The Opening of Hegel's Logic and The Empty Possible World (original) (raw)
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Hegel's Logic and Narration of Contingency A Lógica e a Narração da Contingência em Hegel 1
The paper's main aims can be formulated as follows: a) Hegel has a strong notion of contingency. Contingency is for him not simple absence of necessity, and not simple under-determinedness either. Contingency is an original notion, having the same logical and metaphysical weight and dignity as the notion of necessity; b) this " strong " notion of contingency is decisive for Hegel's conception of subjectivity. Insofar it can be tracked up to his real philosophy. Other than assumed in many commonplace interpretations of Hegel, I will suggest that the power to go from necessity to contingency makes up an essential part of subjective freedom as much as the power to go from contingency to necessity. This has important consequences especially in the philosophy of history, which is shown to be not aprioristic and dogmatic, but open to contingency (though not to sceptical conclusions); and c) consistently with the recognition of the irreducibility of contingency to a priori concepts, Hegel also recognizes the need for a non-philosophical narration of contingency and gives us some interesting clues about it and its relationship to philosophy. Throughout my argumentation of these three theses, I hope to provide evidence for the thesis that dogmatic constructions on Hegel's philosophy of history (including, but not limited to the so-called thesis of the " end of history ") can be undermined by referring to Hegel's understanding of contingency. On a more general scale, this also shows that the logical groundwork of Hegel's real philosophy cannot be abandoned without jeopardizing the potential of Hegel's thought to contribute to current philosophical debates. My argument is structured as follows. I will, first of all, comment on some passages of Hegel's Science of Logic from the beginning of the " Subjective logic " regarding the logic of
Dialettica hegeliana ed epistemologia analitica [Hegelian Dialectic and Analytic Epistemology] is the re-edition of the lecture notes for a course held by Mario Dal Pra at Milan State University in 1977. The book stands out for its constant effort to keep together historical rigour in the interpretation of classic authors and theoretical reflection on contemporary philosophical problems. The issue at stake is the possibility to conceive of Hegelian dialectic as a sophisticated version of empiricism, and therefore as less "idealistic" than it is ordinarily done. On the one hand, Dal Pra fully accepts the 'epistemological critique of dialectic': when it is regarded as a realist metaphysical doctrine, dialectic lacks not only verifiability, but also the minimum empirical underpinnings. On the other hand, if dialectic is no longer a universal ontological structure, but it is re-interpreted as a "particular heuristic tool", then it proves itself as capable of meeting the requirements of a modern theory of knowledge and it provides a useful integration of the philosophy of science. The entire book revolves around the crucial distinction between analytic and synthetic knowledge. Analytic knowledge is based upon the recognition of "data" that pre-exist the act of knowledge. On the contrary, synthetic knowledge entails a "creative" aspect and, to a certain extent, a conceptual "construction" of its object, free from the necessity of empirical confirmation or falsification. In the first part (chapters 2-4), Dal Pra reconstructs the different formulations and nuances the distinction assumes in the thought of Hume, Kant and Hegel, with particular regard to the question as to whether the analytic/ synthetic distinction is able to cover all possible forms of human knowledge. A brief but penetrating survey of Humean and Kantian theses explores the different paths of their criticism about the possibility of metaphysics and the limits of knowledge. Moreover, it allows to point out the radical divergence of Hegel's thought, which appears to be resolutely more confident about the possibility to attain to a rationally constructed organic totality of elements connected by necessary logical bonds.
Hegel and the Spiritual Evolution of Absolute Subject
Ethics in Progress, 2021
The article interprets the methodological potential of Hegel’s speculative dialectics as a possible course of spiritual evolution of the Absolute subject. The intention is towards the method, first through the very construction of the “idea of freedom” from the point of view of Logic; second, through the constitutive function of freedom and the transition of the subjective spirit into the objective spirit; third, through the unfolding of mediation in the realms of the objective spirit. This essentially substantial methodologization dissolves the theoretical space of the idea of the mediating function of freedom as an ontological principle of ethical life. In line with the paradigm of such a course, the text considers a project of speculative ethics, a project within the framework of which the methodological and ontological sublation of spiritual evolution takes place.
Some Metaphysical Implications of Hegel's Theodicy
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2012
This paper examines Hegel’s claim that philosophy “has no other object than God” as a claim about the essentiality of the idea of God to philosophy. On this idealist interpretation, even atheistic philosophies would presuppose rationally evaluable ideas of God, despite denials of the existence of anything corresponding to those ideas. This interpretation is then applied to Hegel’s version of idealism in relation to those of two predecessors, Leibniz and Kant. Hegel criticizes the idea of the Christian God present within his predecessors in terms of his own heterodox reading of the Trinity in order to resolve a paradox affecting them – the “paradox of perspectivism”.
Hegel and the Problem of Beginning
Hegel Bulletin, 2021
In this article I develop an interpretation of the opening passages of Hegel’s essay “With what must the beginning of science be made?” I suggest firstly that Hegel is engaging there with a distinctive problem, the overcoming of which he understands to be necessary in order to guarantee the scientific character of the derivation of the fundamental categories of thought which he undertakes in the Science of Logic. I refer to this as “the problem of beginning”. I proceed to clarify the nature of the problem, which I understand to be motivated by a concern to avoid arbitrariness, and then to detail the nature of Hegel’s proposed solution, which turns on understanding how the concept of “pure being”, understood in a specific sense to be both mediated and immediate, avoids the concerns about arbitrariness which accompany attempts to begin merely with something mediated, or merely with something immediate. On this basis, I offer a number criticisms of alternative approaches to the beginning of Hegel’s Logic.
On the Incompatibility of Hegel's Phenomenology with the Beginning of his Logic
The Review of Metaphysics, 2020
This paper argues firstly that the argument of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is necessary for the justification of the beginning of his logical project, and secondly that Hegel's attempt to secure the beginning of his Science of Logic by relying upon the argument of the Phenomenology fails. I argue firstly that the position taken up at the beginning of Hegel's Logic is constructed in such a fashion that it relies upon the argument of the Phenomenology to justify it. I then offer some support for the view of the relationship between the two texts defended by Maker in order to see how the two might be thought to be compatible. Finally, in the longest part of the paper, I offer a number of reasons for thinking that attempts to render the two compatible in this fashion fail. I therefore conclude that, as it stands, the beginning of Hegel's Logic is not secured against objection in the way that Hegel wants it to be.
Commentary on Hegel's Logic 1: Prefaces and Introduction
Phenomenology of spirit. Although I cannot proclaim to be nearly as good a Hegel-scholar as Harris is, I still thought it worth the effort to express my thoughts and interpretations of Science of logic in a study analysing each paragraph and then explaining it in more detail, as best as I could.