Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference? (original) (raw)
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The relationship is long-standing and mutually beneficial, but Doha seems to underestimate the antagonism it creates among its neighbours.
ABSTRACT The relationships between the Muslim Brotherhood (the MB or Ikhwan) and Arab countries of the Persian Gulf have been survived in a very fluctuating way since the mid 1950s. This paper is intended to address the history of the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in the Gulf Monarchies to better understand the ongoing crisis between Qatar and the Quartet (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt). In this regard, the paper will start with the rundown of the recent crisis among the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and summary of the said countries’ current stance towards the Ikhwan. Then, it will continue with the historical and ideological evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the reasons behind the expansion of the organization from Egypt towards the Gulf Countries. Subsequently, brief information about the background of the MB’s engagement and/or disengagement with each Gulf state will be provided. Finally, the paper will be ended up by questioning whether the ideology of the MB will survive in the Gulf states or it is doomed to disappear in the region. Key words: Muslim Brotherhood, Ikhwan, Gulf countries, Gulf Cooperation Council
The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, 1941-2000 : a social movement within the social domain
2014
This is the first focused study of the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, the most influential and organised social and political movement in Kuwait, from its beginnings in 1946up to2000. It focuses on the circumstances surrounding the emergence and development of the Muslim Brotherhood as part of a general Islamic revival in Kuwait. It argues that the Muslim Brotherhood was driven first and foremost by cultural considerations and that Kuwaiti secularists regarded it as a challenge to their growing influence in both the political domain (traditionally controlled by the ruling family) and the social domain (historically under the control of the religious establishment). The resulting conflict with secularists over the social domain posed a serious threat to the Muslim Brotherhood who considered themselves an extension of the traditional religious establishment. They also viewed the secularists' attempts to reshape Kuwaiti identity as a threat to Kuwait's Islamic identity. This prompted the Muslim Brotherhood to channel all their social, educational and political efforts towards reclaiming the social domain. This study focuses also on the mechanisms adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood, ones which combined Islamic values with modern mobilisation strategies producing a dynamic Islamist movement seeking to revive the golden age of Islam through modern means. The movement maintained a pyramid hierarchy and it refashioned modern economic theory to make it more compatible with Islamic teachings. It also established a Muslim Boy Scouts movement and an Islamic press, while it reformed other organisations to make them compatible with Islamic values. All this was done in an effort to implement Hasan al-Banna's vision of fashioning a pious Muslim individual, a virtuous family and, finally, a true Muslim state. The Muslim Brotherhood's comprehensive and sweeping agenda seeks the complete transformation of social conditions. The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait was not very different from its mother organisation in Egypt. It played a pioneering role in revising Islamic banking, developing charity work and challenging secularism. The Kuwaiti political system supported the Muslim Brotherhood in its struggle against secularists, but the Muslim Brotherhood nonetheless stayed out of politics, focusing on rehabilitating the social domain, in the interests of maintaining on good terms with the ruling family.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Gulf States: Implications for their Relationship with Egypt
This paper aims to give insight into the past, present and future scenarios of the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organization in the Gulf States. It portrays the organic relationship between the MB and socio-political structures in the Gulf area. In further analysis, it explores the MB strategies of entrenchment in the Gulf societies, especially its penetration throughout the ruling elites in each Gulf State. The crackdown by most Gulf States on the MB came about because of its imminent threat to their national security; especially after the organization resumed power in Egypt and stretched eastwards. The paper argues that there are direct implications for the relationships of the Gulf States with the MB, and the relationships of the Gulf States with Egypt after July 3, 2013. The amenable relationship of the historical allies depends mainly on coordinated policies with the MB.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Crisis in the GCC: Roots, Issues and Implications
After the Arab Uprisings of 2011, the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East changed dramatically, especially in the Persian Gulf subregion. For decades, the Muslim Brotherhood was a close ally of the Gulf monarch families because it provided a common narrative against Naser's Pan-Arabism. The Muslim Brotherhood was also legitimising the monarch families' right to rule. In the post-Arab Uprisings era the organisation is seen as a rival of those families and a challenge for their legitimacy to rule as it calls for political changes. The only exception was Qatar, which supported the Muslim Brotherhood financially, militarily and politically in Egypt and elsewhere. Because of that Qatar found itself at odds with the other Gulf Cooperation Council members, most notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. Furthermore, the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera network spread the Brotherhood's agenda, which was based on the call for changes due to the fact that the three abovementioned states deemed the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation. All these incidents led Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain to recall their ambassadors from Doha. Not only the Muslim Brotherhood was under pressure. It became clear that other Islamist organisations in the region had suffered from some setbacks that had affected their overall stance and performance throughout the Middle East (i.e. Hizb an-Nahda in Tunisia, Hamas in the Palestine Autonomy, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). What is emphasised by analysts is that this conflict between Qatar and Saudi Arabia was a battle for regional leadership, not the first one and surely not the last (the war in Syria, the Islamic State, etc.). The aim of the paper is to present the history of the mutual relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Gulf states, describe causes which led to the conflict, the divisions created by the conflict and the consequences of the crisis for the organisation. Divisions and conflicts are viewed as an inseparable feature of international organisations. These tensions result from the opposing interests of the member states of these organisations and different perceptions of threat to their national interests.
Qatar and the Arab Spring. Support for Islamists and New Anti-Syrian Policy
2012
The small but wealthy Gulf State of Qatar is striving to adopt a leading role in the Arab world, and has readjusted its foreign policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. In doing so it has tried to stick to its former strategy of maintaining good relations with all countries that could be important to Qatar’s survival – primarily the US and Iran. At the same time Doha (which until 2011 had mostly counted on the authoritarian status quo in the region) hopes to profit from the recent upheavals in the Arab world by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist opposition groups. With regard to Syria, this policy is threatening to bring Qatar into conflict with its powerful neighbour Iran. While Qatar publicly declared its support for the opposition early last summer, Iran wants to save Bashar al-Assad’s regime and thereby ensure the survival of its main ally in the Middle East. The Syrian crisis could risk destabilising Qatar’s traditional balancing act between the US and its allie...