Ṣūfī Adab Transcending Scruples: The Correspondence of Ibn ʿAbbād of Ronda (original) (raw)
2013, Islamochristiana
SUMMARY: This article focuses on the ethics manifest in the correspondence of Ibn 'Abbād of Ronda (d. 792/1390), particularly the theme of adab. The essay situates Ibn 'Abbād within Ṣūfī discourse on adab and within Islamic ethics generally by sketching his work as a director of conscience primarily interested in the inner spiritual forces at work in particular disciples. The problem of scruples in one disciple presents a test case for Ibn 'Abbād's general approach to moral discernment: the mandates of revelation provide a field in which the Ṣūfī disciple follows God's call, but perfection lies in the proper demeanor connected to tasting certainty, or yaqīn. Investigation of the relationship between šarī'a and ḥaqīqa forecloses any attempt to cast Ibn 'Abbād as antinomian but permits the term " hypernomian " with certain qualifications. Ibn 'Abbād of Ronda (b. 733/1333, d. 792/1390) has been called the director of conscience of his times, a moniker frequently reaffirmed by Western scholars who have studied his writings 1. In particular, his epistolary correspondence manifests his role as a spiritual mentor both for those disciples gathered around him and those living further away. This article will focus on the ethics at work in that correspondence, especially his letters to yaḥyā ibn Sarrāǧ, and consider it against the backdrop of Sufi morality in general, particularly the theme of adab. Ibn 'Abbād's letters show that while he willingly answers questions about the proper ḥukm in certain circumstances, his primary interest lies in the spiritual forces at work within the disciple. Put more strongly, he often cares less about the decision itself than about the forces which give rise to the decision and he investigates these forces in the context of the particular disciple's personality. Ibn 'Abbād's heavy criticism of jurists cannot be taken as evidence of antinomianism, although his ethics could be considered hypernomian with certain qualifications.
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