Philosophy and the Foundations of Cognitive Science (original) (raw)
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Philosophy and the Brain Sciences
Iris, 2009
What are the differences between philosophy and science, or between the methods of philosophy and the methods of science? Unlike some philosophers we do not find philosophy and the methods of philosophy to be sui generis. Science, and in particular neuroscience, has much to tell us about the nature of the world and the concepts that we must use to understand and explain it. Yet science cannot function well without reflective analysis of the concepts, methods, and practices that constitute it. For example, experimental methods and their resulting empirical data are essential for understanding the world, yet such data is not a-conceptual. Understanding how and what theoretical assumptions, conceptual assumptions, and practical knowledge guide the use of experimental methods is relevant to understanding the results of that use. In this way, philosophy -whether done by philosophers or scientists -has a role to play in understanding the world. Neuroscience is typically individualistic in focus; nonetheless, the mechanisms of learning and linguistic ability that some neuroscientists study also have a role to play in understanding communication. Philosophy cannot offer adequate understanding, even conceptual clarity, in isolation from empirical investigation. Yet, this does not require that science or scientific concepts will replace or reduce philosophical concepts, let alone those of ordinary language. 4 For example, neuroscience, as a science, raises all of the problems about explanation, evidence, role of experiment, discovery of mechanisms, etc. that all sciences have. That is, the basic issues in philosophy of science may be raised specifically about neuroscience. In fact, we will argue that much of the debate about the relation of neuroscience to philosophy of mind depends upon how one views philosophy. see, e.g., many of the articles in P. Machamer, P. McLaughlin, and R. Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, Pittsburgh: University of
The Philosophy of Neuroscience
Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly "local." Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, and normativity. Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function suggest ways that "naturalistic" programs might develop in detail, beyond the abstract philosophical considerations in their favor. The literature distinguishes "philosophy of neuroscience" and "neurophilosophy." The former concerns foundational issues within the neurosciences. The latter concerns application of neuroscientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions. Exploring various concepts of representation employed in neuroscientific theories is an example of the former. Examining implications of neurological syndromes for the concept of a unified self is an example of the latter. In this entry, we will assume this distinction and discuss examples of both.
In an intellectual atmosphere still marked by the ideological failures of the twentieth century, the expectations for neuroscience are extremely high, even in fields traditionally sheltered from the seductions of neurobiological explanations, such as political theory, sociology and philosophy. In an attempt to problematize the reception that this neuroscientific vocabulary has received, I provide in this article a cartography of three major lines of philosophical criticism of neuroscience – ‘conceptual’, ‘societal’ and ‘embodied-enactive’ – put forward recently by philosophers of different intellectual traditions. Although these criticisms are important in shedding light on some epistemological inconsistencies of the neuroscientific programme, the need remains to supplement this philosophical work with a different kind of critique, one that could address more directly the social and political relevance of neuroscience as well understand our epoch's urge to ‘turn neurobiological’ previously cultural or sociological phenomena.
Philosophy as Basic Approach Toward Neuroscience
Critical Neuroscience and Philosophy A Scientific Re-Examination of the Mind-Body Problem, 2020
In the Preliminary Discussion, the author reviews the claims and theoretical positions investigated in Chaps. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The question of the possibility of a universal or at least universally-valid (accepted) notion of the mind–body problem is summarized. Through the analysis of the previously discussed subfields, in connection with Neurolinguistics, Neuroheuristics, Artificial Intelligence and the core field of Critical Neuroscience, the author proposes here the Triple-S Model: Self, Soul, Spirit as a solving re-examination of the problem. In this process, the reconsideration and restructurization of core assumptions, frameworks and moral-ethical decision-making processes are implemented to verify the accuracy of claims in contemporary neuroscience and propose a more detailed, precise and scientifically reliable understanding of our true self.
