Newton y el problema de la accion a distancia (English version) (original) (raw)
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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2014
This article responds to Professor Andrew Janiak's recent attempt to defend the proposition that Isaac Newton did not believe in action at a distance between bodies (or any other kind of substance) (Janiak, 2013). His argument rests on a distinction between "three concepts of causation in Newton", which leads him to conclude that although Newton did not believe in action at a distance between bodies, he was able to accept that gravity was a "distant action". I critically examine Janiak's arguments here, and the historical evidence he brings to bear upon it, and argue that Professor Janiak's latest claims do nothing to undermine the view to which he is opposed, namely, that Newton did believe in the possibility of action at a distance between bodies.
Isaac Newton's Natural Philosophy
Isis, 2002
This book is a collection of papers originally presented at a series of meetings at the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology, Cambridge, MA. The volume is in two parts. In the first, we find four essays devoted to the 'motivations and methods' of Newton's research by M. Mamiani, I. B. Cohen, A. E. Shapiro, and M. Feingold. In the second, we find five essays devoted to questions concerning celestial dynamics and rational mechanics by J. B. Brackenridge, C. Wilson, M. Nauenberg, M. Blay, and G. Smith. An appendix contains a paper by Newton's well-known biographer, Richard S. Westfall, prefaced by an appreciation honoring the late author by I. B. Cohen. The specific subjects of the essays are as wide-ranging as they are varied in argumentative style and methodology. I will not review the essays by summarizing them one by one. Some of their technical content might intimidate the reader unfamiliar with this type of historical research. So I will discuss them according to what I believe are the fundamental strengths (and a few weaknesses) of this collection, trying to keep technicalities to a minimum. My choice should by no means be taken as an implicitly judgmental approach to the book. The authors of the essays will, I hope, excuse the limited competence of the reviewer. I have grouped my comments under two broad headings, 'Methods' and 'Results'. Methods I sometimes found myself baffled while reading this book, strangely not because of the arduous mathematical notation which is frequently
Gravity and De gravitatione: the development of Newton’s ideas on action at a distance
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2011
This paper is in three sections. The first establishes that Newton, in spite of a well-known passage in a letter to Richard Bentley of 1692, did believe in action at a distance. Many readers may see this merely as an act of supererogation, since it is so patently obvious that he did. However, there has been a long history among Newton scholars of allowing the letter to Bentley to override all of Newton's other pronouncements in favour of action at a distance, with devastating effects on our understanding of related aspects of his physics and his theology. Furthermore, this misconceived scholarly endeavour shows no sign of abating. The second section then offers a historical reconstruction, based on Newton's writings, of how, when and why he began to accept actions at a distance and make them one of the cornerstones of his physics. Finally, using this chronological account of Newton's use of actions at a distance, the paper reassesses the claims of B. J. T. Dobbs that Newton's important manuscript, De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum, was written, not in the late 1660s or early 1670s as was previously supposed, but during the composition of the Principia, in 1684 or 1685.
2012
Newton's development of an ontology of force, along with a mathematical treatment of natural phenomena, had vexed both historians and philosophers of science for decades. In dealing with such a dilemma, philosophers of science and Whig historians more often than not adopt a positivist stance which stresses Newton's agnosticism towards the causation of force, and highlight some sort of positivism in his natural philosophy, thus downplaying his ontological commitments to the conundrum of causation of force. On the other hand, contextualist historians tackle that puzzle by making use whether of Newton's alchemical studies or his metaphysics of nature founded upon a voluntaristic theology, in order to assert Newton's involvement in harmonizing his mathematical physics and natural philosophy within the framework of British natural philosophy. Notwithstanding this, Newton's philosophy of mathematics, and especially his ontology of mathematical entities, remains outside the sphere of interests for both historians and philosophers of science. The aim of this thesis is to rehearse an approach to the problem of Newton's ontology of force by analyzing his ontology of mathematical entities, as deployed in the Principia, within the framework of Newton's voluntarist theology. The purpose is that of showing that within Newton's own mathematical practice we are not required to mingle levels of his epistemological discourse with his ontological assumptions as it happens in the above-mentioned approaches. By means of this analysis, it is expected, additionally, to advance our understanding of Newton's acceptance of action at a distance based upon his notion of gravity force as a superadded quality.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2011
This paper is a critical response to Hylarie Kochiras' ''Gravity and Newton's substance counting problem,'' Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (2009) 267-280. First, the paper argues that Kochiras conflates substances and beings; it proceeds to show that Newton is a substance monist. The paper argues that on methodological grounds Newton has adequate resources to respond to the metaphysical problems diagnosed by Kochiras. Second, the paper argues against the claim that Newton is committed to two speculative doctrines attributed to him by Kochiras and earlier Andrew Janiak: i) the passivity of matter and ii) the principle of local causation. Third, the paper argues that while Kochiras' (and Janiak's) arguments about Newton's metaphysical commitments are mistaken, it qualifies the characterization of Newton as an extreme empiricist as defended by Howard Stein and Rob DiSalle. In particular, the paper shows that Newton's empiricism was an intellectual and developmental achievement that built on non trivial speculative commitments about the nature of matter and space.
THE CONCEPT OF CAUSATION IN NEWTON’S MECHANICAL AND OPTICAL WORK
2007
In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficiënt causal explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that: (1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau- sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in- terventionist one. (2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe- nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly- ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani- cist one.