A ideia de razao publica em Rawls (original) (raw)
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Los Pueblos, Las Personas y Los Derechos Humanos Según Rawls: Una Defensa
2017
Mi objetivo en este artículo es aclarar y defender uno de los aspectos más relevantes de la argumentación de Rawls sobre la justicia internacional, a saber, su doctrina sobre los Derechos Humanos. En primer lugar me ocuparé de la reconstrucción de su teoría sobre los Derechos Humanos; luego desarrollaré dos argumentos que permiten asumirla como correcta. El primer argumento se refiere al razonamiento de los agentes que representan a los pueblos democráticos liberales, cuya posición original es adecuada a la identificación de los principios de la justicia internacional desde su punto de vista común. El segundo argumento se refierea la importancia de la historia y la cultura con respecto a la identificación de los intereses fundamentales de los individuos; en mi interpretación, finalmente, sostengo con Rawls que ambos argumentos pueden ser abordados dentro de una teoría de la justicia m&a...
Revista da Faculdade de Direito do Sul de Minas, 2019
This article analyzes the rawlsian proposal of society as an equitable system of cooperation and the relevance of the notions of freedom and equality as guiding elements of the principles of justice. In this sense, securing stability and the formation of a public reason so that societies might develop in a more just way by reconciling the most varied conceptions of good present within a society is a challenge for the project of social justice in Rawls. Some possibilities for conciliation among these different conceptions of good emerge in this context, demonstrating that it is necessary to strengthen the sense of justice in each subject so that, in the conflict between a conception of unreasonable good, the principles of justice prevail and begin to serve as guide for the establishment of social justice. Thus, based on the hypothetical-deductive approach, using a theoretical basis present in the contemporary political philosophy, the article invites us to reflect on the supposed theorists who structure the rawlsian conception for a just political society. It remains evident that the basic structure, one of the foundations of Rawls’s ideal of social justice, is responsible for confronting injustices, challenging societies to review their actions. As complex as it may be the complete elimination of the contingencies that manifest within social life, it is the responsibility of the institutions to contribute to mitigating such intercurrences and promoting cooperation.
Teorema, 2020
The scope of public reason determines which political decisions should be taken ac- cording to its standards. In this paper, I defend a broad-scope view of public reason, ac- cording to which every single political decision should be justified by public reasons. In the first part, I argue that, despite the unclarity of Rawls’ position, it is compatible with the wide-scope view. In the three following parts, I refute the main arguments in favour of the narrow-scope view of public reason. Finally, I offer an argument for the wide-scope view and conclude that it is preferable from the point of view of political liberalism. // El alcance de la razón pública determina qué decisiones deben atenerse a ella. En este artículo defiendo una concepción de la razón pública de amplio alcance, según la cual todas las decisiones políticas deberían estar justificadas por razones públicas. Prime-ro sostengo que, aunque la postura de Rawls es confusa, es compatible con una razón pública de amplio alcance. En las tres siguientes secciones rechazo los argumentos principales en favor de una razón pública restringida. Después ofrezco un argumento a favor de la concepción amplia y concluyo que ésta es preferible desde el punto de vista del liberalismo político. PALABRAS CLAVE: Rawls, liberalismo político, razón pública, alcance, argumentación pública.
A Republican Interpretation of the Late Rawls
The Journal of Political Philosophy, 2006
WHAT sort of liberal is Rawls? What sort of liberal is a philosopher who makes the citizen (and not the individual) the subject of his political liberalism; who starts from a normative-political definition of the citizen as a moral person with moral powers; who makes overlapping consensus (and not the balance of interests) his theory’s central regulative ideal; who makes reasonableness (rather than strategic rationality) the principle that is to guide discussion among free and equal citizens; and who has such a patently constitutive-civic conception of primary goods? Add to this that Rawls declares his theory of the good society compatible with the tradition of classical republicanism and thinks it capable of answering Marx’s four major criticisms of liberalism.1 Truly, Rawls is not an easy thinker to situate as a philosopher of liberty: it is difficult to decide whether his theory is best interpreted in terms of the republican tradition or in terms of the liberal tradition; there is a good deal of republicanism in his doctrine, but also a good deal of liberalism. The aim of this article is to help determine which tradition affords the best interpretation of Rawls, above all the later Rawls: the author of Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. I presuppose throughout the article a certain familiarity with Rawls’ thought on the part of the reader.
