Private Information In Sequential Common-Value Auctions (original) (raw)

Abstract

We study an infinitely$repeated first$price auction with common values. Initially, bid$ ders receive independent private signals about the objectslvalue, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one$sided incomplete ...

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