Gallagher, S. 2011 (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self (original) (raw)

Beyond Body–Mind: Self-narratives and Consciousness

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A Phenomenological Description of the Self

This paper outlines the results of a phenomenological investigation into the nature of the self. It is a conceptual model of the composition and functional structure which is, I hope, true for all human selves. Phenomenology is biasless reflective examination of experience, in this case experience of the self. Thus, the model of the self presented is a model of the self as experienced by itself. To do phenomenology, each person must examine his or her own experience. Thus, this essay is devoted to outlining the results of my own examination of my experience of myself. By reporting these results in a language publicly available to all, I make it possible for others to compare the findings of their own reflective examination of themselves with my results, thereby making possible consensual validation or disconfirmation of assertions regarding the nature of the self. The investigation proceeds from the transcendental Self (what Husserl calls the transcendental Ego) taken as that-which-is-conscious to the empirical self, that synthetic unity of diverse elements available as objects of consciousness which each of us is, to the transcendental Self taken as agent, as that-which-acts. The transcendental Self is inherently incapable of becoming an object of consciousness, for it is that which is itself conscious. Strictly speaking we should not use a noun phrase, but should rather speak of experiencing and acting as functions of the self to which no particular experiencable objects or types of objects correspond. The empirical self is the self as available in experience to conscious examination; it is that complex of affairs of which I am or can become conscious which has or can rationally acquire the sense “me” or “mine.” It is composed of thinking and thoughts, perceptions, bodily sensations, emotions, moods, the self-concept, and deliberate and habitual action viewed from the point of view of that person whose action it is. Though composed of many elements, the self is a unity in that it is located in a single place, is embodied, and its elements are functionally related to each other and to the whole in a teleological drive toward survival, health and happiness. The self is intrinsically related to its world, to other selves, and to itself. By virtue of its relation to itself, the self is free to choose courses of action and to perform them. It is free to determine for itself ethical maxims by which to guide its actions fruitfully. Determination of such ethical maxims is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

Constituting Self: Some psychological reflections on 'self'

This paper pursues the general intention of working toward integrating the disparate literature about self and fitting them into psychological thinking so as to clarify what a self is in clinical, applied and scientific practice. The question is whether there is anything that can be called a self that has an ontological status, or whether what we refer to as self is simply a linguistic way of indexing one's location in the various kinds of spaces one can be said to virtually inhabit: the political space that identifies whether we are liberal or conservative; the economic space concerning how we are engaged; the social space specific to any one or a group of people as a friend or enemy; and on. The term self occurs ubiquitously in our thinking and communications as a reference, but also there is more. Beyond linguistic and cognitive referencing there is an adherence of individual identity, the reflective individual act, and there is the self-other relationship. An examination of Donald Winnicott, the reflections of Charles Larmore, and other investigations may offer ways of thinking about and conceptualizing the self that fits with psychological practice and science. It may, then, give a glimpse of a beginning platform in which the variety of ways we use the term self in psychology can be made transparent and evolve a coherent way of thinking about and using self concepts that will sharpen the way we engage in psychological discourse and influence practice. In any event, this is a beginning of an investigation of a way of handling the complexities of self and self-concepts that psychologists may find interesting if not useful.

A Contemporary and Interdisciplinary Definition of the Self

This article addresses contemporary definitions of the self in both philosophical and cognitive neuroscience literature. In this article, I attempt to operationally define the self by amalgamating Gallagher’s model of the narrative and minimal self with evidence from both psychological and cognitive neuroscience. Gallagher defines the narrative self as reflecting on past experiences and future endeavors. The narrative self shapes our expectations, beliefs, thoughts, feelings and actions and is susceptible to these beliefs, thoughts, feelings and actions when making decisions. Using this definition, Gallagher describes the narrative self as an ensemble of selves, a forever changing entity, contingent on mood, state and motivation. On the other hand, the minimal self is simply the self in the present objective state, irrespective of a person’s memories or future decisions. As Gallagher had described it, the minimal self is composed of the sense of ownership and the sense of agency. The sense of ownership is the acknowledgment of one’s own sense of self, which can be understood as a separate entity from non self objects. The sense of agency, however, is the understanding that the individual is the source of an action. In the next section, I discuss the operational definition of the self within the cognitive neuroscience literature. Using these philosophical definitions, I offer a bridge between these perspectives by comparing Gallagher’s narrative self with the default mode network.

The Self-experience of the Self

Charles Larmore sums up in three statements the traditional position of philosophy about the self (with particular reference to René Descartes and John Locke): 1) it is impossible to be a self without being in relation with itself; 2) the relation that the self has with itself (and by which it is a self ) is a cognitive relation, it is a self-knowledge; 3) this relation of self-knowledge is of the same kind as the cognitive relation that the self has with the objects of the world. Larmore criticizes statements 2 and 3 and maintains that the relation (of the self with itself ) in which the nature of the self consists is not cognitive, but practical and normative: the nature of the self is the same relation of commitment that exists between my beliefs and my actions; each of my beliefs commits me to behave a certain way. In this paper, I want to refute Larmore’s criticism of statement 2 and to show, following Michel Henry, that the relation in which the nature of the self consists is actually a self-experience; I maintain that we can affirm statement 2 of the traditional position about the self without being forced to affirm also statement 3.

Self as One and Many Narratives

Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 2021

There are a variety of options in a narrative approach to the self. I limit myself to one approach that argues narratives have important roles in our lives without it being true that a narrative constitutes and creates the self. My own position is broadly sympathetic with that view, but my interest lies with the question of whether there is truth in the claim that to create one’s self-narrative is to create oneself. I argue that a self-narrative may be multiply realised by the inner self—impressions and emotions—and the outer self—roles in work and life. I take an optimistic attitude to the idea that narrative provides a metaphor that may stimulate insight in the nature of self if we accept a plurality of narrative selves. This paper mines a vein of research on narratives for insights into selves without being bewitched into accepting implausible conclusions.

The Story of the Self: Narrative as the Basis for Self-Development

There is an on-going debate between those who believe selves are stable kinds of pre-linguistic entity and those who maintain that selves, are themselves, formed by our linguistic practices specifically our capacity to compose stories and appreciate narratives (cf. Kerby 1991: 4, Dennett 1991: ch. 13, MacIntyre, 1981: ch. 15 Riceour, 1992: fifth study). The latter view is usually advanced under the auspices of a particular vision of the nature of language. The essence of that vision, which rejects the idea that language serves a purely referential function, is nicely expressed by Kerby when he writes "language is viewed not simply as a tool for communicating or mirroring back what we otherwise discover in our reality but is itself an important formative part of that reality, part of its very texture." (Kerby 1991: 2). I make a provisional case for thinking that selves might indeed be a 'product' of our narrative practices but from a different angle.