Reasonableness as Proportionality: Towards a Better Constructive Interpretation of the Law on Searching Computers in Canada (original) (raw)
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8 9 11 11 12 CHAPTER-2: CONSTITUTIONALITY 2.1 Pre-constitution information gathering powers 2.2 The power of the courts in respect constitutional issues 2.3 The Bill of Rights 2.4 The right to privacy in general 2.5 The right to just administrative action 2.5.1 Procedurally fair administrative action 2.6 The general limitation provision 2.7 Post constitution amendments to information gathering powers 2.7.1 Power of search & seizure in terms of s74D of the Act 2.7.2 Reasonable ground discretion 14 16 16 18 18 CHAPTER-3: CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3.1 Discretion to allow search and seizure 3.2 Constitutional challenges to information gathering powers 27 3.3 Risk of constitutional infringement 3.4 The right to privacy 3.5 The right to privacy and search and seizure 3.6 The right to privacy and compulsory disclosure of information CHAPTER• 4:THE COURTS APPROACH ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE 4.1 How the courts interpret and apply the information gathering provisions 39 4.1.1 The issues pertaining to the search warrants 4.2 Comparative approach in other jurisdictions on search and seizure 4.3 The American Approach 4.3.1 Effect of the Fourth Amendment 4.3.2 The American Exclusionary Rule 4.4 The European Approach 4.4.1 The interests protected by Article 8 4.4.2 Justification for interference by the Authorities 4.5 The Search and seizure of Computer Data CHAPTER• 5: THE NATURE OF THE APPLICATION FOR SEARCH AND SEIZURE 5.1 Notice of application, nature of application and the right of appearance 5.1.1 Pro-Forma Warrant in terms of s74D of IT Act and 57D of VAT Act 5.1.2 Power of Attorney 5.2 Format of application 5.3 Pro-Forma notice of application 5.4 Affidavits-Disclosure of founding affidavit 5.4.1 Pro-Forma Founding Affidavit 73 5.5 Procedure during execution of warrant 5.6 Defective search warrant and remedies CHAPTER-6: SETIING ASIDE OF A SEARCH WARRANT 6.1 Application to have warrant set aside 6.2 Rights to privacy and property can't always stop a Revenue raid CHAPTER• 7: CONCLUSION 7.1 Conclusion 7.2 Can section 74D survive the constitutionality test BIBLIOGRAPHY 85