Philosophy and Neurosciences: Perspectives for Interaction
RUDN Journal of Philosophy, 2023
The study analyzes modern reductivist and antireductivist approaches to understanding the interaction between philosophy and neuroscience. It analyzes the content and grounds for using the concepts of neuroscience and neurosciences, philosophy of neuroscience, and neurophilosophy. The milestones in the development of neuroreductivism, from Patricia Churchland's arguments in support of intertheoretic reduction through Francis Crick's eliminativism to John Bickle's ruthless reductionism, are described. The ontological, methodological, and epistemic grounds for the reduction to neurosciences of other ways of representing mind and body are analyzed. Drawing on the post-Wittgensteinian paradigm of the philosophy of neuroscience of Max Bennett, Peter Hacker, and Andrew Reynolds, the semantic problems that arise in the neurosciences when epistemic reduction is attempted are described and derive from the inability to eliminate the basic metaphorical level of meaningmaking and transmission rooted in everyday language and its figures, among which metaphors are fundamental. The descriptivist approach to the language of neurosciences is contrasted with neurorevisionism, an attempt to "correct" established ways of conceptualizing consciousness and corporeality, akin to earlier revisionisms, particularly physicalism, and forced to deal with similar problems. Reduction-the operation of the "return," itself understood metaphorically-and antireduction, which resists scientific revisionism and "returns" understanding to the level of everyday language and philosophy to descriptive work, is presented as a circular hermeneutical movement necessary for scientific and philosophical understanding, but not leading to disciplinary hegemony or the "victory" of either side. The study concludes with a sketch of the publications included in the rubric.
Critical Neuroscience and Philosophy
2020
Critical Neuroscience and Philosophy "A 'scientific re-examination of the mind-body problem' is certainly a 'difficult task' and Tomasi seems to navigate the rough water with a safe methodological approach. The book provides the reader with a comprehensive overview, which exhibits a remarkable balance in the presentation of disputed topics. In addition, the author provides the necessary tools to have both people with science or philosophy backgrounds acquainted to the topic. Neuro-lovers will appreciate and learn from the presentation of the numerous neuroscience 'sub-branches,' together with details on the methodological approaches used in the neuroscience research. Philosophers will enjoy the freedom and degree of theoretical abstraction, unusual in neurobiology books. Tomasi does in fact analyse the 'mind-body problem' with a critical appraisal that combines the rigidness of the scientific method with the speculative insight and thoroughness of the philosophy. The combination of the two sources of knowledge makes this book a fundamental tool for those who share the need to bridge the (apparent) gap between science and philosophy. Another key adjective for describing the book is multidisciplinary. The author spans from logic to quantum mechanics, from medicine to informatics, from religion to ethics, from theory to practice. In all the cases the rigor in defining critical words makes even a lay reader feel like taken by the hand during the journey.
How has Neuroscience Contributed to the Philosophy of Mind?
How has Neuroscience Contributed to the Philosophy of Mind? - An Inquiry Against Dualism
This is an argumentative inquiry paper in which I inquire into the intersection between neuroscience and philosophy (neurophilosophy) and how it is in sharp contrast with a dualist view of the mind, particularly a Cartesian view of dualism, ontological interactionist dualism. This was a submission I had made to the university as a philosophy essay.
Psychological Concepts in Cognitive Neuroscience
PROMETHEUS, 2020
Psychological Concepts in Cognitive Neuroscience: Some remarks On Bennett & Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. The use of psychological concepts in cognitive neuroscience is heavily criticized by Bennett & Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. The central objections to neuroscience's attribution to the brain of psychological concepts that are meaningful only when applied to the entire being. That is supposedly the case of "seeing," "communicating," and "reading." Bennett & Hacker identify in such attributions what they call a mereological fallacy. The critical revision of Bennett & Hacker's argument is an opportunity to present the debate about philosophy and psychological neuroscience and outline a Wittgensteinian perspective about the meaning of psychological concepts, its interest, and its relevance to scientific research. KEYWORDS: Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophy of Mind. Wittgenstein. RESUMO: O uso de conceitos psicológicos na neurociência cognitiva é fortemente criticado por Bennett & Hacker em Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Sua objeção central dirige-se à atribuição ao cérebro pela neurociência de conceitos psicológicos que são significativos apenas quando aplicados a todo o ser. Esse é supostamente o caso de "ver", "comunicar" e "ler". Bennett & Hacker identificam em tais atribuições o que eles chamam de falácia mereológica. A revisão crítica do argumento de Bennett & Hacker é uma oportunidade para apresentar o debate sobre filosofia e neurociência psicológica e delinear uma perspectiva wittgensteiniana sobre o significado dos conceitos psicológicos, seu interesse e sua relevância para a pesquisa científica.
The philosophy and neuroscience movement
Mind, 2007
A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about thirty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained to deal with. After sketching the history of the movement, we explore the relationships between neuroscience and philosophy and introduce some of the specific issues that have arisen.