Forensic anthropology and the concept of race: If races don't exist, why are forensic anthropologists so good at identifying them? (original) (raw)

Understanding race and human variation: Why forensic anthropologists are good at identifying race

American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 2009

American forensicanthropologists uncritically accepted the biological race concept from classic physical anthropology and applied it to methods of human identification. Why and how the biological race concept might work in forensic anthropology was contemplated by Sauer (Soc Sci Med 34 1992 107–111), who hypothesized that American forensic anthropologists are good at what they do because of a concordance between social race and skeletal morphology in American whites and blacks. However, Sauer also stressed that this concordance did not validate the classic biological race concept of physical anthropology that there are a relatively small number of discrete types of human beings. Results from Howells (Papers of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology 67 1973 1–259; Papers of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology 79 1989 1–189; Papers of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology 82 1995 1–108) and others using craniometric and molecular data show strong geographic patterning of human variation despite overlap in their distributions. However, Williams et al. (Curr Anthropol 46 2005 340–346) concluded that skeletal morphology cannot be used to accurately classify individuals. Williams et al. cited additional support from Lewontin (Evol Biol 6 1972 381–398), who analyzed classic genetic markers. In this study, multivariate analyses of craniometric data support Sauer's hypothesis that there are morphological differences between American whites and blacks. We also confirm significant geographic patterning in human variation but also find differences among groups within continents. As a result, if biological races are defined by uniqueness, then there are a very large number of biological races that can be defined, contradicting the classic biological race concept of physical anthropology. Further, our results show that humans can be accurately classified into geographic origin using craniometrics even though there is overlap among groups. Am J Phys Anthropol 2009. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Assumed differences; unquestioned typologies: The oversimplification of race and ancestry in forensic anthropology

Forensic Anthropology, 2021

Forensic anthropologists traditionally estimate “race” or “ancestry” as part of the biological profile. While practitioners may have changed the terms used to describe regionally patterned human skeletal variation, the degree to which they have altered their typological approaches remains unclear. This study analyzed 119 peer-reviewed forensic anthropology articles published in four relevant journals (1966–2020) by matching combination(s) of the key words “race,” “ancestry,” “ethnicity,” and/or “population affinity.” Results indicated that while “ancestry” has supplanted “race,” this change has not brought concurrent modifications in approach, nor deeper scrutiny of underlying concepts. “Race” and “ancestry” were infrequently defined in 13% and 12% of sampled articles, respectively, and a plethora of social, geographic, and pseudoscientific terms persisted. Forensic anthropologists increasingly engaged with questions addressing the forces patterning human biological variation: 65% of studies postdating 1999 discussed population histories/structures and microevolution; 38% between 1966–1999. Fewer studies contextualized or critiqued approaches to analyzing population variation (32% of studies postdating 1999; 4% from 1966–1999), and virtually no studies considered the possibility that skeletal variation reflected embodied social inequity (5% of studies postdating 1999; 0% from 1966–1999). This lack of interrogation and clarity contributes to the faulty notion that all forensic anthropologists share similar definitions and leads to an oversimplification of complex biocultural processes. While the lack of definitions and biocultural engagement may be partly due to editorial and peer-review pressures, it is likely that many forensic anthropologists have not interrogated their own perspectives. This article holds that it is essential for us to do so.

