“True Islam”, Apostate Leader and Islamic Radicalism: The Emergence of Laskar Jihad in Indonesia (original) (raw)
Related papers
FROM KHILÂFAH TO MODERN STATE: The History of Islamic Political Transformation
Ulul Albab, 2021
This article discusses the dynamic and changes in Islamic political history. Rather than focuses on the Islamic doctrine, it focuses on the characteristics of each historical period. Through historical approach, this study reveals that Islam and state-politics are two sides of a coin. Since the beginning of Islam, it has been intertwined with state politics. Nevertheless, the history of Islamic politics has many faces. There is no standard shape or entity of Islamic politics. Changes and variation are the result of the Islamic ummah's efforts to develop political institutions that suit the demand of the era while trying to adhere to the Islamic teachings. This dynamic is seen in the changes from the era of the Prophet PBUH, the era of the four main Caliphs, up to the era of the large dynasties. In this modern era, the Islamic politics experiences a crisis due to the downfall of the old Islamic political entity (the caliphate) and the interaction with the modern west-political ideas. Various thoughts and political concepts tries to provide answers for the appropriate Islamic political shape/entity for this new era. However, currently a standard and ideal shape for an Islamic political entity is yet to be found. Tulisan ini membahas dinamika dan perubahan yang terjadi dalam sejarah politik Islam. Kajian difokuskan pada karakteristik di tiap-tiap periode sejarah, bukan pada doktrin politik Islam. Dengan pendekatan kesejarahan kajian ini menunjukkan bahwa Islam dan politik-pemerintahan merupakan dua sisi mata uang yang tidak terpisahkan. Sejak awal mula Islam sudah From Khilâfah to Modern State...
The Muslim World, 2005
ducation is about opening doors, opening minds, opening possibilities." 1 This article aims to explore how education has opened "doors" "minds" and "possibilities" for the resurgence of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia through the case of Ja ' far Umar Thalib, founder and leader of Laskar Jihad or Jihad Fighters. 2 It explains Ja ' far's intellectual character in light of his educational experiences and the connection between his intellectual character and his active involvement in Islamic radical movement in post-Suharto Indonesia. This article suggests that the style, agendas, and strategies of Laskar Jihad reflect Ja ' far's intellectual character, which was shaped by his particular educational background, including the types of schools that he attended, the type of knowledge that he learned, the mentors who taught him, and the friends with whom he shared his educational experiences. This article also suggests that Ja ' far's success in promoting his ideas and attracting followers through Laskar Jihad was highly determined by the credibility and reputation that he has in the Salafi-Wahhabi movement. This is to believe that "credibility is a precondition for getting your message heard" 3 and "a leader simply cannot do his job if there are any doubts about his credibility." 4 This article further suggests that despite its symbolic success, Islamic radicalism has threatened religious harmony and moderation that has developed collectively by the Department of Religious Affairs and moderate Muslim intellectuals and leaders throughout the history of post-Independent Indonesia. 5 If no educational measures are taken, Islamic T M W • V 95 • J 2005 82 radicalism will continue to flourish and hinder the democratization of social, religious, and political life in the country. Context The collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime on May 21, 1998 raised some hopes for the future of democracy in Indonesia. Many believed that it would pave the way for a reform movement in the country to accelerate democratization. Despite some failures and slow progress, reformers have been able to make some significant changes, such as reducing the authority of the executive power, especially that of the president, by revising the national constitution (Undang-undang Dasar 1945), reducing the role of the armed forces in politics, 6 reforming the structure of political parties, 7 changing the electoral system, 8 broadening the freedom of the press, and shifting the paradigm of government and development from centralization to regionalization. 