Saint Thomas More's Conscientious Objection (original) (raw)

Thomas More, England and the Martyrs: Martyrs of conscience.

Conference talk presented at the 2018 Europa Christi Congress 14-22 October, Częstochowa, Warszaw, Rzeszów, Lublin Lodź, Kraków. This Paper will both ambitiously cover a few notable English martyrs as well as some of their institutions, and meekly confine itself to a panoramic view of the topic. It will present the English Martyrs, as Martyrs both of the Libertas Ecclesiae and Conscience.

Thomas More and the Politics of Conscience

Relying on their intimate knowledge of More’s life and writings, and drawing from the best recent scholarship (including their own), Karlin and Oakley provide a lucid account of More’s lifelong struggle to practice the “indirect approach” to philosophic statesmanship amidst the turmoil of Tudor politics. Along the way, they offer valuable suggestions about how to apply More’s thinking to a changed political, moral, and intellectual landscape.

A Saint on Trial: Analyzing the Condemnation of Sir Thomas More

ADDRESS St. Thomas More's star has risen and fallen in unusual ways over the years. Hailed in his lifetime as one of the great humanists of the age, he died with almost all of his friends and family accusing him of pointless pertinacity. Though his books were widely read and his integrity respected by even his enemies, it would take another four centuries before a critical edition of his works would appear and for the Church to add his name to the roster of the canonized. Since then, More's legacy has grown steadily: He was declared the patron saint of statesmen by John Paul II at the start of the new millennium, and he was even added to the liturgical calendar of the Church of England – the legitimacy of which, of course, More lost his life denying. Thomas More, we now know, was a sage and a saint, but was he guilty of the formal charges that led to his execution on July 6,

Conscientious Objection to Unjust War: From Augustine to John Paul II

2017

This paper examines the development of the Catholic tradition on selective conscientious objection (SCO), the right to refuse to participate in a war judged to be unjust, from Augustine through Aquinas, Vitoria, Suárez, and Grotius to Vatican II, the statements of the U.S. bishops, and the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. It has been argued that support for what we now call selective conscientious objection has for centuries been a minority position – over against the majority position that argues that soldiers have no responsibility to make judgments about the justice of the war in which they are called to fight. The soldier’s only responsibility is to fight justly, obeying legal orders but disobeying illegal ones, such as targeting innocent civilians. But is it possible to fight an unjust war justly? The minority tradition has become official, as represented by support for SCO in the Compendium.

Thomas More on Conscience, Courage, & the Comedy of Politics

The Imaginative Conservative, 2018

As the gulf between classical and postmodern notions of conscience and government grows ever wider and their clashes more explosive, it is high time for the jury to give renewed attention to the nuances of Thomas More’s understanding of the apparently competing, but ultimately harmonious, demands of divine, natural, and human law…

Conscience and Conscientious Objections

In Western countries conscientious objections are usually accommodated in various ways, at least in certain areas (military conscription, medicine) and to some extent. They appear to be regarded as fundamentally different from other kinds of objection. But why? Some people question the legitimacy of conscientious objection in certain contexts, or to certain matters. Thereby, they indirectly challenge the legitimacy of conscientious objection as such. The historical development of thought on conscience has exacerbated the situation. For reasons such as these, a search for a philosophical foundation of conscientious objection was called for. In this study it is argued that conscientious objections cannot be understood as long as conscience is misunderstood. Hence, part I provides a new interpretation of the historical development of expressions of conscience and thought on the subject, informed by a novel approach to conscience as a symbol. Part II is concerned with the theory and practice of freedom of conscience. In part III a new approach to conscientious objection is developed, rooted in the symbol-approach to conscience, and both informed by and in contrast with existing theories of conscientious objection.

Review Essay: Thomas More's Trial by Jury

Today, as in More’s time, the principles and practicalities at stake in clashes of personal belief, religious authority, and political power remain complex. Though attention to More’s legal defense cannot furnish us with simple solutions in theory or policy, however, it can raise crucial questions not only about what legal procedures are necessary to guarantee justice to criminal defendants, but also about the proper boundaries and interrelations of natural, divine, and human law. Although it says more about some of these questions than others, Thomas More’s Trial by Jury provides both a valuable contribution to our understanding of an important legal conflict, and a salutary spur to reflect on what is best as well as what is most questionable in the foundations and development of modern political doctrine and practice.

Two conceptions of conscience and the problem of conscientious objection

Schuklenk and Smalling argue that it is practically impossible for civic institutions to meet the conditions necessary to ensure that conscientious objection does not conflict with the core principles of liberal democracies. In this response, I propose an alternative definition of conscience to that offered by Schuklenk and Smalling. I discuss what I call the ‘traditional’ notion of conscience, and contrast this with the existentialist conception of conscience (which I take to be a close cousin of the view targeted by Schuklenk and Smalling). I argue that the traditional notion, grounded in an objective moral order, avoids the criticisms advanced by Schuklenk and Smalling; the existentialist conception, in contrast, does not. I conclude by discussing the benefits and risks of a ‘restricted view’ of respect for conscience.