Regulatory takings and constitutional repair the 1990s' property-rights rebellion (original) (raw)
1995, Constitutional Political Economy
In spite of the fact that the Constitution's fifth amendment states that "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation" politicians systematically impose almost confiscatory land-use restrictions on citizens. Growth of regulation and property-fights uncertainty have spawned grass roots opposition and political efforts to reinforce constitutional protections. Lacking success at the national level, property-fights advocates moved to the states where by August 1994 more than forty introduced property-rights legislation. Statistical estimates of the likelihood that such legislation would be introduced reveal strong support of the notion that the property-rights movement is a reaction to growth of government regulation.
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The New Politics of Property Rights
Critical Review, 2004
Philosophical defenses of property regimes can be classified as supporting either a conservative politics of property rights—the political protection of existing property titles—or a radical politics of direct political intervention to redistribute property titles. Traditionally, historical considerations were used to legitimize conservative property‐rights politics, while consequentialist arguments led to radical politics. Recently, however, the philosophical legitimations have changed places. Conservatives now point to the beneficial economic consequences of something like the current private‐property regime, while radicals justify political redistribution as restitution for historical misappropriations. This shift can be explained by such factors as the failure of state‐directed redistributions of property during the twentieth century to benefit the poor. But there are limitations to the usefulness of historical arguments for radicals, and of consequentialist arguments for conservatives: namely, the undeserving poor and the idle rich, respectively.
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