Language and Logical Pluralism: Some Aspects of a Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Nature of Logic Downloaded from (original) (raw)
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Disputatio, 2021
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus construes the nature of reasoning in a manner which sharply conflicts with the conventional wisdom that logic is normative, not descriptive of thought. For although we sometimes seem to reason incorrectly, Wittgenstein denies that we can make logical mistakes (5.473). My aim in this paper is to show that the Tractatus provides us with good reasons to rethink some of the central assumptions that are standardly made in thinking about the relation between logic and thought. In particular, the rejection of logical mistakes is to be understood in connection with Wittgenstein’s non-psychological approach to the thinking subject (5.641). On Wittgenstein’s view, inference, understanding, and meaning are holistically related; cases of defective reasoning are to be explained in terms of a defective grasp of meaning which manifests in an indeterminate use of signs. Invalid reasoning therefore does not count for Wittgenstein as a species of reasoning, but rather as the mere illusion of reasoning. The rejection of logical mistakes thus gives voice to a radical disjunctivist approach.
A Critical Relation between Mind and Logic in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein: An Analytical Study
This paper deals with the study of the nature of mind, its processes and its relations with the other filed known as logic, especially the contribution of most notable contemporary analytical philosophy Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein showed a critical relation between the mind and logic. He assumed that every mental process is logical. Mental field is field of space and time and logical field is a field of reasoning (inductive and deductive). It is only with the advancement in logic, we are today in the era of scientific progress and technology. Logic played an important role in the cognitive part or we can say in the philosophy of mind‘ that this branch is developed only because of three crucial theories i.e. rationalism, empiricism, and criticism. In this paper, it is argued that innate ideas or truth are equated with deduction and acquired truths are related with induction. This article also enhance the role of language in the makeup of the world of mind, although mind and the thought are the terms that are used by the philosophers synonymously but in this paper they are taken and interpreted differently. It shows the development in the analytical tradition subjected to the areas of mind and logic and their critical relation.
Frege on Anti-Psychologism and the Role of Logic in Thinking
2016
According to (what I call) the Explanatory Problem with Frege's Platonism about Thoughts, the sharp separation between the psychological and the logical on which Frege famously insists is too sharp, leaving Frege no resources to show how it could be legitimate to invoke logical laws in an explanation of our activities of thinking. I argue that there is room in Frege's philosophy for such justificatory explanations. To see how, we need first to correctly understand the lesson of Frege's attack on psychologism as fundamentally marking a contrast between justification and explanation, and, second, we must take Frege to be committed to the idea that the laws of truth are normatively constitutive for the process of thinking.
Catch Me If You Can – Wittgenstein on the Ineffability of Logical Form
Logic and Logical Philosophy
Logical form and logical analysis as the search for it have been introduced during the development of logic and analytical philosophy and are still widely considered as key tools or methods for the solution of philosophical puzzles. It is instructive to have a look at a criticism of these presupositions and I present Wittgenstein as the author who provides such a criticism. I present a development of his view of logical form which went from the thesis of the ineffability of logical form to the denial of the meaningfulness of the notion of logical form as such. This refusal is linked to Wittgenstein’s abandonment of the idea of the language of pure experience. The method of philosophical therapies is presented as an alternative to logical analysis and this methodology is linked with Wittgenstein’s consideration of game and family resemblance.
The central and probably most controversial point concerning the psychologism -anti-psychologism debate is the problem of Frege's alleged influence on the change in Husserl's views. Contemporary thinkers investigating the early period of Husserl's philosophy (between 1891-1895) have attempted to show that the opinion that Frege's doctrine had a traumatic influence on Husserl's views is not justified. This paper, which tries to maintain a balance between strictly philosophical argumentation and narrowly understood historical argumentation, suggests an alternative solution. By appealing to Frege's works (known by Husserl) published before 1894, the locus of psychologism will be determined. Afterwards, I will present Husserl's and Frege's views on the elucidation procedure and the distinction between calculus and 'lingua characteristica'. By discussing Husserl's works from 1894-1897, I will show that his standpoint changed dramatically as he entered into the anti-psychological program, involving a new theory of concepts, judgment, and the so-called 'pure Fregean flavour' -a new account of logical content.