9 This new development shows that post-Suharto Indonesia has been open to reform and is a fertile ground for democratization. But at the same time, post-Suharto Indonesia has also been a fertile ground for radicalism. Radicalism has characterized the activities of many interest groups in the country, including the Islamic ones. The resurgence of Islamic radicalism has been one of the important characteristics of post-Suharto Indonesia. Radical Islamic groups who were suppressed by the Suharto regime have found sufficient freedom to organize themselves, consolidate their power, and actively play roles in the dynamics of social, religious, and political affairs in post-Suharto Indonesia. They have become what Weber termed the "disenchantment" 10 of post-Suharto Indonesia. If a willingness to implement Shar i" ah is an indication of Islamic radicalism, the rising trend of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia seems to be very strong. In 2002, the Center for Islamic & Social Studies of Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta State Islamic University conducted a survey on the development of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. The survey indicated that supporters of Shar i" ah law have reached 71 percent, rising by 10 percent from the previous year (2001). The survey also indicated that the supporters of Islamism in Indonesia after September 11, 2001 have grown in number by over 18.8 million in a year with a total number of 133.9. 11 Based on this survey result, PPIM Director Jamhari remarks: "The face of peace, tolerant, moderate and modern Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, the most important Muslim country in the region, becomes the nest of Islamic terrorism." 12 Many names have emerged as leading figures in the rise of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia. Among them are Habib Rizieq Shihab 13 of Front of Defenders of Islam or Front Pembela Islam (FPI), 14 Abu Bakar Ba ' asyir 15 of Islamic Congregation or Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) 16 and The Council
A REAL THREAT FROM WITHIN: Muhammadiyah's Identity Metamorphosis and the Dilemma of Democracy
This paper will look at Muhammadiyah as a constantly metamorphosing organism from which have grown modernist-reformist, liberalist progressive, political pragmatist and potentially violent fundamentalist-radical Muslims. It will argue that the trajectory passed by and the victory of the radical-puritan element in the National Congress 2005 can potentially become an obstacle for Muhammadiyah's involvement in the process of implementing democratic values in Indonesia in the future. To keep watching Muhammadiyah's trajectory is crucially important due to the fact that this organization is one of the powerful forces in the world toward the democratization process. In order to be on the right track of democracy, Muhammadiyah has to be able to cope with its internal disputes over democratic values. Only by means of coping with these internal disputes can this organization ensure its role in propagating and disseminating democratic ideas as well as practices in Indonesia.
Ahmadiyya Caliphate, 2020
This study discusses the emergence of the Ahmadiyya Caliphate after the death of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1908. The main problem of the study was how to unravel the emergence of the Ahmadiyya caliphate so that his teachings spread to Indonesia. To answer this problem is used the historical method consists of four stages, namely heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The results of this study indicate that the emergence of the Ahmadiyya caliphate was due to a message from Mirza Ghulam Ghulam Ahmad before his death in 1908. Before his dealth, Ghulam wrote a book called Al-Wassiyat, in which it stated that after his death there would appear a "second sign" called the Khalifah. The caliph, called the Khalifatul Masih, will continue Ghulam Ahmad's mission to spread Islam throughout the world.The number of his followers now around 150 million people are spread in almost 200 countries led by Khalifatul Masih V, Mirza Masroor Ahmad. He presided over Ahmadiyya community around the world from the Central Headquarters in London, England.The spread of Ahmadiyya teachings also succeeded to reach Indonesia in 1925 despite the pros and cons reactions from the community.Although Ahmadiyya Community in Indonesia considered astray and infidel but Ahmadiyya Community continues to survive.
even if those who govern you are Abyssinian unbelievers!" Both in his own country and in unbelievers' country, every Muslim should observe everybody's rights, should not do harm or offend anybody and should obey the laws and the administration. For this purpose, we should teach Islamic knowledge and its beautiful morals to the youth. If the pure youth are left ignorant of Islam, their belief in Islam and their morals will be corrupted by being deceived by false heroes and hypocritical friends, thus they will run toward endless disaster and ruination. To attack Islam means to assassinate all the people on the earth, to tread on the human rights and human liberty and to attempt to change the prosperity of men into disaster. This evil offence has been committed for the pleasure, entertainment and fun of a handful