Japan's misfiring security hedge: Discovering the limits of middle-power internationalism and strategic convergence (original) (raw)

The quiet achiever: Australia-Japan security relations

· the mutual strategic concerns that have motivated these quiet achievements are intensifying not moderating · US defence policy is increasingly reliant and demanding of support from its regional allies · both Australia and Japan are committed to increasing their force projection capabilities in similar manners.

Beyond the Quasi-Alliance? An Analysis of the Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership

the rest: journal of politics and development, 2024

This article examines a pathway of the Japan-Australia “special strategic partnership” in recent years. Both countries have developed a special strategic partnership, referred to as a “quasi-alliance”. Hence, the purpose of this research is to contextualise the development of the Australia-Japan quasi-alliance from global, regional, and bilateral perspectives. Globally, the quasi-alliance has been influenced by power transition and hegemonic competition in global politics. Regionally, the quasi-alliance has been embedded into the trilateral and multilateral strategic frameworks in the Indo-Pacific. Bilaterally, the quasi-alliance has been shaped by the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC). Nonetheless, close security ties were temporarily adrift over Australia’s submarine deal and realigned by tangible milestones, such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and the new JDSC signed off in 2022. While investigating these footsteps of the quasi-alliance formation, this article considers whether both countries have moved beyond the quasi-alliance toward a full military alliance in the changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

the special japan-australia strategic partnership within the ambit of

This paper examines Japan’s and Australia’s efforts to enhance the maritime capabilities of the Philippines in the face of China’s maritime expansion in East Asia. It observes that both Japan and Australia are members of a loose association of maritime democracies called “Democratic Security Diamond (DSD).” A brain child of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the DSD was formed by four naval powers—Australia, India, the United States, and Japan--to safeguard safe guard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific. As members of the DSD, Japan and Australia have emphasized the relevance of the regional security architecture through the creation of multilateral organizations as a means of upholding a stable and rules based order in East Asia. Both are also actively involved in joint assistance to the development and maritime capacity building of third countries that might be threatened by the rise of China such as the Philippines. Since the formation of their special strategic partnership in 2012, Japan and Australia have assisted the Philippines in building up its navy, coast guard, and air force. In conclusion, this paper argues that in building up the country’s maritime security capabilities, the Philippines should look at the prospect of signing a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with Australia and the Japan and forming a trilateral security partnership made up of Tokyo, Canberra, and Manila.

Australia-Japan: Towards a New Security Partnership?

This paper assesses the impact of recent upgrades in security ties between Australia and Japan and their implications for the bilateral relationship. In particular, the development and future of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) is assessed. It is argued that former Prime Ministers Abe and Howard encouraged the enhancement of security ties to unprecedented new highs, but that the rise of China and leadership change in Japan and Australia in 2007 will make the prospects of a full security treaty unlikely.

Future directions in Australia-Japan relations: An Australian perspective

This article offers an Australian perspective on future directions in Australia/Japan relations. An attempt is made to identify issues that will have a bearing on the bilateral relationship over the next five years and beyond at the national level. There is not any likelihood of a substantial rupture or change in relations in the short-term. The continuation of a stable, close and dynamic relationship in the mid to long-term, however, will depend on how both countries conduct their respective foreign policies towards China.

Australia, Japan and Minilateralism in the Economic-Security Nexus

2023

Japan and Australia have a common interest in cooperating to boost their resilience in the face of coercive economic practices by major powers in the Indo-Pacific. Increasingly, the two countries are pursuing minilateral arrangements to achieve this economic-security goal, with areas of emerging cooperation in energy transition, supply-chain security, as well as critical and emerging technologies. This paper will examine Australia-Japan minilateral cooperation in this nexus between economics and security. It will demonstrate that growing minilateral cooperation is due to its inherent agility and adaptability in the face of a rapidly changing region and also because such arrangements can be easily built on a base of established bilateral and multilateral cooperation.