal conservative would wish. Indeed it is quite challenging.

R. G. Collingwood: The Idea of History

In 'The Idea of History', R.G Collingwood claims that the idea of history is very special type of idea that requires a very special kind of study. In this paper I explain the reasons behind Collingwood's claim that history cannot be studied in the same way as the natural sciences. I furthermore clarify Collingwood's distinction between scientific and interpretive explanations in history. I moreover provide a concise explanation of Collingwood's theory of causation, and its implications for the notions of evidence, and truth. I conclude that Collinwood's idealistic cultural philosophy of history, although having certain merits, makes a highly implausible argument for apriori knowledge based on an unoriginal, and universally recognised epistemological principle.

Nature and the Historization of History - a Commentary

2008

In his text, Kragh gives a brief but very informative overview of the idea that nature itself is historical, i.e. subject to change over time. He includes a discussion on whether even the natural laws themselves may be changing in this way, and ends by asking if nature is “truly historical” in the same way as human societies are. He answers in the negative. One of the arguments he uses is that while a historian can think back in time and identify with the historical actors, the scientist cannot in the same way imagine being a dinosaur or a molecule.

Prediction and Explanation in Historical Natural Science

In earlier work (Cleland [2001], [2002]), I sketched an account of the structure and justification of 'prototypical' historical natural science that distinguishes it from 'clas-sical' experimental science. This article expands upon this work, focusing upon the close connection between explanation and justification in the historical natural sciences. I argue that confirmation and disconfirmation in these fields depends primarily upon the explanatory (versus predictive or retrodictive) success or failure of hypotheses visa `-vis empirical evidence. The account of historical explanation that I develop is a version of common cause explanation. Common cause explanation has long been vindicated by appealing to the principle of the common cause. Many philosophers of science (e.g., Sober and Tucker) find this principle problematic, however, because they believe that it is either purely methodological or strictly metaphysical. I defend a third possibility: the principle of the common cause derives its justification from a physically pervasive time asymmetry of causation (a.k.a. the asymmetry of overdetermination). I argue that explicating the principle of the common cause in terms of the asymmetry of overdeter-mination illuminates some otherwise puzzling features of the practices of historical natural scientists.