Rawls’s Concept of Political Liberalism
DEFENDOLOGIJA, 2016
John Rawls’s concept of political liberalism provides new arguments in defi ningpolitical concept of justice. The issues of social inequality and distribution of goods insociety are put aside and in the political focus are the citizens who are in favor of differentphilosophical, moral and religious universal doctrines. The central issue which the conceptof political liberalism seeks to resolve is how is it possible for a society made up ofpluralism of different confronting universal doctrines to be well-ordered and stable. Thepaper focuses on essential elements of political liberalism whose aim is to regulate theplural coexistence of universal doctrines.
Justice and the Public Sphere: A Critique of John Rawls’ Political Liberalism
2017
This article criticizes John Rawls’ conception of political liberalism, which insists that political sphere governed by his two principles of justice can be separated from any comprehensive moral doctrines, and that the validity of his conception of justice is political, not metaphysical nor comprehensive. I argue that Rawls’ project is flawed by showing that his two principles of justice and political liberalism are presupposed by the very comprehensive/ metaphysical doctrines which he denies. Whether he realizes it or not Rawls chooses a particular comprehensive theory of the good/person, specifically that of an unencumbered self. I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism from two points of view. First, I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism from political economy points of view, which I argue that the foundation of Rawls’ principles of justice lies in his particular theory of the person. Second, I discuss Rawls’ political liberalism from philosophical points of view, which I argues th...
Legitimacy and Consensus in Rawls' Political Liberalism | Iride
In this paper I analyze the theory of legitimacy at the core of John Rawls’ political liberalism. Rawls argues that a political system is well grounded when it is stable. This notion of stability embodies both pragmatic and moral elements, each of which constitutes a key desideratum of Rawlsian liberal legitimacy. But those desiderata are in tension with each other. My main claim is that Rawls’ strategy to overcome that tension through his theory of public justification is ultimately unsuccessful, because the account of consensus it envisages is unstably placed between the extremes of moralized redundancy and pragmatic free-for-all. In other words, what counts as consensus is either regulated too tightly, or not enough.
Globalization and Democratization in Brazil: An interpretation of Rawls's political liberalism
(Paper in English) Este artigo reflete os resultados de uma pesquisa em andamento sobre a dimensão normativa da globalização dentro da transição brasileira para a democracia à luz de uma teoria da justiça global, de inspiração rawlsiana. Recorrendo ao que pode-se denominar "a recepção brasileira do liberalismo político de Rawls" –particularmente, à sua contribuição para uma teoria da justiça global–, argumenta-se em favor de uma idéia de razão pública que subscreva tanto a um ethos autônomo, deliberativo, para a ação local (democratização brasileira) quanto a uma concepção universalizável, igualitária, de justiça e liberdade (reformulação rawlsiana da social-democracia). Assume-se que o principal desafio da justiça global hoje consiste em efetivar a dimensão normativa da globalização de forma a consolidar a democracia em instituições sociais, econômicas e políticas das chamadas sociedades emergentes, tais como o Brasil. Ao recorrer a uma teoria da justiça global que evita as contradições tanto do neoliberalismo quanto do socialismo de estado, procura-se reformular a idéia rawlsiana de autonomia pública e democracia deliberativa em uma sociedade cujas instituições ainda estão em processo de consolidação. Recorre-se à trilogia de Rawls (A theory of justice, Political liberalism e The law of peoples) para defender a social-democracia brasileira e sua inserção no processo globalizante sem subscrever a uma agenda neoliberal nem sucumbir ao dilema universalista-comunitarista.
Construing the Reasonable. Rawls’s Political Liberalism Between Rorty and Habermas
Il Politico, 2019
L’articolo investiga il concetto di “ragionevole”, che può essere definito la chiave di volta del liberalismo politico di John Rawls, esplicitandone le opposte interpretazioni possibili al fine di ottenere un chiarimento più generale sul progetto filosofico del tardo Rawls. La prima sezione, dopo una schematica presentazione del liberalismo politico di Rawls, offre una discussione analitica delle nozioni di “ragionevole” e “razionale” a livello domestico. La seconda sezione rende esplicita la fondamentale ambiguità contenuta nel concetto di “ragionevole”, utilizzando a tal fine in maniera paradigmatica le letture opposte proposte da Richard Rorty e Jürgen Habermas (rispettivamente, una lettura contestualista-pragmatista e una Kantiano- universalista). Infine, la terza sezione esamina lo sviluppo del concetto di “ragionevole” a livello internazionale, mostrando come proprio a questo livello la ambiguità insita in questo concetto conduca a delle tensioni non adeguatamente risolte da R...