Dynamics of the Presidential Veto: A Computational (original) (raw)

The veto as electoral stunt: EITM and a test with comparative data

2012

Abstract This paper extends Romer and Rosenthal's approach to separation of power, incorporating the use of vetoes and veto overrides, without sacrificing their explanatory power of policy outcomes. Vetoes are treated as deliberate acts of position taking in executive-legislative negotiation. The model yields comparative statics results and hence empirical implications. These are turned into seven falsifiable hypotheses on veto and override incidence.

Toward a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides

Political Research Quarterly, 2001

This research develops a typology of vetoes and overrides based on the nature of the coalition that originally passed the legislation. We posit that both legislative and non-legislative objectives inform the strategies of the President and congressional leaders. The implications for measures of presidential and congressional power are considerable. Using veto and override data for the period 1969-98, we show that vote-switching between the passage of legislation and veto overrides is likely to occur only for a specific subset of legislation.

Veto Power and Governmental Policy

2011

How does the power to veto affect governmental policy? We develop a game-theoretic model of an interaction between an expert, a proposer and a vetoer. The proposer and the vetoer do not know perfectly the consequences of policies and have to rely on an expert for this information. The expert transmits a message to the decision-makers and the communication is cheap talk: the message has purely an informational function. We use this model to analyze how the power of veto affects the information transmitted in equilibrium and the utilities of the players. The model has several important applications ranging from legislative and regulatory politics to corporate governance.

MODELS OF VETOES AND VETO BARGAINING

Key Words executive-legislative relations, presidents, separation of powers, gridlock I Abstract Models of veto bargaining have become an important tool for formal institutional analysis. This chapter reviews the core model of veto bargaining and some of its more interesting and useful extensions, focusing on one of the best developed applications, the presidential veto over legislation. One of the primary attractions of these models is that they often produce crisp, testable empirical predictions. Our review focuses on 18 such predictions. We conclude with a brief review of the empirical evidence related to these hypotheses.

Item Vetoes and Attempts to Override Them in Multiparty Legislatures

Journal of Politics in Latin America, 2013

This paper analyzes the dynamics of vetoes and veto overrides in the context of a multiparty legislature using an original dataset from the period 1983–2007 in Argentina. We argue that the President can use an “item” or “partial” veto to selectively delete articles, while keeping enough distributive goods in the bill to break up the coalition responsible for its passage, thereby eliminating support for an override. Our research reveals that total vetoes – which affect all legislators equally – are more likely to be overridden than partial vetoes. Contradicting the received wisdom that in multiparty legislatures override attempts are more likely under a divided government, we find that override attempts are more likely in plurality governments. We use case analyses to illustrate the main arguments developed in this paper.

The Economic Power of Veto Players The Connection between Fiscal Policies, and Political Systems

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016

The present paper explores the correlation between political systems, and fiscal policies, very much in the footsteps of the seminal work by Roubini and Sachs (1989), thus focusing on the relative dispersion or concentration of political power as the main political characteristic. The principal theoretical goal is to predict those changes in fiscal policy that may be induced by modifications in the partisan structure of political systems, as compared to cross-sectional differences between constitutional systems. Following the distinction between the cash-based, and the accrual based approach to public finance, the paper attempts to study the government's fiscal stance as capital balances, besides treating the current flows. The theoretical model introduced in this paper attempts to define the possible appropriation of liquid assets in the public sector, starting from the basic fiscal equation. Empirical research presented consists of both a quantitative, econometric part, and qualitative case studies. The classification of political systems is based on the distinctions introduced in the Database of Political Systems, as published by the World Bank. Said distinctions regard the possible concentration of power in the hands of a president, and the degree of proportionality in the electoral regime; they form the constitutional frames of the political system. The degree of political polarization regarding economic policy is the main measure of partisan fragmentation. Quantitative research allowed concluding that political systems do differ as for the amount of liquid capital held by the public sector. Three broad clusters of countries were defined, regarding their political systems, and these clusters display a significant disparity as for the observable fiscal stance. Case studies sampled from those clusters lead to conclude that the amount of liquid assets held by the public sector changes in close correlation to political polarization. The main path open for future research is the question whether fiscal variables can indicate pre-emptively the emergence of political veto players, even before their official appearance in the partisan, or the constitutional structure.

Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto

The Journal of Politics, 2002

This article evaluates and compares "president" and "presidency" centered explanations of presidential activity with respect to one important presidential power, the veto. Using individual bill data for nine congresses characterized by divided party government, I estimate a logistic regression model of presidential vetoes. This contrasts with previous research, which has used annual aggregate data. Using individual bill data allows controls for objectionable legislation passed by Congress and enables me to measure and compare the "propensity to veto" of different presidents. I conclude that presidential vetoes are in substantial measure caused by Congress passing objectionable bills, but that even controlling for congressional behavior, presidents exhibit strikingly different veto behavior. Ford was most prone to using the veto, and Reagan, the least. Although external factors exert great influence on the president's veto decision, the individual choices and strategies of presidents also have an important influence.

Getting their way, or getting in the way? Presidents and party unity in legislative voting

2002

Scholars disagree on what effect, if any, presidential versus parliamentary government has on political parties. In this paper, I measure unity in parties on legislative votes for parties and coalitions in 20 legislative chambers in 18 countries. I then estimate the effects of both regime type and membership in government on parties on legislative voting unity. I find that presidentialism undermines party unity. Furthermore, within presidential systems, parties that control the presidency, and parties allied with the government, do not win any more than do opposition parties, and their losses are more apt to result from breakdowns in legislative voting unity.