The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (original) (raw)
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This paper presents an alternative narrative of the Cambodian peace process and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) based on Arturo Escobar’s theory of development, which defines development as a colonial discourse and practice, which sought to impose supposedly superior Western values, science and technology on the non-Western world. In the same way, the peace process and UNTAC can be described as a mission civilisatrice that underestimated the West’s role in causing the conflict in the first place while the attempt at conflict resolution is marked by an overestimation of the West’s ability as well as insufficient self-criticism and attention to the actual political, economic and social conditions in Cambodia.
UNTAC in Cambodia: A New Model for Humanitarian Aid in Failed States?
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T he collapse of entire societies as a result of internal conflict, often characterized in the post-cold-war period by ethnic hostilities and by long suppressed cultural, political, and religious divisions, has placed an unprecedented burden on the peace-making and peace keeping roles of the United Nations. In many instances --Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti have had, perhaps, the highest profiles --the UN has had to struggle to define not only an appropriate response to the humanitarian crisis, but also an effective method of intervention. How to stanch the bleeding, begin the healing process, and establish conditions for political stability once the international forces have left, is a daunting problem that has met with only partial success.