SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND TRUTH-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS (original) (raw)
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Theories of Semantics: Merits and Limitations
Meaning is so intangible that one group of linguists , the structuralists , preferred not to deal with it or rely on it at all. It is a variable and not to be taken for granted. Nevertheless , many theories have been interested in the study of meaning. Because of the limited scope of this paper, the discussion will cover some of the well–known theories of meaning formulated in the last century. Mainly referential theory of meaning, non– referential theory of meaning and generative grammarian theory of meaning are discussed. Some assumptions, merits and limitations for each theory are also described. The researcher hopes that many people can benefit from this article since meaning is a complex concept and difficult to understand.
Truth theories, competence, and semantic computation
2012
For a T-theory to be adequate for a language L it must meet certain constraints on interpretation of speakers that are codified in the methodology of Radical Interpretation (cf. Davidson 1973; 1974). It is clear that Davidson thought that speakers of natural languages are interpretable by means of the methodology of radical interpretation, and hence that the claim (ER) is not trivially true because of problems of interpretation.
Towards a Theory of Semantic Competence - Master Thesis 2011
2011
In the present thesis, a theory of semantic competence is modeled using tools from epistemic logic. The resulting formal model is used to analyze a problem from the philosophy of language, namely Frege's Dilemma. There are two aims of the thesis: to construct a formal theory of semantic competence, and to show that the formal theory can be used as an useful analytical tool in uncovering the informational structure behind problems from the philosophy of language. The first aim is achieved by, first, deciding for which theory of meaning a theory of semantic competence is wanted. Due to its simplicity, Millianism is chosen. Then various non-formal theories of semantic competence are evaluated with respect to finding one which allows for an objective, inter-subjective comparison of competence levels. It is argued that the conceptual theory of (Marconi, 1997) is the best choice: the theory has a clearly defined structure making modeling possible, and is based on empirical studies from cognitive neuropsychology. Following these initial choises, the modeling framework and its philosophical interpretation is presented. The framework used is epistemic logic, and both the propositional and quantified versions are introduced. As a more expressible logical language is required, manysorted quantified epistemic logic is presented, and a novel, general completeness result is shown for many-sorted extensions of quantified modal logic. Having thus set the stage of achieving the first aim, a slightly simplified version of the theory of (Marconi, 1997) is modeled. A suitable model-class is defined and a meaning function is added to capture Millian meaning. Based on the shown completeness result, a sound and complete axiom system is presented, and a logic representing the formal theory is thereby found. The model is then validated. It is shown that both the essential ontological properties as well as the competence types from Marconi's theory are present. It is further shown that the formal counterparts of the competence types from Marconi's theory adhere to the principles dictated by empirical studies. Thereby, the first aim is achieved. To accomplish the second aim, proof of concept is shown. This is done by analyzing an objection to the correctness of the Millian theory of meaning, namely Frege's Dilemma (Frege, 1892). The formal theory is used to analyze both disjuncts of the dilemma, while focusing on the epistemic situation of the agent, i.e. the agent's level of semantic competence. The formal theory of semantic competence allows for multiple notions of semantic competence, each resulting in a unique rendering of the dilemma. Based on these analyses, it it is concluded that once the underlying informational structure of the discussed situations is revealed, neither disjunct proves to be a problem for the Millian theory of meaning. Hereby, the second aim is accomplished. However, I raise an intuitive objection to one of the analyses. It is argued that the objection introduces an un-accounted for parameter, namely contexts. In order to show that this objection is not fatal for the proposed analysis, a chapter is devoted to the construction of a contextual theory of semantic competence. The notion of contexts is incorporated into the models for semantic competence, and the possibilities for finding a complete axiomatic system is discussed, but no completeness result is shown. Therefore, a formal theory, i.e. a logic, for contextual semantic competence is not presented. However, the model-theoretic machinery is used to re-analyze the problematic case. It is shown that when the situation is modeled in a contextual model, the epistemic analysis of the disjunct again showed the Puzzle about Identity is unproblematic for the Millian view. Overall, the constructed formal theory of semantic competence is shown to elucidate informational aspects of the problems posed to the philosophy of language by Frege's Dilemma. In particular, once the informational structure of the problems is clear, it is shown that each argument is far from being as decisive against Millianism as has been the mainstream view in 20th century philosophy of language.
On the Very Idea of a Theory of Meaning for a Natural Language
Synthese, 1997
A certain orthodoxy has it that understanding is essentially computational: that information about what a sentence means is something that may be generated by means of a derivational process from information about the significance of the sentence’s constituent parts and of the ways in which they are put together. And that it is therefore fruitful to study formal theories acceptable as compositional theories of meaning for natural languages: theories that deliver for each sentence of their object-language a theorem acceptable as statement of its meaning and derivable from axioms characterizing subsentential expressions and operations forming that sentence. This paper is to show that there is something deeply wrong with these ideas, namely that they are based on a certain confusion about ascriptions of semantic knowledge. The paper is to make this point by considering a semantic theorist who has explicit knowledge of a theory of truth for L. And by showing that all the theorist needs ...
LINGUISTIK TERAPAN
Meaning is the essence of language. It has been one of the main concerns in the study of language since the age of Plato and Aristotle. There have been various theories of meaning but only a few explains ‘what one knows when s/he is said to know the meaning of linguistic expressions’. Truth-conditional theory of meaning is one of them – not to say the only theory of meaning – which explains ‘what one knows when s/he is said to know the meaning of linguistic expressions’. However, it has been little paid attention to by theorists working on linguistic meaning since the decline of the ideal language philosophy. It happens so because it is basically misunderstood, i.e. the misunderstanding between linguistic proposition and epistemic proposition in the correspondence theory of truth. This paper revives the significance of the truth-conditional theory of meaning in understanding what constitutes the meaning of linguistic expressions when one is said to know it.