Critiquing "Approximate Truth" (original) (raw)

Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism

Philosophy of Science, 1992

ABSTRACT This paper describes a theory of accuracy or approximate truth and applies it to problems in the realist interpretation of scientific theories. It argues not only that realism requires approximate truth, but that an adequate theory of approximation also presupposes some elements of a realist interpretation of theories. The paper distinguishes approximate truth from vagueness, probability and verisimilitude, and applies it to problems of confirmation and deduction from inaccurate premises. Basic results are cited, but details appear elsewhere. Objections are surveyed, including arguments by Miller, Laymon, and Laudan. Comparison is made with Niiniluoto's theory of verisimilitude, and the utility of his theory for realism assessed

A Fond Farewell to "Approximate Truth"?

Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 2018

Most commonly, the scientific realism debate is seen as dividing those who do and do not think that the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific theories indicate with high probability that those theories are ‘approximately true’. But I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has far outlived its usefulness. Not only does it obscure the central differences between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realist, but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such realism is untenable in either form.

Two arguments for scientific realism unified

Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents of our scientific theories can still be defended. Selective realists thereby hope to secure the argument from success against apparent historical counterexamples. Independently of that objective, historical considerations have inspired a further argument for selective realism, where evidence for the retention of parts of theories is itself offered as justification for adopting a realist attitude towards them. Given the nature of these arguments from success and from retention, a reasonable expectation is that they would complement and reinforce one another, but although several theses purport to provide such a synthesis the results are often unconvincing. In this paper I reconsider the realist's favoured type of scientific success, novel success, offer a revised interpretation of the concept, and argue that a significant consequence of reconfiguring the realist's argument from success accordingly is a greater potential for its unification with the argument from retention. 1 Musgrave (1988) argues that 'careful realists', at least since Whewell, have always intended the verification of novel predictions in discussions of scientific success. Worrall (1989b), , and Psillos (1999) each argue the importance of peculiarly novel success; many recent antirealist arguments also now pay particular attention to such results. 2 The most famous example of the antirealist challenge from the history of science is . Many interpret Laudan as defending a (pessimistic meta-) induction that implies our own theories are destined for replacement by new theories, radically incongruent with our own. Others (for example argue convincingly that Laudan should instead be understood as merely providing examples that at least appear to undermine the credibility of the realist's inference from success to approximate truth. On either interpretation historical considerations present the realist with a significant challenge.

Evidence, Explanation, and the Empirical Status of Scientific Realism

Erkenntnis, 2005

There is good reason to believe that, if it can be decided at all, the realism debate must be decided on empirical grounds. In an earlier paper, the author has proposed a method for empirically deciding the debate that relies on Glymour's bootstrapping account of confirmation. The present paper proposes a variant method that can make do with the less controversial Bayesian confirmation theory.

Putting scientific realism into perspective

Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 2022

In this paper, we offer a brief overview of the debate between realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science. On the background of that debate, we consider two recently developed approaches aimed at vindicating realist intuitions while acknowledging the limitations of scientific knowledge. Perspectivalists explain disagreement in science without giving up the idea that currently accepted scientific theories describe reality largely accurately: they posit the existence of different perspectives within which scientific claims can be produced and tested. The integrative approach instead encourages researchers to embrace pluralism: conflicting frameworks and methodologies can be integrated when new knowledge is gained. In the natural and human sciences, researchers sometimes behave as if perspectivism is true; at other times, they hope for a reconciliation between conflicting frameworks and believe that this can be achieved by progressively filling knowledge gaps.

Comparative success and empirical progress without approximate truth

Synthese, 2023

This paper argues against a particular version of the inference from the success of a scientific theory to the claim that the theory must be approximately true to some extent. The kind of success at issue is comparative, where one theory is more empirically successful than its rival if that theory predicts phenomena that are inexplicable or anomalous according to its rival. A theory that exhibits this kind of comparative success can be seen as thereby achieving empirical progress over its rival. David Harker has developed a form of selective scientific realism based on the idea that this kind of success is evidence for the approximate truth of the parts of theories responsible for such success. Counterexamples to Harker's position are cases in which a theory is more successful than its rival in virtue of containing parts that are not even approximately true. In order to identify some counterexamples to Harker's position, this paper considers four historical cases that Greg Frost-Arnold has recently used to motivate a novel historical challenge to realism called the Problem of Misleading Evidence. This paper argues that these four cases are counterexamples to Harker's position, and that they provide a strong reason to doubt his position and the kind of success-to-truth inference that he defends.

Explanatory Failures of Relative Realism

2015

Scientific realism (Putnam 1975; Psillos 1999) and relative realism (Mizrahi 2013) claim that successful scientific theories are approximately true and comparatively true, respectively. A theory is approximately true if and only if it is close to the truth. A theory is comparatively true if and only if it is closer to the truth than its competitors are. I argue that relative realism is more skeptical about the claims of science than it initially appears to be and that it can explain neither the success nor the failure of science. Hence, it is not a promising competitor to scientific realism.

The Appearance and the Reality of a Scientific Theory

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2020

Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. Relative realists object that we cannot make the absolute judgment that a theory is successful, and that we can only make the relative judgment that it is more successful than its competitor. I argue that this objection is undermined by the cases in which empirical equivalents are successful. Relative realists invoke the argument from a bad lot to undermine scientific realism and to support relative realism. In response, I construct the argument from double spaces. It is similar to the argument from a bad lot, but threatens many philosophical inferences, including relative realists' inference from comparative success to comparative truth.

A Defense for Scientific Realism: Skepticisms, Unobservables, & Inference to the Best Explanation

2017

The epistemological status of scientific knowledge claims has been undermined by skepticism, in particular by universal skepticism. This thesis asserts that Bas C. van Fraassen’s empirical stance is akin to universal skepticism. This work also maintains that van Fraassen’s empirical stance does not lead to the conclusion that scientific knowledge claims are empirically adequate—especially those claims that resulted from the scientific method of inference to the best explanation (IBE). To illustrate why van Fraassen’s stance does not devalue scientific knowledge claims will be suggested via Peter Lipton’s understanding of IBE combined with Ernan McMullin’s epistemic values. By bridging McMullin’s values with Lipton’s version of IBE, we get a more robust version of IBE; as a result, scientific claims may display a cluster of epistemic virtues and values. Where scientific knowledge claims display a cluster of epistemic virtues and values, they are simply beyond being empirically adequate.