A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Civil Law World (1600-1900) (original) (raw)
Related papers
This Oxford Handbook examines the radical transformation of worldview taking place in the period from the middle of the 16th century (from the publication in 1543 of Copernicus' De Revolutionibus) to the early 18th century (the years immediately before Hume and the Enlightenment). The intention of the volume is to cover both well-known and undeservedly less well-known philosophical texts by placing these works in their historical context which includes tight interconnections with other disciplines (e.g., experimental science) as well as historical and political events. By proceeding in this manner the editors hope to recover a meaning of "philosophy" that comes closer to the way its early modern proponents would have understood and practiced it. The editors also point to the reader-friendly character of this Handbook: in addition to grouping chapters in five categories (metaphysics; the mind; epistemology; ethics and political philosophy; and religion), cross-references to chapters or pages dealing with the same (or similar) issues make it possible for readers to consult the book selectively. Due to space constraints, in the remainder of this review I propose to take advantage of this feature and briefly look at the articles
A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence
Ratio Juris, 2006
Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf (1632-1694) 1 was the most celebrated German legal philosopher of the second half of the 17th century, in virtue of three widely disseminated jurisprudential works: De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1670), De Officio Hominis et Civilis (1682), and the so-called Eris Scandica (Palladini 1996, passim). He was (within certain limits) admired by his exact contemporary John Locke (1632-1704), who often referred his correspondents to Pufendorf's works (when Locke himself declined to write "a book of offices") (Dunn 1969, 38ff.); he was made even better known by the contempt of Leibniz, who styled Pufendorf "not much of a lawyer and even less of a philosopher," 2 and who provoked Jean Barbeyrac and Christian Thomasius into spirited defenses of Pufendorfism. What Pufendorf's defenders most admired (as will be seen later) was his total separation of natural law from both moral theology and revealed divine law: In this "secularization" of natural law Pufendorf followed in one way Hugo Grotius (etiamsi daremus), in another way Hobbes (who had usually made natural law only a set of rational "theorems" concerning self-preservation) (Hobbes 1957, chap. 14). 3 To be sure, in his eclectic, synthetic fusion of Grotius and Hobbes, Pufendorf brought together Hobbesian rational self-conservation and Grotian "natural" sociability-not an easy or obvious task, given Hobbes's grim notion of "nature" as a moral vacuum in which "force and fraud are cardinal virtues" (Hobbes 1957, chap. 13), indeed as a state of war in which natural sociability is painfully absentand he defended this eclectic fusion of the two greatest jurisconsults of the first half of the 17th century with extensive quotations from Roman jurisprudence, and above all from Cicero and Seneca. 4 What matters most in Pufendorf is his expounding of a so-called "modern" natural law in which God and Scripture (and any notion of a "confessional" state) 5 are kept safely away from a natural law and natural justice grounded simply in reason and natural sociability (and hence equally available to adherents of all religions whatsoever).
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: Selected Papers in Legal Theory
2014
Foreword [1994] 1–4 LAW AS PRACTICE QUELQUES QUESTIONS MÉTHODOLOGIQUES DE LA FORMATION DES CONCEPTS EN SCIENCES JURIDIQUES [1970] 7–33: 1. Introduction 7 / 2. La particularité de l’objet des sciences juridiques 8 / 3. La particularité de la méthodologie des sciences juridiques 10 / 4. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciences juridiques: Quelques problèmes 15 [4.1. Le concept du droit 16 / 4.2. Le concept dogmatique du contenu du droit 21 / 4.3. Le concept de la normativité juridique 23 / 4.4. Le concept des lacunes en droit 24] / 5. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciencesjuridiques: Quelques conclusions 26 / 6. La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques et la réalité: Conclusion finale 29 / 7. Annexe: Des bases d’une classification possible des définitions en sciences juridiques 31 // GELTUNG DES RECHTS – WIRKSAMKEIT DES RECHTS [1978] 35–42 // MACROSOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF LAW: A SURVEY AND APPRAISAL [1983] 43–76: I. Issues of the Macrosociological Theories of Law 46 / II. The Role of the Macrosociological Theories in the Social Science Foundation of Legal Thinking 63 // REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ITS INNER MORALITY [1984] 77–89: 1. Law and Morals As Two Systems of Norms, and the Inner Morality of Law 77 / 2. Law As A Value Bearer and As A Mere External Indicator 78 / 3. The Inner and External Moral Credit of Legislator 83 / 4. The Inner Morality of Law 86 // THE LAW AND ITS LIMITS [1985] 91–96 LAW AS TECHNIQUE DOMAINE »EXTERNE« ET DOMAINE »INTERNE« EN DROIT [1983] 99–117: 1. Le »juridique« et le »non-juridique« 99 / 2. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que groupes de phénomènes 104 / 3. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que points de références 112 / 4. Conclusion 116 // DIE MINISTERIELLE BEGRÜNDUNG IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHER SICHT [1977] 119–139: I. Die prinzipiellen und geschichtlichen Grundlagen der Herausforderung der ministeriellen Begründungen 120 / II. Die möglichen und erwünschten Funktionen der ministeriellen Begründung im sozialistischen Rechts 128 / III. Die ministerielle Begründung und ihr Wert in der Auslegung derRechtsnormen 132 // THE PREAMBLE: A QUESTION OF JURISPRUDENCE [1970] 141–167: I. The Notion of the Preamble 142 / II. Content and Functions of the Preambles 146 / III. Normativity of the Preamble Content 150 / IV. The Problem of the Justifiability of Preamble-drafting in the Light of Socialist Legal Policy 161 // PRESUMPTION AND FICTION: MEANS OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 169–185: I. Presumption 169 [1. In the Judicial Process of Establishing the Facts: praesumptio homini vel facti 170 / 2. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris tantum 170 / 3. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris et de jure 171 / 4. In a Possible Theoretical Reconstruction 171] On »Presumption« 172 [1. Function 172 / 2. Presumption and Fiction 173 / 3. Irrelevancy of Epistemological Foundation 173 / 4. The Technique of Presumption 174] II. Fiction 175 [1. In the Linguistic Formation of Legal Norms 175 / 2. In the Judicial Application of Legal Norms 175 / 3. In the Doctrinal Processing of Legal Norms 176 / 4. In the Theoretical Reconstruction of Legal Norms 176 / 5. Approaches to and Understandings of Fiction 177] On »Fiction« 178 [1. History and Understandings 178 / 2. Classification 180 / 3. Law as Fiction 181 / 4. Presumption and Fiction 182] // LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 187–198: I. Legal Technique 187 [1. In the Large Sense 1987/ 2. In Legal Practice 189 / 3. In Legal Science 189 / 4. As a Special Technique 190] II. On Legal Technique [1. Definition and Function 190 / 2. Legal Technique and Legal Cultures 192 / 3. Postulates of Legal Technique in the Cultures of Modem Formal Law 195 {a) The Principle of Consequentiality 195 / b) The Principle of Coherency 195 / c) The Principle of Conceptual Economy 196 / d) The Principle of Non-redundancy 196}] LAW AS LOGIC MODERNE STAATLICHKEIT UND MODERNES FORMALES RECHT [1982] 201–207: 1. Die Klassifizierung als logisches und als gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Verfahren 202 / 2. Typologie der staatlichen und rechtlichen Erscheinungen 202 / 3. Der moderne Staat und das moderne formale Recht: Frage der Zusammenhänge und Entwicklungsalternativen 204 // HETEROGENEITY AND VALIDITY OF LAW: OUTLINES OF AN ONTOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION [1986] 209–218 // LEIBNIZ UND DIE FRAGE DER RECHTLICHEN SYSTEMBILDUNG [1973] 219–232: 1. Aktualität von Leibniz 219 / 2. Der Gedanke der universalen mathematischen Methode 221 / 3. Die logischen Konzeption der Rechtswissenschaft 224 / 4. Die geometrische Vision der rechtlichen Systembildung 227 / 5. Das Scheitern der Leibnizschen Idee und seine Lehre 230 // LAW AND ITS APPROACH AS A SYSTEM [1975] 233–255: 1. The Logical Structure of Law as a Historical Product 233 / 2. Tendencies of Formal Rationalization in Legal Development 234 / 3. Historical Development of the Approach to Law as a System 239 / 4. Present State of the Attempts at a Logical Reconstruction of Law and Legal Reasoning 243 / 5. Question of the Axiomatic Conception of Law 248 / 6. Heuristic Value of the Approach to Law as a System 250 // LOGIC OF LAW AND JUDICIAL ACTIVITY: A GAP BETWEEN IDEALS, REALITY AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES [1982] 258–288: 1. Historical Background 259 / 2. Ideals 264 / 3. Reality 270 / 4. Future Perspectives 277 // KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW – YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW [ms] 289–293, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF NORMS: SCIENCE- AND LANGUAGE-PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS [ms] 295–314: 1. Presuppositions 295 / 2. The Context of the Application of Norms 300 [2.1 Actualisation in Concrete Meaning 300 / 2.2 Linguistic Undefinedness 304 / 2.3 Lack of Logical Consequence in the Normative Sphere 308] LAW AS EXPERIENCE ON THE SOCIALLY DETERMINED NATURE OF LEGAL REASONING [1971] 317–374: 1. Interrelation of the Creation and Application of Law 317 / 2. The Socially Determined Nature of the Application of Law 332 / 3. The Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning 337 / 4. The Question of Perspectives 363 // TOWARDS THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW: SOME THESES ON THE BASIS OF LUKÁCS’ ONTOLOGY [1983] 375–390, IS LAW A SYSTEM OF ENACTMENTS? [1984] 391–398: 1. Working Models of Law 391 / 2. Senses of ContExtuality in Law 393 / 3. Jurisprudential Approach and Socio-ontological Approach 394 / 4. Conclusions 396 [4.1. Law as Historical Continuum 396 / 4.2.Law as Open System 396 / 4.3. / Law as Complex Phenomenon with Alternative Strategy 396 / 4.4. Law as an Irreversible Process 397 / 4.5. The Genuinely Societal Character of Law 397] // EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE UNIQUENESS OF NATIONAL LEGAL CULTURES [1992] 399–411: 1. The Philosophical Framework 399 / 2. Law as Tradition 403 / 3. European Integration and the Preservation of the Uniqueness of National Legal Orders 407 // INSTITUTIONS AS SYSTEMS: NOTES ON THE CLOSED SETS, OPEN VISTAS OF DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSCENDENCY OF INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS [1991] 413–424: I. A Logic of Systems 413 / II. Ideal Types and Historically Concrete Manifestations 416 / III. Ideal Type As A Normative Ideology 418 / IV.Objectivity and Contingency of Systems 420 / V. Limits and Bonds, ConsEquEntiality and Practicability of a System 423 LAW AS HISTORY FROM LEGAL CUSTOMS TO LEGAL FOLKWAYS [1981] 427–436, ANTHROPOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE? LEOPOLD POSPÍŠIL AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL CULTURES [1985] 437–457: 1. Rule, Fact and Principle in the Concept of Law 438 [a) Abstract rules 439 / b) Abstracts from actual behaviour 439 / c) Principles Upheld by Legal Decisions 440] 2. Attributes of Law 445 [a) Authority 446 / b) Intention of Universal Application 446 / c) Obligatio 447 / d) Sanction 447] 3. Law and its Social Functional Definition 450 [(1) Law is a Global Phenomenon 451 / (2) Law is a Phenomenon Able to Settle Conflicts of Interests 451 / 3) Law is a Phenomenon Prevailing as the Supreme Controlling Factor 452] 4. Conclusion 454 // LAW AS A SOCIAL ISSUE [1985] 459–475: I. The Social Prestige of Law 459 / II. The Social Nature of Law 463 / III. Law and Language in the Service of Social Mediation 466 (1. Passive Mediation and Active Intervention 468 / 2. The Dilemma of the Mediation of Values 472) // LAW AS HISTORY? [1986] 477–484: 1. Understandings of the Term »Law« 477 / 2. Law and History 478 / 3. Law as History 481 // RECHTSKULTUR – DENKKULTUR: EINFÜHRUNG ZUM THEMA [1988] 485–489 Curriculum Vitae 491 / Bibliography 493 // Index 515 / Index of Normative Materials 523 / Index of Names 525
Routledge History of Philosophy Volume VII
The nineteenth century was a period of intense intellectual activity with advances being made in the sciences, in mathematics and in psychology which gradually established itself as a discipline independent of philosophy. Philosophical disputes arose about the nature of scientific method and about whether, or to what extent, the understanding of human conduct and human society required the adoption of the methods of observation and experiment common to the natural sciences. Different philosophical theories about the nature of reality, the foundations of knowledge and of morality, and the limits of individual freedom were systematically developed, and many such theories are still very much alive in contemporary philosophical debates. The philosophers discussed in this volume include those belonging both to the 'analytic' and the 'continental' traditions, as well as the now influential American pragmatists. Each chapter is written by a different author who presents the issues in the context of the period in which they arose, while also keeping an eye on their relevance to current philosophical interests. A few philosophers are discussed in more than one chapter, in different but mutually illuminating contexts. Each chapter in The Nineteenth Century is self-contained and makes a distinctive contribution to a set of philosophical problems. This volume provides a broad, scholarly introduction to nineteenth-century philosophy. It also contains a glossary of philosophical terms and a chronological table of philosophical and cultural events.
History & Philosophy of Law: Basic References in English
The literature on history and philosophy of law is as interesting as it is vast; this list of references aims to provide some good points of entry into it, and some useful orientations within it, both historical and contemporary. (The aims are quality, variety and significant, not comprehensive coverage.
The beginnings of medieval and modern jurisprudence: The development of European legal thought
Dialog Campus Publisher
In this volume, I have tried to expand in four directions, starting from the field of thinned-out legal theory. In the introductory chapter, I outlined some of the basic features of the development of medieval and modern European law; in the following chapters - and this is the title of the volume - I analysed the main stages in the development of European jurisprudence over the last thousand years; finally, in the last two chapters, I attempted to summarise briefly the development of the main categories of private law dogmatics and criminal law dogmatics. The latter two openings may allow theorists of legal theory and of these two fields of law to develop common forums for discussion, thus reviving the discourses of legal philosophy/criminal law and legal philosophy/private law theory which have been extinct for many decades. It should be pointed out that this four-way opening has brought such a mass of literature into the analysis, less Hungarian than German, Anglo-American and French legal literature, that in this first round I have had to limit myself to a simple excerpt in a number of cases concerning new topics. This is particularly the case in the chapters on glossators and commentators, where I have based my writing mainly on the analyses of Hermann Lange and the Coing-Handbuch, and in the chapter on the development of private law doctrinal categories I have focused mainly on Hans Hattenhauer's monograph on this subject.