1. In a passage in which he expressed his rejection of "psychologism" ("the laws of logic and arithmetic are binding for us because this is the way we think, the way our minds operate'"), Gottlob Frege, in his preface to the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, insisted that the laws of logic were eternal and immutable and that they were binding irrespective of any way people might care to think. He asked: what would we say if we found people who made judgments contrary to our logical propositions, and who did not recognize our laws of logic at all? And to this he replied:''! should say, 'Here we have a new kind of madness'whereas the psychological logician could only say, 'Here's a new kind of logic."' (p. xvi)
Wittgenstein's Tractatus and the epistemology of logic
Martin Stokhof and Hao Tang eds. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus at 100 Years, Palgrave-Macmillan
This paper discusses Wittgenstein’s early account of the epistemology of logic in relation to Frege, Russell, and Carnap. My goal is to explain how the key insight of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy of logic, captured in his slogan ‘logic takes care of itself’, enables him to solve several problems that arise for Frege’s and Russell’s philosophies and epistemologies of logic. These include problems relating to the justification of logical accounts and logical consequence, as well as to the status of logic as an a priori investigation distinct from empirical psychology. More specifically, Wittgenstein’s key insight eliminates the need to appeal in the study of logic to any allegedly self-evident truths, intuitions or substantial metaphysical knowledge regarding abstract objects. Further, his associated conception that the right way to articulate an account of logic isn’t propositions or theses, but a logical language whose design mirrors the logical structure of thought and language, puts him in a position to address what Sheffer\ called later ‘the logocentric predicament’, a difficulty that arises for what are known as universalist accounts of logic, such as those of Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein. In the last section I use the proposed interpretation to explain why the Tractatus doesn’t suffer from a paradox of nonsensical theses, contrary to how it has often been interpreted. I also outline how Wittgenstein’s use of colloquial language to introduce his logical language foreshadows Carnap’s method of logical syntax, anticipating the distinction between metalanguages and object languages in contemporary logic, and explain why Carnap’s criticisms of Wittgenstein fail.
Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic - Michael Potter
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
notice of the circumstance that many of the conceptual resources he introduces in order to make sense of Reid's apparently contradictory claims play a crucial role in precisely the theories which Reid attacks. Thus Nichols exploits the concept of habit in order to defend Reid's yes-and-no answers to the Molyneux question (pp. -), but he does not mention that habit and custom are elements which figure prominently in Hume's account of belief formation. Although it certainly makes good sense to understand Reidian sensations in terms of their life-preserving function (p. ), it needs to be pointed out that Descartes says precisely this when specifying the teleological function of the senses. Since this criticism only concerns Nichols' evaluation of Reid's account of the Way of Ideas, his book can be regarded as an excellent study of Reid's theory of perception, making innovative contributions to Reid scholarship. University of Sydney A W Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic. B M P. (Oxford UP, . Pp. xii + . Price £..) Wittgenstein's ideas concerning logic before the First World War eventually found their way to being dictated and written down in parts and at various times. There are four manuscripts together with a Summary which constitute his Notes on Logic. Potter's book offers an engaging discussion of the origins of the Notes, their composition and content, their use in Wittgenstein's Prototractatus, and their significance for understanding Wittgenstein's early philosophy. The book is comprehensive, and includes chapters on Wittgensteinian facts vs complexes, truth operations, generality, typical ambiguity, identity, the theory of judgement, the picture theory and Tractarian objects. It offers the complete text of the Notes, and features interesting new interpretations of Wittgenstein's thoughts. In this short review, I can only hope to give readers a sense of the important controversies surrounding the unique ideas of the book. There is much more to be found in its pages. Potter's history surmises (p. ) that the Notes should be understood as two distinct texts of rather different character. One consists of , and , dictated to a German stenographer in Birmingham and later translated into English by Russell. The other is Wittgenstein's commentary on the Birmingham dictation, and consists of the Summary and , written largely in English by Wittgenstein at Cambridge in his efforts to explain the Birmingham material to Russell (p. ). Potter observes that a section of the Prototractatus draws very closely on , , but never word for word from or the Summary (p. ). Potter says that 'Debates about whether one influence was greater than another are often sterile, especially when, as here, it is so evident that both [Frege and Russell] were formative and important' (p. ). But readers will readily discover that a central theme of the book (p. ) is to argue that 'most of the underlying principles which guided [the Notes] were so far from Russell's way of thinking that he never understood what they were.... These guiding principles Wittgenstein owed to Frege, not to Russell' (p. ).
The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd Edition Michael Starks, 2019
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality(mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I begin with ‘On Certainty’ and continue the analysis of recent writings by and about them from the perspective of the two systems of thought, employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) ,The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019).