The film business in the United States and Britain during the 1930s -super-1 (original) (raw)

The film business in the U.S. and Britain during the 1930s

Film was a most important product in the lives of the people during the 1930s. This paper sets out to analyse the underlying economic arrangements of the film industries of the U.S. and Britain during the decade in producing and diffusing this commodity-type to the population at large. In doing this, the paper finds a highly competitive industry that was built around showing films that audiences wanted to see, irrespective of the extent of vertical integration. It also examines the nature of the inter-relationship between the two industries and finds an asymmetry between the popularity of British films in the American market and that of American films in the British market. Our explanation for this is that the efforts of British firms on the American market were not sufficiently sustained to make a significant impact on American audiences

Profitability trends in Hollywood, 1929 to 1999: somebody must know something

This article presents an overview of the development of the US film industry from 1929 to 1999. Notwithstanding a volatile film production environment, in terms of rate of return and market share variability, the industry has remained relatively stable and profitable. Film production by the film studios is interpreted as analogous to the construction of an investment portfolio, whereby producers diversified risk across budgetary categories. In the 1930s, high-budget film production was relatively unprofitable, but the industry adjusted to the steep decline in film-going in the postwar period by refining high-budget production as the focus for profitability.

The Risk Environment of Film Making: Warner Bros in the Inter-War Years

Explorations in Economic History, 1998

This paper examines the financial strategies employed in the process of film production with particular emphasis on the performance of Warner Bros during the period from 1921 to 1940. The setting of film budgets is interpreted within a context of the financial risks involved, and in particular, a portfolio theory approach is found to provide a useful framework for describing and analyzing risk. The rapid growth of the film industry in the interwar years, together with the economic volatility of the period, produced a variety of risktaking strategies, and this paper attempts to assess the relative success of these strategies.

Product differentiation at the movies. Hollywood 1946 to 1965

Journal of Economic History, 2002

In the post–Second World War period the floor fell out of the market for films in the United States. However, while the average revenue of films fell, the “hit” end of the market sustained itself. The growing inequality in the distribution of revenues meant that the risks associated with high-budget productions could no longer be balanced against the steady earnings of medium-budget films. During the 1950s the “majors” all became distributor–financiers as they reduced their exposure to the risks associated with film production. In doing this, they retained their dominant position in the industry.

Hollywood Studios, Independent Producers and International Markets: Globalisation and the US Film Industry c.1950–1965

2014

This paper examines the internationalisation of Hollywood entertainment in the period c.1949-1965. Two observations are commonly made about the US motion picture industry in this period. The first is that the era witnessed the 'disintegration' of the studio system, with the major vertically integrated 'studios' forced to sell off their cinema chains and also becoming increasingly reliant on 'independent' producers to supply their product. The second is that the period saw US producers and distributors become increasingly reliant on foreign markets as a source of revenue. This paper analyses the 665 films released internationally in this period by Warner Bros. and MGM, for which reliable financial data is available from surviving studio ledgers. It examines the foreign revenues earned by these films, and compares this with the 'international orientation' of the pictures themselves (an international orientation index is constructed on the basis of each film's setting, characters, stars and other creative inputs). The paper finds that the growing importance of foreign markets for US distributors was reflected in the balance of their film portfolios, with an increasing proportion of films with a strong international orientation as the period progressed. The evidence also indicates that independent producers, rather than major studios themselves, were increasingly responsible for the production of this internationally oriented product. Finally, the paper examines the geographical locations where these internationally oriented films were set, and compares this with the international distribution of film revenues for the major studios. Certain national locations were clearly more commonly used as film settings than others, and such differences cannot be simply be explained by their relative value as film markets.

Calculated Risks: Film Finances and British Independents in the 1970s

This article examines three British films made at Shepperton Studios in the first half of the 1970s. It draws upon the reports filed by Film Finances’ assessor John Croydon to the Chairman Robert Garrett, and correspondence between Film Finances and the films’ producers, as well as scripts, schedules, daily progress reports and budgetary information. Two of the films, The Wicker Man (Robin Hardy, 1973) and ‘Don’t Look Now’ (Nicolas Roeg, 1973), were backed by the struggling independent British Lion. The third, Lisztomania (Ken Russell, 1975), was the second in a planned three-picture deal with Goodtimes Enterprises’ subsidiary Visual Programme Systems (VPS), and was supported by the National Film Finance Corporation (NFFC); but the deal collapsed in spectacular fashion, almost bankrupting its producers in the process. The focus of attention here will be on production histories, rather than the films themselves. I hope to be able to assess, thereby, what additional value the Film Finances Archive can provide in understanding the relations between capital and creativity in the British film industry in this period.

Film Finances and the British New Wave

Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 2014

The majority of historical accounts of British cinema remark upon the significance of the British New Wave films released between 1959 and 1963. Whether seen as a major flourishing of creative activity among relatively unknown actors and directors or as a retrogressive series of representations of gender and sexuality, there is no doubt that 'a breakthrough of sorts did occur'. 1 The cycle, commonly termed 'kitchen sink', ranged from Room at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959) to Billy Liar (John Schlesinger, 1963). 2 One of its most distinguishing features was a heightened emphasis on location shooting in an attempt to capture a poetic, visceral evocation of working-class life outside London. The films were produced by independent production companies as indicative of the rise of that mode towards the end of the 1950s as circuit-owning companies like Rank and the Associated British Picture Corporation became cautious in a context of declining box-office takings, television competition and consequent desire to spread the risk of film-making. While the attainment of a distributor's guarantee and bank loans were vital sources of funding for film production, the existence of the National Film Finance Corporation (NFFC) eased the pathway to what the Kinematograph Weekly described as 'a new pattern of production and distribution in which creative individuals have as much say as impersonal mammoth corporations'. 3 It is within this context that Film Finances became involved in providing completion guarantees for some of the most significant films of the British New Wave. The company's role has hitherto been undocumented in published works