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Reason, Reasons and Normativity
All normative phenomena are normative in as much as, and because, they provide reasons or are partly constituted by reasons. This makes the concept of a reason key to an understanding of normativity. Believing that, I will here present some thoughts about the connection between reasons and Reason and between Reason and normativity.
EXPLAINING NORMATIVITY: ON RATIONALITY AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF REASON 1
Aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence constitute reasons for persons, i.e. grounds which make certain beliefs, moods, emotions, intentions or actions appropriate or inappropriate. Our capacities to perceive and understand how things are, and what response is appropriate to them, and our ability to respond appropriately, make us into persons, i.e. creatures with the ability to direct their own life in accordance with their appreciation of themselves and their environment, and of the reasons with which, given how they are, the world presents them.
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Many philosophers working on normative issues follow the ‘Reasons First’ program. According to this program, the concept of a ‘normative reason’ for an action or an attitude is the most fundamental normative concept, and all other normative and evaluative concepts can be defined in terms of this fundamental concept. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term ‘reason’ in English. The best explanation of the data relating to these concepts is that they can all be defined in terms of explanatory concepts and other normative or evaluative notions: for example, in one sense, a ‘reason’ for you to go is a fact that helps to explain why you ought to go, or why it is good for you to go. This implies that none of the concepts expressed by ‘reason’ is fundamental.
The Reasons that Can't be Followed: Comment on Joseph Raz's From Normativity to Responsibility
Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, 2013
2 This contrasts with a mere explanatory reason, as well as with other attempts to explain normativity, eg by explaining it in terms of value. 3 ''[T]he point is that normative reasons must be capable of providing an explanation of an action: If that R is a reason to ' then it must be possible that people ' for the reason that R and when they do, that explains (is part of an explanation of) their action'' (p. 27). The formulation is modeled on Williams: ''If there are reasons for action, it must be that people sometimes act for those reasons, and if they do their reasons must figure in some correct explanation of their action.'' Bernard Williams, Internal and External Reasons, in MORAL LUCK 102 (1981).
'Normativity and Reason' explores what might be involved in the claim that the normativity of moral standards is a normativity of reason. Taking the accounts of moral normativity given by a range of moral theorists, including Hume, Pufendorf, Locke, Sidgwick and Scanlon, and comparing these with medieval and early modern scholastic natural law theory, the paper argues that normative standards on action involve a variety of distinct kinds of justificatory force - and that standards of moral right and wrong or of moral obligation involve, in particular, a distinctive justificatory force of Demand. Using this theory of obligation, the paper argues for a new account of moral rationality, and of the relation of moral and legal obligation.
Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy
Philosophia, 2009
The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers.
Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2005
Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like 'having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children'. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning in general. Christine Korsgaard relates the rational binding force of practical reasons to the various identities or self-conceptions under which we value ourselves. The problem is that it is not clear why such self-conceptions would necessitate us rationally, given the fact that most of our identities are simply given. Perhaps, Harry Frankfurt is right in arguing that we are not only necessitated by reason, but also, and predominantly by what we love. I argue, however, that "the necessities of love" (in Frankfurt's phrase) are not to be separated from, but should be seen as belonging to the necessities of reason. Our loves, concerns and related identities provide for a specific and important structure to practical reflection. They function on the background of reasoning, having a specific default role: they would lose their character as concerns, if there was a need for them to be cited on the foreground of deliberation or if there was a need to justify them. This does not mean that our deep concerns cannot be scrutinised. They can only be scrutinised in an indirect way, however, which explains their role in grounding the normativity of agent-relative reasons. It appears that this account can provide for a viable interpretation of Korsgaard's argument about the foundational role of practical identities.