Socratic " Argument " in Plato's Early Definitional Dialogues (original) (raw)
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The Structure of Enquiry in Plato's Early Dialogues
2015
This book proposes and defends a radically new account of Plato's method of argument and enquiry in his early dialogues. Vasilis Politis challenges the traditional account according to which these dialogues are basically about the demand for definitions, and questions the equally traditional view that what lies behind Plato's method of argument is a peculiar theory of knowledge. He argues that these dialogues are enquiries set in motion by dilemmas and aporiai, incorporating both a sceptical and an anti-sceptical dimension, and he contends that Plato introduces the demand for definitions, and the search for essences, precisely in order to avoid a sceptical conclusion and hold out the prospect that knowledge can be achieved. His argument will be of great value to all readers interested in Plato's dialogues and in methods of philosophical argument more generally. vasilis politis is Head of Philosophy and Director of the Plato Centre at Trinity College Dublin. He is co-editor of The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy (with Giorgos Karamanolis, Cambridge, forthcoming), and has published numerous essays in journals including Phronesis.
Nailing Down Arguments in Ancient Greece: A Gloss on the Logic of Socrates and Aristotle Jim Elliott
The Purdue Historian, 2013
Part I-The Socratic Elenchus "I found this [Socratic] method the safest for myself and very embarrassing to those against whom I used it; therefore, I took delight in it, practiced it continually, and grew very artful and expert in drawing people, even of superior knowledge, into concessions the consequences of which they did not foresee, entangling them in difficulties out of which they could not extricate themselves, and so obtaining victory that neither myself nor my causes always deserved."-Benjamin Franklin, Papers 1 What is the elenchus? Consider this excerpt from Plato's Euthyphro: "Is the pious [itself] not the same and alike in every action? … Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another's that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not." 2 Here, Socrates is interrogating Euthyphro, a self-reported religious expert, as to the nature of piety. When Socrates first enquires as to what exactly "piety" is (notably a self-serving enquiry, as Socrates is about to hear his own trial regarding his alleged impiety), Euthyphro quickly states that piety is his imputation for his father's wrongdoing. Socrates, however, is not very fond of this response; in fact, he points out that Euthyphro's response is indeed an example of piety, not a definition; moreover, Euthyphro's answer seems to be morally ambiguous (is it right to impute your father?). The quotation above is Socrates' follow-up-having claimed that certain acts can be pious, Euthyphro has committed himself to believing that there is some sort of intrinsic quality to these "pious actions"; Socrates now enquires as to this intrinsic quality (namely, "the pious [itself]"), and Euthyphro is now forced to justify his claim and explicate this apparent intrinsic quality. This bit of text exemplifies what the Greeks called elenchus (Attic: ελεγχοςto scrutinize, refute, or cross-examine), and what we now call the "Socratic method". It is important to note that Socrates was not the inventor of the elenchus, however-the honorary title is merely 1 Quotation pulled from Nails, Debra, "Socrates", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Emphasis placed by myself.
Classics Ireland 27, 2021
This book has been ably reviewed by others. I am taking a second look at it now on the occasion of the publication of its sequel, a review of which I also provide in this volume. I have had the distinct pleasure of being a student and colleague of Vasilis Politis (VP) since the initiation of the project that led to these monographs, and the great privilege of witnessing the development of the project for more than a decade. VP's Plato is in a way the only one I have known. When I hear the terms 'aporia', 'whether-or-not', and 'ti esti', they ring in my ears like bells. In this double review, I hope to impress upon the reader the unique importance of this interpretation of Plato, both for the history of philosophy and philosophy more broadly, and thereby to give a sense of its melody and resonance.
Using Examples in Philosophical Inquiry: Plato’s Statesman 277d1-278e2 and 285c4-286b2.
New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic, 2022
Plato often depicts Socrates inquiring together with an interlocutor into a thing/concept by trying to answer the “What is it?” question about that thing/concept. This typically involves Socrates requesting that his discussion partner answer the question, and usually ends in failure. There are, however, instances in which Socrates provides the sort of answer, in relation to a more familiar thing/concept, that he would like to receive in relation to a more obscure thing/concept, thus furnishing his interlocutor with an example of how he would like him to answer. This chapter considers this dialectical tool by focusing on three instances of its use (Meno 73e3–76e4; Laches 191e9–192b3; Theaetetus 146e7–147c6). It argues, first, that in these instances Socrates provides true and adequate definitions of the things/concepts in question. It further argues that dialectic, for Plato, is just as much about the essences everyday things/concepts as it is about the essences of more obscure things/concepts; and that it is just as much about the meanings of the words we use to designate things, as it is about the essences of those things.
It is first argued that dialectic was a form of regimented debate, which grew out of public debates in Ancient Greece. A set of rules for dialectical bouts is then given and their meaning explained. The transition from oral to written arguments is briefly examined, leading to the formulation of a delimitation problem in Plato's dialogues, as he inserted dialectical arguments within ordinary dialogue contexts, turning them into discussions where one of the participants reasons hypothetically to make the other realize that they are not entitled to their view. Doing so, Plato adjusted dialectic to a variety of dialogue purposes and in order to explore this variety, a study of the early tradition of classifying Plato's dialogues in terms of their 'character' is suggested, the results of which are then compared with types of dialogues in contemporary Argumentation Theory. 4.1 Public Debates and Dialectic as Regimented Debate Ut nihil affirmet ipse, refellat alios G. E. R. Lloyd argued in Magic, Reason and Experience that beliefs about nature were subjected within Ancient Greek culture to the same "radical examination" as political views: they were openly challenged in public debates, where every assumption was liable to be scrutinized. 1 In the opening section of On the Nature of Man, the author describes public debates between contending speakers concerning such beliefs: He who is accustomed to hear speakers discuss the nature of man beyond its relations to medicine will not find the present account of any interest. For I do not say at all that a man is air, or fire, or water, or earth, or anything else that is not an obvious constituent of man; such accounts I leave to those that care to give them. Those, however, who give them have 1 [42, p. 248].