A Philosopher in the Lab. Carl Stumpf on Philosophy and Experimental Sciences (original) (raw)
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D. Fisette, R. Martinelli (Eds.): Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint. Essays on Carl Stumpf
Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 69 / 4 / 2016 B. REFERATE ÜBER FREMDSPRACHIGE NEUERSCHEINUNGEN Denis Fisette, Riccardo Martinelli (Eds.): Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint. Essays on Carl Stumpf (Series: Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie, Bd. 46). 546 S., Brill-Rodopi, Leiden/Boston 2015; ISBN 978-90-04-29909-2 (hardcover); ISBN 978-90-04-29910-8 (e-book), EUR 115,-A student of Franz Brentano and R. H. Lotze, mentor -among othersof Edmund Husserl, Robert Musil, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Lewin, professor at the universities of Würzburg, Prague, Halle, Munich, Berlin -where he founded the Institute of Psychology -, Carl
Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
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Introduction: Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Parts 1 and 2
Philosophical Psychology, 2010
In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology (Nos. 23.3 & 23.4) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.
All in the Family: The History and Philosophy of Experimental Philosophy
Experimental philosophy (or "x-phi") is a way of doing philosophy. It is "traditional" philosophy, but with a little something extra: In addition to the expected philosophical arguments and engagement, x-phi involves the use of empirical methods to test the empirical claims that arise. This extra bit strikes some as a new, perhaps radical, addition to philosophical practice. We don't think so. As this chapter will show, empirical claims have been common across the history of Western philosophy, as have appeals to empirical observation in attempting to support or subvert these claims. While conceptions of philosophy have changed over time, across these changes we find philosophers employing empirical methods in pursuing their philosophical questions. Our primary aim in this chapter is to illustrate this fact. We begin by discussing the relevance of history to experimental philosophy (Section 2), then offer a necessarily condensed and highly selective history of empirical work in Western philosophy, ranging from the ancients (Section 3), to the early moderns (Section 4), to the late moderns (Section 5), and on to the present (Section 6).
Philosophers' Thinking (Experimental philosophy & Qualitative Tools Vol 4)
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (VOLUME 4) and Qualitative tools and experimental philosophy. So-called Experimental Philosophy (X-Phi) is one of the latest fashions or fads in philosophy. It gives people who wish to do ‘philosophy’ but do not find something in the other types of doing philosophy something to do. The other types are, apart from a handful of original- and creative thinking individuals, the usual academic publications, theses, conferences, etc that keep professional philosophers busy and enable them to maintain their obligatory lists of publications, dealing with minute ‘analysis’ of aspects of other microscopic ‘analysis’. Much of so-called Experimental Philosophy appears to me like some kind of rather superficial social surveys and drawing, mostly philosophically irrelevant conclusions from them. I present a number of sources on this kind of doing of ‘philosophy’. As I myself was trained as a scientist and for years did work as scientific researcher I find much of what is passed off as so-called experimental philosophy very amateurish, not-methodological, lacking scientific research methods and naïve. I intended to add a second section to this volume, entitled scientific method, but the volume will already be too large without it. I include different definitions of this sub-domain of philosophy, criticism of it and its methods and reasons for the practising of it. I conclude with a number of studies on the philosophy of sex and two articles of my own on the feeling accompanying male ejaculation and male orgasm. I end with a Brian Leiter post/s and very interesting comments by a number of philosophers. THAT says more about philosophy/izing and the state and nature of this discipline than many so-called X-Phi ‘experiments’. Just as there are a few good, outstanding or excellent original- and creative- thinking ‘traditional’ philosophers, a great number of average ones and a mass of forgotten poor ones, and this go for all ‘fields’ or kinds of philosophy/izing, including experimental philosophy; we find in the ‘field’ of experimental philosophy that there are a few worthy of the name of philosopher, who ask significant and original questions and deal with them in creative ways, the usual great number of lesser ones jumping on the fashionable bandwagon (as they have no original problems to concern themselves with and creative ways to deal with them) and the great mass not to be taken seriously at all.
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Philosophical Explorations, 2007
Experimental philosophy is the name for a recent movement whose participants use the methods of experimental psychology to probe the way people think about philosophical issues and then examine how the results of such studies bear on traditional philosophical debates. Given both the breadth of the research being carried out by experimental philosophers and the controversial nature of some of their central methodological assumptions, it is of no surprise that their work has recently come under attack. In this paper we respond to some criticisms of experimental philosophy that have recently been put forward by Antti Kauppinen. Unlike the critics of experimental philosophy, we do not think the fledgling movement either will or should fall before it has even had a chance to rise up to explain what it is, what it seeks to do (and not to do), and exactly how it plans to do it. Filling in some of the salient details is the main goal of the present paper.
A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: AFTER 65 YEARS
A Philosophy of Science-after 65 years, 2020
This is a retrospective and comparative analysis of the relationship of philosophy to scientific endeavors in general, to physics and medicine specifically. I intend it as a comparative and analytic inquiry, focally annotated, into the writings by scientists from several specialities: cognitive linguistics, philosophy and theoretical physics. This is a broad inquiry into the role of philosophy in the work of scientists; given that the origins of science and philosophy share similar intentions, in the opinion of many, the scientists have left the study of philosophy to the philosophers. The discussion is also a lament about the state of theoretical physics today and offers an explanation for this state of being.
The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy
Philosophical Explorations
In disputes about conceptual analysis, each side typically appeals to pre-theoretical 'intuitions' about particular cases. Recently, many naturalistically oriented philosophers have suggested that these appeals should be understood as empirical hypotheses about what people would say when presented with descriptions of situations, and have consequently conducted surveys on non-specialists. I argue that this philosophical research programme, a key branch of what is known as 'experimental philosophy', rests on mistaken assumptions about the relation between people’s concepts and their linguistic behaviour. The conceptual claims that philosophers make imply predictions about the folk’s responses only under certain demanding, counterfactual conditions. Because of the nature of these conditions, the claims cannot be tested with methods of positivist social science. We are, however, entitled to appeal to intuitions about folk concepts in virtue of possessing implicit normative knowledge acquired through reflective participation in everyday linguistic practices.
A Theory of Intelligibility, Ch. V On Experimentalism
The passage from classical mechanics (CM) to quantum mechanics (QM) has meant a deep change in the quality of understanding and in the metaphysical outlook inscribed in science. The external opinion or feeling (not being myself a professional physicist) expressed here is that such evolution has not made things easier for the explanatory processes involved in the search for intelligibility.