of passion-blinded, stone-hearted group. May Allâhu ta'âlâ rescue people from this very ominous, grievous disaster; Âmin! Mere prayers with tongue or pen will not be accepted; it is also necessary to hold on to the means and make every effort possible. Muslims should know their frank and insidious enemies who attack their faith and happiness. They should not believe the lies of these enemies and should not disunite, nor should they forget that they are brothers. In the subject on "Bâghî", Ibn 'Âbidîn wrote: "The Khârijîs explained away (ta'wîl) the inexplicit documents (dalâ'il), that is, they attributed unclear, unusual meanings to some âyats and mutawâtir hadîths. Those who departed from Hadrat 'Alî's (radiy-Allâhu 'anh) soldiers and fought against him acted this way. They said, 'The judge is Allah only. Following the decision of two arbitrators, Hadrat 'Alî left the caliphate to Mu'âwiya (radiy-Allâhu 'anhumâ) and committed a grave sin.' This wrong explanation caused them to fight against him. They said 'disbelievers' about those who did not believe as they did. And now, those who follow Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhâb, who appeared in Najd, claim that solely they themselves are Muslims. They say 'polytheists' about those who do not believe as they do, and they regard killing them and taking away their property and women as halâl. The 'ulamâ' of fiqh, the mujtahids, did not say 'kâfir' about those who, like the Khârijîs and Wahhâbîs, departed on account of inexplicit documents, but said 'bâghî', 'âsî' or 'ahl al-bid'a', that is 'non-madhhabite' or 'heretic'. One becomes a kâfir if he explains away wrongly and does not believe a dalîl with a single meaning which is openly understood. An example of this is to deny that the universe will be annihilated and that the dead will come to life again. However, one does not become a kâfir by slandering or denying the caliphate of Hadrat Abû Bakr and Hadrat 'Umar (radiy-Allâhu 'anhumâ) if he concludes this as a result of attributing an uncommon meaning to a document. He who says, ''Alî is God. Jabrâ'il went wrong in bringing the wahî,' becomes a kâfir, because, such words cannot be deduced from ta'wîl or ijtihâd but stem from [1] Documents of the Right Word, in English, 496 pp., is available from Hakîkat Kitâbevi, Fatih, Istanbul. he said, "O Allah! Tell me the thing which is for Thee!" Allâhu ta'âlâ declared, "O Mûsâ! Did you love those whom I loved and did you bear hostility against My enemies?" Mûsâ ('alaihi 'ssalâm) realized that the most valuable thing to be done for Allâhu ta'âlâ was al-hubbu fi 'llâh wa 'l-bughdu fi'llâh.' It was true that in the Battle of Siffîn Hadrat Mu'âwiya (radiy-Allâhu 'anh) had copies of the Qur'ân al-kerîm attached to the points of spears and thus put an end to the bloodshed among Muslims. The fight had been stopped by the end of the first month of the new year, Muharram, 37 A.H. Messengers ran between the two sides to come to an agreement. When Muharram ended, Hadrat 'Alî (radiy-Allâhu 'anh) declared that the time was up and the rebellion had not been given up. First, Ashtar, who was on his side, came forward with his soldiers. The Damascenes went to meet him. Ashtar was one of the conspirators who had excited the 'Camel' Battle. Qisâs-i Anbiyâ says, 'In the 'Camel' Battle, there were twenty thousand people on the side of Hadrat 'Alî and thirty thousand on the opposite side. When they were about to come to an agreement, 'Abdullâh ibn Saba', Mâlik Ashtar and other leaders of those who had martyred Hadrat 'Uthmân (radiy-Allâhu 'anh), assembled one night and planned to commence the battle. They unexpectantly assaulted the opposite side. Those who were on the side of Hadrat 'Â'isha (radiy-Allâhu 'anhâ) were bewildered at this sudden attack. Ashtar and his friends told Hadrat 'Alî (radiy-Allâhu 'anh) that the opposite side assaulted and they resisted.' It is seen that 'Abdullâh ibn Saba', a Jew, and his friends were the ones who incited both the battles and broke the agreements. In Siffîn, Hadrat 'Alî attacked the Damascenes with all his soldiers and much blood was shed in few days. Selecting ten thousand people, he attacked again. Hâshim, who carried his flag, attacked, too, continuously saying, "O those who love Allah! Come with me!" It was a very bloody combat. All Thursday night they fought until morning. And those who did not die were either wounded or exhausted. On Friday, Ashtar assaulted again. Mu'awiya and 'Amr ibn 'Âs (radiy-Allâhu 'anhumâ), upon finding out that forty-five thousand Muslims on their side and twenty-five thousand on the opposite side had died, searched ways of preventing the shedding of fraternal blood and rescuing Muslims from this calamity. Hadrat 'Amr ibn 'Âs said, "Let's show them the Qur'ân to tell them that Muslims are brothers." Hadrat Mu'âwiya commanded to attach copies of the Qur'ân on the