Estimation and evidence in forensic anthropology: Sex and race

American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 2009

Forensic anthropology typically uses osteological and/or dental data either to estimate characteristics of unidentified individuals or to serve as evidence in cases where there is a putative identification. In the estimation context, the problem is to describe aspects of an individual that may lead to their eventual identification, whereas in the evidentiary context, the problem is to provide the relative support for the identification. In either context, individual characteristics such as sex and race may be useful. Using a previously published forensic case (Steadman et al. (2006) Am J Phys Anthropol 131:15–26) and a large (N = 3,167) reference sample, we show that the sex of the individual can be reliably estimated using a small set of 11 craniometric variables. The likelihood ratio from sex (assuming a 1:1 sex ratio for the “population at large”) is, however, relatively uninformative in “making” the identification. Similarly, the known “race” of the individual is relatively uninformative in “making” the identification, because the individual was recovered from an area where the 2000 US census provides a very homogenous picture of (self-identified) race. Of interest in this analysis is the fact that the individual, who was recovered from Eastern Iowa, classifies very clearly with [Howells 1973. Cranial Variation in Man: A Study by Multivariate Analysis of Patterns of Difference Among Recent Human Populations. Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology; 1989. Skull Shape and the Map: Craniometric Analyses in the Dispersion of Modern Homo. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. Easter Islander sample in an analysis with uninformative priors. When the Iowa 2000 Census data on self-reported race are used for informative priors, the individual is clearly identified as “American White.” This analysis shows the extreme importance of an informative prior in any forensic application. Am J Phys Anthropol 2009. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Ancestry Studies in Forensic Anthropology: Back on the Frontier of Racism

Biology

One of the parameters forensic anthropologists have traditionally estimated is ancestry, which is used in the United States as a proxy for social race. Its use is controversial because the biological race concept was debunked by scientists decades ago. However, many forensic anthropologists contend, in part, that because social race categories used by law enforcement can be predicted by cranial variation, ancestry remains a necessary parameter for estimation. Here, we use content analysis of the Journal of Forensic Sciences for the period 2009–2019 to demonstrate the use of various nomenclature and resultant confusion in ancestry estimation studies, and as a mechanism to discuss how forensic anthropologists have eschewed a human variation approach to studying human morphological differences in favor of a simplistic and debunked typological one. Further, we employ modern geometric morphometric and spatial analysis methods on craniofacial coordinate anatomical landmarks from several L...

The trouble with race in forensic identification

Science, Technology and Human Values, 2020

The capacity of contemporary forensic genetics has rendered “race” into an interesting tool to produce clues about the identity of an unknown suspect. Whereas the conventional use of DNA profiling was primarily aimed at the individual suspect, more recently a shift of interest in forensic genetics has taken place, in which the population and the family to whom an unknown suspect allegedly belongs, has moved center-stage. Making inferences about the phenotype or the family relations of this unknown suspect produces suspect populations and families. We discuss the criminal investigation following the Marianne Vaatstra murder case in the Netherlands and the use of forensic (genetic) technologies therein. It is in many ways an interesting case, but in this paper we focus on how race surfaced in science and society. We show that race materializes neither in the technologies used nor in the bodies at stake. Rather, race emerges through a material semiotic relation that surfaces in the translation that occurs as humans and things move across sites. We argue that race is enacted, firstly, in the context of legislation as biology reduced to bodily characteristics; secondly, in the forensic analyses as patterns of absent presence; and, thirdly, in society as a process of phenotypic othering.

The trouble with race in forensic identification STHV

Science, Technology and Human Values, 2020

The capacity of contemporary forensic genetics has rendered “race” into an interesting tool to produce clues about the identity of an unknown suspect. Whereas the conventional use of DNA profiling was primarily aimed at the individual suspect, more recently a shift of interest in forensic genetics has taken place, in which the population and the family to whom an unknown suspect allegedly belongs, has moved center-stage. Making inferences about the phenotype or the family relations of this unknown suspect produces suspect populations and families. We discuss the criminal investigation following the Marianne Vaatstra murder case in the Netherlands and the use of forensic (genetic) technologies therein. It is in many ways an interesting case, but in this paper we focus on how race surfaced in science and society. We show that race materializes neither in the technologies used nor in the bodies at stake. Rather, race emerges through a material semiotic relation that surfaces in the translation that occurs as humans and things move across sites. We argue that race is enacted, firstly, in the context of legislation as biology reduced to bodily characteristics; secondly, in the forensic analyses as patterns of absent presence; and, thirdly, in society as a process of phenotypic othering.